Embassy of the GDR in the Republic of Cuba, 'Draft of a Concept for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba from 24 to 26 January 1968'

Embassy of the GDR in the Republic of Cuba

Havana, February 3, 1968

Dr. Nau/Wi

Draft of a concept for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba from 24 to 26 January 1968

I.          Basic starting point

1. The year 1964 was marked by two extraordinarily positive steps in foreign policy:

- Fidei Castro's second trip to the USSR in the spring of 1964, combined with the signing of the well-known joint communiqué.

- The meeting of the fraternal parties of Latin America in Havana at the end of November / beginning of December 1964 with the decision to hold such meetings every two years.

2.         - In the spring of 1965, the PURS took part in the consultative meeting of the 18 fraternal parties in Moscow.

- In October, the PURS was renamed the Communist Party of Cuba, and the Central Committee was formed.

At this point, an accelerated course begins towards the development of an own ideological-political and theoretical platform; the elaboration of an own strategy and tactics for the so-called Third World, especially for Latin America (Tricontinental - OLAS).

- At the same time, there was an increased economic orientation towards capitalist countries, particularly France, Spain and England.

3. The pivotal point for the considerations of the Cuban leadership was the concern to secure the existence of socialist Cuba against the expected attacks of US imperialism. The fragmentation of the forces of US imperialism into "2, 3 Vietnams" in Latin America, 

(p. 1)

brought about by the continental revolution and triggered by the guerrilla struggle, is one of the decisive tactical considerations. The victory of the Latin American revolution, planned for 1970, would have at the same time largely compensated for the unsatisfactory internal development, especially in the national economy and in the supply of the population.

4. - The death of " Che " Guevara was the visible expression of the defeat of the Cuban conception of Latin America. In this situation, the objective possibility of a gradual correction of the OLAS line existed for a time. A temporary restraint in foreign policy was evident.

- In terms of domestic politics, the leadership apparently came to the conclusion that the revolution only had 2-3 years left until 1970 in order to achieve at least a certain domestic political stabilization and to solve the most urgent supply problems, given the hopelessness of the revolution's victory on the continent. The CPC increasingly took a course towards a certain mass line (poder local, tribunales popular, planes de eficiencia etc.) and on the solution of economic tasks, especially in agriculture, with the aim of increasing export production and solving internal supply problems (planes especiales, brigadas invader, cordon de Habana).

5.         With Fidel Castro’s speech at the end of the Cultural Congress on 11 January 1968, clarity was finally created:

- The Cuban leadership is resolutely pursuing its foreign policy and ideological-political course of exporting the revolution, regardless of the defeat in Bolivia, while forcing its demarcation from the majority of communist and workers' parties and at the same time approaching all forces, regardless of their ideology and philosophy, that are prepared to support the main Cuban line.

(p. 2)

- The domestic political and economic course is being continued out of objective necessity, with the increasing transfer of so-called "guerrilla methods" to productive work. The tendency to strengthen military and paramilitary management methods in administration and production continues.

II. The Significance of the Central Committee Plenum

1.         The so-called microfraction:

- Characterization of the political and social composition of the so-called micro-faction, in particular the 9 "leading" members...

(presented orally by Comrade Kulitzka)

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- The aim of the majority of the supporters of this "microfraction" was to defend the ideology and theories of Marxism-Leninism against the growing and dominant influence of petty-bourgeois nationalist, ultra-left, Trotskyist and other views within the CPC.

- The best elements made repeated attempts to constructively criticize the policies of the CPC leadership, particularly in questions of policy towards Latin America and the fraternal Latin American parties, relations with the USSR and other socialist fraternal countries, and fundamental questions of building socialism (planning, observance of economic laws, the role of the working class and trade unions in the development of socialist production relations, the role of material stimuli, etc.).

- In achieving their goals, some methods were used which objectively gave F. Castro the opportunity to condemn this political grouping inside and outside the CPC as factionalists and thus as enemies of the party (secret meetings and consultations, attempts to obtain confidential documents and information, contacts with representatives of sister parties, attempts to bring documents with the platform of the flu abroad - especially into the hands of the CPSU, etc.).

- The integrity and political honesty of the group was particularly seriously questioned by the obvious personal ambitions of Aníbal Escalante and by his undignified "self-critical" behavior after his arrest.

- Apart from A. Escalante's possible personal desire for power, the group did not seek to change the political balance of power or to take power itself. Objectively speaking, it had no opportunity to do so, since, with the exception of a former deputy minister, it did not include any officials in leading positions. This group was therefore completely harmless and insignificant as a power factor for FC.

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2. Why was the micro-faction settled?

What would be the objective of the Cuban leadership?

- Starting from the fact that the "micro-faction" does not represent any dangerous political power factor, the answer must be sought in the overall ideological and political situation of the CPC.

The ideological ambiguity and confusion within the party, including the functional body, is apparently so great that the questions and arguments of the micro-fraction found an echo that was dangerous for the course of F. Castro (evidence: Hart - Llanusa, attitude, "Theoria y Practica", row over "Revolucion y cultura" (Serguera), dissolution of the party schools, dissolution of "editoria politica").

- In order to maintain the appearance of a unified position of the Central Committee, the excluded Central Committee members Matar and Calcines were not condemned as micro-factionists - despite corresponding connections and (probably) participation!

- The inner objective:

a)         Elimination of any discussion about the party line. Suppression of any (even constructive) criticism of the policy of the "lider maximo". The reckoning and exemplary punishment creates an atmosphere of intimidation and unconditional subordination of all party members as well as non-party state and economic officials.

b)         It was made clear that any critical statement against Cuban party and government policy would be condemned as anti-party and could result in repressive measures.

c) It is possible to hold members of the micro-fraction (e.g. from Fruticuba, Ministry of Raw materials industry [Grundstoffindustrie], etc.) responsible for certain economic difficulties or supply problems.

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4. In the interest of the "own" line, a renewed sharp discrimination against the socialist countries (especially the USSR) among the population is achieved, thus promoting mistrust and distance from the socialist brother countries of Europe and their representatives.

- External objective:

1. To date, the clearest absolute ideological-political and theoretical demarcation from the majority of communist and workers' parties, with a clear formulation of one's own "independent" line.

2. The existence and activities of the micro-faction serve as indirect, substantial evidence for the non-participation of the CPC in the Consultative Meeting and the World ­Conference.

3. The attempt to accuse the leaderships of fraternal parties of ­collusion and complicity with the micro- ­faction can - while emphasizing the (unquestioned) political independence of Cuba - only be viewed as an ineffective attempt to pressure them to continue to secure the vital support and aid of the socialist countries.

4. It postulates the "right and duty" of CPC to criticize the policies of the socialist countries and the communist and workers' parties whose positions differ from those of the CPC, while at the same time ­claiming exclusive possession of the only correct revolutionary theory and practice.

5. The "unmasking" of the micro-faction is the continuation of the so-called revolutionary criticism of the supposedly outdated theses of Marxism-Leninism in the direction of "Fidelism" as a pseudo-scientific, pseudo-revolutionary, eclectic-pragmatic mixture of petty-bourgeois ultra-left adventurism , nationalist arrogance, Trotskyist and Chinese views and Western European so- ­called "neo-Marxist" theories.

(p. 6)

3. On the methodology of the debate in the plenary session:

- The forces belonging to the "micro-faction" within the CPC and the representatives of socialist countries with whom they came into contact were treated from the outset as class enemies using the operational means of the security organs, with the aim of exposing these people as "enemies" or "making them look stupid" (primary example: Schreiber - Fernandez).

- Brotherly Socialist countries were cynically exposed without a single attempt being made to draw the attention of the sister parties to possible mistakes made by individual members and to warn them.

On the contrary, certain fraternal parties were directly identified with the actions of individual representatives (e.g. CPC).

- In particular, the references to the activities of advisers of the USSR in the area of the Ministry of the Interior (especially security organs) bring the socialist countries and their allegedly anti-Cuban activities (according to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez) on a par with the subversive activities of US imperialism and its organs (CIA).

-           The pathetic attitude of A. Escalante enabled the Cuban leadership to choose the demagogic method of presentation. The "self-criticism" and the attempts to ingratiate themselves with the arrested Escalante, which were published verbatim, spared the Cuban leadership from having to really deal with the arguments and questions of the micro-faction.

4. On the role of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez:

-           CRR's role as an informant has become even clearer through its published statement (example CSSR).

-           CRR was forced by the leadership of the CPC to follow its path to the end (publication statement).

(p. 7)

- In its statement, CRR tried to continue to play up the impression of being a "mediator" who is concerned about both the unity of the CPC and the honor of the former Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) [SVP].

- In reality, CRR provided real support:

a)         Through his "examples" he helped to characterize the microfraction as degenerate, partly antisocial and immoral elements.

b)         He set the criteria for the relationship between Cuba and the USSR

c)         He demanded measures to prevent the "anti-Cuban" activities of representatives of socialist countries, ie he assumes that there is such planned activity on our part!

III. The role of GDR representatives in the "revelations" of Raúl Castro

1. Embassy contacts:

to the convicted - especially to the 9 main culprits; evaluation of these contacts - Comrade Kulitzka.

2. The role of the central delegations:

-           The activities of comrades Hockart and Kögler beyond their actual tasks are a fact (see Möbus' role as language mediator at Kögler's request).

-           The existence of an alleged letter from Hockart.

-           The alleged repeated references to Kögler and Schreiber as "trusted persons in all matters".

3. The Schreiber Case:

-           Comrade Schreiber of the Central Committee of our party was officially commissioned by the CPC CC to handle the party printing press.

-           Task performed completely correctly.

Attempt by O. Fernandez (OF) to explain internal matters and have them forwarded to Hockart was received without comment by Comrade Schreiber. Proof of transcript and pathetic "argument" in the Raúl Castro’s [RC] report

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- O. F. officially appointed as liaison officer of the CC of the CPK.

- From Raúl Castro’s presentation it can be seen that OF was already being processed operationally at the time of nomination, ie deliberately assigned to Schreiber.

- Nevertheless, consider that work as a clerk is difficult because of fear of contact and connections with him.

IV. Some initial conclusions

1. With the plenum and the subsequent process, we believe that a certain stage of the CPC's development has been completed. The complete ideological and political demarcation from our parties is, in our opinion, the beginning of a new "quality", at least in the relations between the Communist Party of Cuba and our parties.

The time has obviously come when we must respond appropriately to the policies of the Cuban party leadership if we do not want to encourage the local leadership to carry out further "blows".

At the very least, the recent experiences gained by the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR and (in connection with the cancellation of the Zhivkov visit) the Bulgarian comrades in particular should lead to a previously unseen level of coordination and agreement on the shaping of relations with Cuba.

2. Until now we have assumed that we could, to a certain extent, positively influence the policies of the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba through our practical conduct, through our constant generosity, particularly in economic matters, through the presentation of our policies and our experiences, through consultations and talks at higher levels. The plenary session made it clear that the Cuban leadership considers its line to be unchangeable and is not prepared to discuss it. It is of the opinion that there is no common language with us, no understanding on the issues that it considers to be the fundamental questions of its strategy and tactics.

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This gives rise to the need to review our concepts in the political and economic fields. Both the political measures we have planned (e.g. visits at a higher level) and the basic concept of the negotiations with CRR must at least be reconsidered.

4.         The message: assumes, first of all, that nothing will change in the basic line of development of state relations. We show neither guilt nor fearful reticence in carrying out our tasks, without engaging in any form of discussion on the plenary session.

This line has proven successful (press conference, army day, etc.). It is up to the Cuban side to make any corrections to their behavior towards us and to limit or cancel planned measures.

5.         A thorough study of the materials available leads us to a number of conclusions for the internal work of the Embassy, which are not new in general, but are often underestimated in practice. The conclusions for ideological-political and organizational vigilance and security will be the subject of service and work meetings, including a review of the deployment or reduction of Cuban personnel, particularly within the office building.

6.         It is to be assumed that the Cuban side will draw conclusions for stricter control and monitoring measures in order to complete the institutionalization process of the revolution in this area too. We are thinking of a strong restriction of the direct contacts with leading Cuban personalities that have been possible up to now, for which there have been no restrictions, more effective control of the previously unlimited travel ability [sic, Reisefähigkeit], and possible complications in the area of foreign information.

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So far, there is no evidence for this.

Dr. Naumann

ambassador

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