Skip to content

July 2, 1950

Incoming Cable No. 19413, Roschin to the Central Committee

[handwritten in the upper right-hand corner:

N 5536/sh sh]



Strictly Secret


Copy Nº 1 LAYOUT

Copy Nº 2 to Stalin

Copy Nº 3 to Stalin

Copy Nº 4 to Molotov

Copy Nº 5 to Malenkov

Copy Nº 6 to Beria

Copy Nº 7 to Mikoyan

Copy Nº 8 to Kaganovich

Copy Nº 9 to Bulganin

Copy Nº 10 to Vyshinsky

Copy Nº 11 to Gromyko

Copy Nº 12 copy


from PEKING Nº 19413 at 0700 2 July 1950

Copy Nº 3


19419 19420 19421 19422


Spets NºNº 1122-1126





On 2 July I visited Zhou Enlai at his invitation. Zhou Enlai informed me of the following:


1. On 1 July Indian Ambassador in the PRC Panikkar visited Zhang Hanfu and informed him that the government of India was concerned about the events in Korea and was taking some steps for these events to be localized and for the question of Korea to be solved peacefully. When he said this Panikkar pointed out that the Indian government sees the achievement of a peaceful solution of this question in its discussion in the UN. Consequently the Indian government thinks it is first of all necessary for these purposes to seek the PRC’s participation in the UN and, accordingly, the return of the Soviet Union to the UN. This point of view of the government of India, noted Panikkar, is shared by the governments of Britain and Egypt.


Thus, said Panikkar, in the event of the PRC government’s agreement the government of India could introduce its proposals for the discussion of UN members. Zhang Hanfu promised Panikkar to report what was presented to the PRC government.


Then Zhou Enlai reported that he had discussed this question with Mao Zedong. Their opinion came down to the following:


a) the PRC should be in the UN, forcing the Kuomintang government out of there.


b) the PRC government agrees that India or any other country facilitate recognition of the PRC by the UN.


c) the question of the PRC’s participation in the UN should not be mixed with the question of the events in Korea. These are different questions, and they should be solved each in their own turn.


d) after recognition of the PRC by the UN, the PRC government agrees to discuss any questions within the UN’s competence and provided by its Charter.


[Translator’s note: the following paragraph was highlighted in the left margin:] Then Zhou Enlai reported that the PRC government would like to make a statement that it considers the decision adopted by the Security Council on the Korean question illegal since this decision was adopted without the PRC and USSR and was actually instigated by the US.


Zhou Enlai asked the above be conveyed to the Soviet government and to find out its point of view on this question by way of consultation. Zhou Enlai added that practical steps would be taken by the Chinese government after receiving a reply from the Soviet government, which it would like to receive as rapidly as possible. I promised to immediately report this to the Soviet government.


Referring to Reuters information about a meeting of the British Ambassador in the USSR allegedly taking place with the head of the USSR MFA’s European Department, Zhou Enlai casually asked the substance of their conversation. I replied that I did not yet know anything of this. Zhou Enlai asked [me] to inform him about the substance of the conversation if it touched on questions of interest to them.


[Translator’s note: the following paragraph was highlighted in the left margin:] 2. Then Zhou Enlai pointed out that during the discussion with Mao Zedong of the military situation which had developed in Korea they had made the following assessment, which he requested also be reported to the Soviet government.


The Americans of the 120,000 occupation troops in Japan might send a maximum of up to 60,000, or three divisions to Korea, augmented by various troops arms. The landing of these troops might be made at the ports of: Fusan [Busan], Masan, and Makpho [sic]. After the landing of the troops they will be able to move north along the main rail lines.


These groups of Americans should be met at the approaches to Taejon, Kymchen [sic], and Daegu. The forces of North Korean should advance to the south more rapidly for these purposes and seize these points.


At the same time a sufficiently strong blocking force capable of not permitting a possible landing of the Americans in Chemulpo [Incheon] and their advance on Seoul should be located in the region of Chemulpo to cover Seoul.


Based on the above Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai think that the operations in Korea might be drawn out. In reply to my question, does the Chinese government have any information about the recruitment of Japanese into expeditionary units for Korea, Zhou Enlai replied that there is as yet no such information, however the possibility is not excluded of a recruitment of volunteers from among officers of the former Japanese Army. Zhou Enlai added that in the event of the Americans crossing the 38th parallel [Translator’s note: most of the rest of the paragraph was highlighted in the left margin] Chinese troops under the guise of Korean units will undertake volunteer actions against the Americans. The Chinese command is concentrating three armies of nine divisions with a total strength of 120,000 men in the area of Mukden for this purpose. Zhou Enlai expressed confidence that these Chinese units would be able to cope with the ground forces of the Americans, but they would need air cover. This cover is non-existent at the present time. Zhou Enlai asked [me] to find out whether there was a possibility of creating such protection by the air forces of the USSR. The Chinese friends would like to get a reply from the Soviet government about this question.


Then Zhou Enlai asked [me] to pass on that recently Soviet aircraft, which were not at first identified by Chinese ground units and which were taken by them as American, appeared over the territory of Manchuria in the region of Mudanjiang and other points. It would be desirable to get timely information about possible flights to warn air defense units to avoid misunderstandings.


Touching on the American intervention in the events in Korea Zhou Enlai noted that, from their point of view, the Korean comrades underestimated the possibility of American armed intervention. Back last year during a conversation between the Korean friends and Mao Zedong the latter noted that they needed to take into consideration the possibility of an armed intervention by the Americans. Then during a meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung this May he again directed Kim Il Sung’s attention to this fact. However, Kim Il Sung replied to Mao Zedong that American armed intervention was hardly possible.


I request instructions.


2 July 1950 ROSHCHIN


12 copies me

printed 2/July 1510

distributed 1620 2 July Authenticated by [illegible signature]

issued [by] Plotnikov and Abramkin


Roschin tells the CC of his meeting with Zhou Enlai, in which they discussed talks with the Indian ambassador over maneuvering at the UN, and over the possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea against American forces.

Document Information


RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 334, ll.0074-0078. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg.


The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date



Record ID