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April 3, 1979

Information about the Results of the Official Friendly Visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of This Year)

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about the results of the official friendly visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of this year)


During the visit to India A. N. Kosygin, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU took into account the peculiarities of the situation that has recently developed in Asia, India's positions in connection with Beijing's expansionist policies, and the proven practice of high-level meetings with Indian representatives.


The main results of the visit were reflected in the joint Soviet-Indian communiqué published on 16 March 1979.


The meetings and talks of A. N. Kosygin with the Prime Minister, M. Desai, with the President [Neelam Sanjiva] Reddy, with the Vice-President [Basaapa Danappa] Jatti (?), with the Deputy Prime Ministers [Jagjivan] Ram and [Charan] Singh, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vajpayee and other Indian politicians were used to strengthen and develop the friendly Soviet-Indian relations, to influence the attitude of the Government of India to current international problems in the interest of the countries of the socialist community.


In discussing the issues of Soviet-Indian relations, it was reaffirmed that they were developing on the basis of the Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971) and that a special contribution to their development had been made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973 and the visit of the Prime Minister of India, Desai, to the Soviet Union in October 1977.


All Indian interlocutors emphasized that despite the change of political leadership in India by the takeover of power by the Janata Party, the course towards the development of cooperation and friendly relations with the Soviet Union remains unchanged.


In the course of the negotiations it was stated that the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government had a positive view of the development of Soviet-Indian cooperation and that we intended to do everything in our power to strengthen friendly relations and cooperation with India in the political, economic, trade, scientific-technical, cultural and defense fields.


M. Desai made it quite clear that his government was not prepared to develop relations with other countries, including the USA and China, at the expense of stable and multi-level relations with the Soviet Union. These assurances were confirmed by concrete agreements reached during the visit to deepen and perfect Soviet-Indian cooperation in various areas.


Several documents were signed: a long-term programme of economic, commercial and scientific and technical cooperation for a period of 10-15 years, an agreement on cooperation in the field of health and medical science, a protocol on cultural exchange for the years 1979-1980 and an agreement on certain reciprocal supplies of various goods in 1979.


In the context of India's interest in the development of the nuclear industry, we have expressed our willingness to cooperate with India in the peaceful use of nuclear energy on the basis of the Agreement signed on 22 January 1979 and in full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the requirements of IAEA.


The Indian representatives raised some questions concerning the supply of new military technology, which BIE justified with the need to consolidate the country's defense readiness in the face of China's increasing aggressiveness and the deterioration of the situation in Southeast Asia. In a positive sense, we agreed to examine India's specific requests in this area.


The discussion of international problems highlighted the consistency and stability of the Soviet peace policy, the essence of which had been reiterated in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech on March 2 this year, and the willingness of the Soviet Union to develop cooperation with India in the world arena and to coordinate foreign policy views and actions.


Questions concerning Beijing's foreign policy course were discussed comprehensively. A principal assessment of the Chinese aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was given, and the necessity to further activate the actions in defense of Vietnam was underlined. It was stated that it would be wrong to consider the situation as a local issue, that the continuation of the current line in Chinese policy would be a very serious threat to all countries bordering China.


What can be seen from the talks in Delhi, the Indian leadership is seriously concerned about China's efforts to consolidate its positions in the world through a merger with the imperialist states, especially the USA and Japan, and to realize its hegemonic plans in Asia. Distrust and caution towards China are firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Indian people, the Indian politicians, the intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie. M. Desai explained the following: "It is difficult to deal with the Chinese because they are not willing to listen to the voice of reason and because the only language they understand is the language of violence.


President Reddy said in an interview that the Indian people and their overwhelming majority share the Soviet Union's position on today's events in Indochina, condemn China as an aggressor and demand its withdrawal from the territory of Vietnam.


With these sentiments in mind, a formulation was included in the joint communiqué stating that both sides, after discussing the situation arising in Southeast Asia in connection with China's large-scale armed invasion of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, demand the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam.


In the spirit of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech as of March 2 this year, the Indian side was informed about the state of Soviet-US relations, including the question of the conclusion of the preparation of an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The Prime Minister of India stated that the importance of a Soviet-US meeting at the highest level and the signing of an agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments cannot be underestimated and the Government of India will warmly welcome it. M. Desai repeatedly emphasized India's interest in improving Soviet-American relations.


The negotiations reconfirmed that the positions of the Soviet Union and India on such issues are consistent with, or close to the current international situation, such as the consolidation of peace and security, the elimination of sources of tension and the prevention of the threat of war, the consolidation of the process of easing tensions in Europe and the extension of this strategy to other regions of the world, including Asia, as well as on fundamental issues of disarmament.


At the same time, the Indian approach to these problems included an effort to avoid formulations in the joint communiqué that could complicate India's position in the movement of non-aligned states.


The negotiations have shown that India remains in the non-aligned position, but continues to show considerable interest in developing multilevel relations with the Soviet Union, which are seen in Delhi as a strong counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia.


Under these conditions, the inclusion of India in the left-wing - the movement of non-alignment, the winning of positions that take progressive orientation in this movement of Cuba, Vietnam and other countries - becomes an increasingly urgent task. Summing up the negotiations, meetings and talks that had taken place, the Prime Minister of India declared: "India and the Soviet Union are united by close friendship and this friendship is constantly strengthening. Our friendship is such that between India and the Soviet Union there is no possibility of misunderstanding in any matter whatsoever".


Desai's assessment of the status of Soviet-Indian relations was also confirmed by us. In attaching a certain importance to such assurances by the Indian head of government, however, one must not ignore the fact that there are also opponents of Soviet-Indian cooperation in the current Indian leadership who tend towards the West and join pro-American and anti-Soviet forces. On the whole, however, it is quite obvious that the ideas of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union have had deep roots in India for more than 30 years. They correspond to the national interests of India.


In India one cannot help but realize that weakening relations of our country with the other socialist countries, would inevitably lead to a weakening of India's international positions, especially in Asia, and would reduce India's possibilities in solving the tasks of overcoming the country's economic backwardness.


A. N. Kosygin met with representatives of the leadership of the Communist Party of India [Chandra] R. Rao and [P. K. Vasudevan] Nair (?) together and informed them on the content of the negotiations with Mr. Desai. There was an exchange of information on the activities of the two brother parties to the realization of the XXV Congress of the CPSU and the XI Congress of the Party.


The Indian comrades of the CPI decided to perform their tasks, and they highly appreciated the results of comrade A. N. Kosygin's trip to India from the point of view of consolidating peace in Asia, mobilizing efforts to fight against China's aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, further developing the Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation, and supporting the left and democratic forces of India.


During the reception at the Soviet Embassy in Delhi, Comrade A. N. Kosygin had a short conversation with the former Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi.


We believe that the results of Comrade Kosygin's trip to India will have a positive influence on the further development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community with India.


This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.


Document Information


SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/13941.


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