August 8, 1974
Inter-Ministerial Meeting on Procurement of German NPP Exports of 1200 to 2400 Megawatt to Iran with Enriched Uranium on 8 August 1974 1974 (15:00 to 17:30 hours) in the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Attendance List of [11] participants
Name - Ministerial Rank - Ministry
[Federal Ministry for Research and Technology: 5 participants]
[Foreign Office: 2 participants]
[Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs: 4 participants]
Inter-ministerial meeting on procurement of German NPP[1] exports of 1200 to 2400 Megawatt [MW] to Iran with enriched uranium on 8 August 1974 (15:00 to 17:30 hours) in the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology.
Results in Notes
1. Problem: In light of the competitive international situation- especially with regards to the United Staes and France - NPP exports are only possible still with simultaneous guarantees of fuel procurement with enriched uranium. Current in this context are first the NPP offer to Iran (1200 to 2400 MW) and later - but also during this year - to Brazil (4000 to 6000 MW). The enrichment resources can currently - if at all - only be procured from the USSR.
- KWU[2] should - and will - try that in the case of Iran (2400 MW maximum). Natural uranium for the feed one can buy on the world market, albeit for high prices.
- If an according agreement between KWU and a Soviet partner (Techsnabexport[3]) materializes, KWU will still need - also because of demands by Iran - a material, not financial, reinsurance in form of a guarantee statement by the Federal Government.
- This is - if at all - possible only indirect with or via URENCO[4]; since at the time in question - and which is a critical one! - around 1980 only URENCO will dispose of the required material, which by the way is currently guaranteed by the German offset supplies.
- Additional purchases for the critical period around 1980 are hardly possible with the USAEC.[5] Even the signing of prepared delivery agreements for about 10 Gigawatt [GW] of planned German NPP is, as of recently, at least partially in doubt, or it is possible only with significantly more uncertain conditions.
- Therefore indirectly also the danger of a growing dependency on the USSR in the vital energy sector is increasing:
- This dependency will look in the critical period around 1980 as of today like this:
- For Uranium 235 by 40 percent
- For electric energy by overall maximum 10 percent
In case of a (potential) realization of the project NPP Königsberg[6], the latter will increase by about 10 percent, and in case of a realization of the Iran project (4 times 600 MW maximum) by additional 2 percent maximum –
Overall this means a maximum increase in dependency from 3 percent to 13 percent maximum.
- This risk appears to be acceptable for the following reasons:
- In quantitative terms it [increase in dependency] is comparatively low
- After 1982, when the URENCO production will set in and the first nuclear loads are completed, it will strongly decrease
- Except for certain financial losses, the nuclear component will have an effect only about 2 years after a presumable shut off
- The centrifugal capacity of URENCO can, if necessary, be increased very quickly after 1980 (question of investment of capital)
- This has to occur anyways, if the existing, respectively still planned, agreements with the USAEC would not be honored respectively would no longer materialize. (In this case an additional shut off from the side of the USSR would be no fundamental aspect anymore to an anyways bad situation)
3. Procedure
If the Iran enterprise, given these circumstances, is supposed to come about, then
- first the leaderships (State Secretary level) from the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, Foreign Office, and Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs will have to agree in principle, based on according drafts for approval of a respective guarantee by the Federal Government
- In negotiations between KWU and the AEOI[7] a suitable (and legally acceptable!) form for this guarantee has to be figured out (maybe our guarantee to KWU!)
- If required, also EC[8] (EURATOM[9]) approval process [need to be] started
Before all that, the Federal Government can at best make good-will-statements and KWU has to work at its own respectively Iranian risk.
Signed Ma(rkus) 8/8 [1974]
[RD, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology]
[1] Nuclear power plants.
[2] Deutsche Kraftwerksunion (“German Power Plant Union”). Subsidiary of Siemens and AEG Corporations for nuclear power plant construction.
[3] A Soviet technology export enterprise under the Soviet Union's Foreign Trade Ministry, from 1975 independent state company.
[4] “Uranium Enrichment Company”, a British-German-Dutch nuclear fuel consortium.
[5] United States Atomic Energy Commission.
[6] In Bavaria, (West) Germany, 100 kilometers North of Nuremberg.
[7] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
[8] European Community.
[9] European Atomic Energy Community.
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