From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Memorandum of the Conversation with Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger, 19 April 1975'

In. No. 01355
5 June 1975

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION 

with the Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger

19 April 1975

On the morning of Saturday, 19 April, I was invited by Kissinger for what he claimed to be an urgent matter. 

First. Kissinger stated that he had received an urgent assignment from President Ford, who asked to convey to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev the following oral message regarding Vietnam affairs:

“Oral message:

The President urgently requests the attention of General Secretary Brezhnev to the following.

Over the past three years, Soviet-American relations have developed based on the Basic Principles adopted in May 1972 and primarily on the principle of restraint. The situation in Vietnam has now reached a point where the United States and the Soviet Union must consider the long-term consequences of the international situation as a whole. It would be of little benefit to discuss the origins of the current situation or the parties responsible for it.

In light of the current situation, our primary focus is to create controlled conditions that would save lives and facilitate the safe evacuation of American citizens and South Vietnamese individuals for whom we have a direct and special responsibility. This can only be accomplished through a temporary ceasefire.

            We urgently request the Soviet Government to utilize their good offices to facilitate a temporary cessation of hostilities. In this regard, we are prepared to engage in discussions concerning the unique political conditions that could enable this. We anticipate a response as soon as possible.”

Upon reviewing the message, I addressed Kissinger directly with a series of clarifying questions, through which he provided the following explanations of the President’s oral message:

1. Ford’s message is essentially a request of the President to reach out to L.I. Brezhnev to employ his good offices “for the ultimate resolution of the entire Vietnam tragedy.”

2. This is a specific request, the President is not extending similar outreach to anyone else. He is not extending the same outreach to the Chinese, based on the fact that, while he wants to have normal relations with Beijing in principle, the actual influence and capabilities of China to impact global events are vastly different and incomparable to those of the Soviet Union. The USSR and the USA stand as the key players determining the course of global events on a worldwide scale.

3. The White House has made the final decision to fully evacuate all Americans from South Vietnam, as well as those South Vietnamese for whom the USA has specific obligations.

            4. The evacuation is proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace. However, Soviet “surface-to-air” (SAM) missiles have been spotted in the vicinity of Saigon, which are currently being supplied by the North Vietnamese from North Vietnam. We, in the U.S. government, understand that the Soviet side is not responsible for these missile transfers or their potential use. However, there is strong emotional tension within the USA currently, and if the North Vietnamese were to use the Soviet missiles to shoot down one or more American planes conducting urgent evacuation, the right-wing groups in the USA would likely blame the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, whether justified or not.

The White House is concerned about this situation and would like to confidentially bring this information to the attention of the General Secretary. Furthermore, if the North Vietnamese obstruct the ongoing evacuation, the President will be forced to deploy his armed forces and aviation and may even conduct retaliatory strikes.

5. The United States is proposing an immediate ceasefire for a period of two weeks to allow for the completion of the aforementioned evacuation. 

During this time frame, the U.S. government commits to strict obligations of refraining from providing any military aid or equipment to the authorities in Saigon.

6. To assist in evacuating Americans from Saigon, the U.S. government is emphasizing its intention to send only a small contingent of troops – a few hundred marines essential for “crowd control of South Vietnamese” at the designated airfields for the evacuation. Following the evacuation’s completion (within a two-week timeframe at most), “no American soldier will remain on Vietnamese soil.”

7. In the meantime, the U.S. government will take steps to ensure that there is an administration in Saigon “capable of engaging in negotiations.” After the initial two-week period, the U.S. government will be ready to proceed in one of the two directions:

- Convene a new session of the Paris Conference to address the challenges presented by the evolving situation in South Vietnam, aiming to establish peace and a legitimate government that fits the necessary criteria;

- Alternatively, explore other avenues (other than the Paris Conference) for establishing some form of a coalition government in South Vietnam, focusing on a neutral policy approach.

8. When asked how he would summarize their current stance on Vietnamese affairs, Kissinger remarked, “We are being realists in addressing the final phase of the ongoing Vietnamese tragedy. For us (the U.S. Government), the primary objective now is to navigate towards a situation where we (the Administration) can have a solid exit strategy from this tragedy, minimizing unnecessary losses, casualties, and emotional turmoil within the U.S. A ceasefire is pivotal in achieving these goals, affording the U.S. Government ability to mitigate backlash from the right factions within the country opposed to the détente policy, given the sobering reality – regardless of who was right or wrong from the beginning – impacting the U.S. national pride concerning current developments in 'the events in Southeast Asia.”

            Overall, the conversation with Kissinger gives a fairly clear impression that the Ford Administration, despite all its rhetoric and disputes with the Congress, has now concluded that Thieu’s regime cannot be saved and that it is urgently necessary to find a dignified — from the perspective of the Administration’s prestige — way out of the Vietnamese quagmire.

The decision was significantly hastened by mounting apprehensions that any delays in evacuating Americans (as well as their key associates) could potentially lead to casualties or the capture of Americans, which would result in a significant “trust crisis” in the Ford Administration amongst the populace, both currently and in upcoming presidential elections.

In this emotionally charged atmosphere in the United States, the Administration may consider taking bold actions, should the situation mentioned unfold. It is important to highlight that in congressional committees, both in the Senate and the House of Representatives, votes have already been cast in favor of authorizing Ford to deploy U.S. armed forces for the evacuation of not only Americans but also certain South Vietnamese collaborators.

Vietnamese friends should keep all of this in mind. 

From the perspective of the interests of the liberation forces, it seems most beneficial not to engage the Americans in armed combat at the last moment but to allow them to leave completely. Furthermore, even if Saigon forces try to use this two-week period to regroup their forces, it will undoubtedly be overshadowed by the huge demoralizing factor of the complete departure of Americans and, along with them, the upper ranks of the Saigon regime.

In terms of specifically our, i.e. Soviet-American, relations, if the Ford administration is permitted to scramble out of Vietnam within a two-week period (essentially surrendering but with some cosmetic touches), we will emerge as the winners, once again demonstrating to the Administration (and consequently to the entire world) that no major international issues can be resolved without the participation of the Soviet Union, let alone by bypassing it. 

Kissinger, on behalf of the President, closed by expressing hope that L.I. Brezhnev would consider it possible to offer support and communicate pertinent perspectives to Hanoi and the North Vietnamese leadership.

Kissinger concluded by saying that he had canceled his trip to Latin America and urged for Moscow’s response to be conveyed to him “at any time of day or night” to ensure an immediate update for President Ford.

            Second. During my meeting with Kissinger, I asked him about how to interpret the ongoing reports in the American press regarding U.S. authorities taking steps to resume work on raising the sunken submarine, although he, Kissinger, had previously given assurances on behalf of the U.S. government that this would not happen. 

Kissinger responded that they could not do anything about speculation in the press on this matter, but he wanted to once again confirm, on behalf of the United States government, the assurances previously provided in the most emphatic manner.

Kissinger also mentioned that the previous year, the bodies of six deceased Soviet sailors from the sunken submarine were discovered. These sailors were laid to rest at sea following maritime traditions. The names of three of these deceased sailors were identified from the preserved documents, and this information will be shared with us next week. The identities of the other three deceased sailors could not be established.

            Third. During the meeting with Kissinger, I expressed my regret about their response regarding Cyprus. I presented relevant arguments and some other examples concerning the principled nature of our approach, including the possibility of a joint Soviet-American initiative.

Kissinger tried to justify their position by reasoning that it is difficult for them to invite the Soviet side to act jointly on an issue that impacts the interests of two of their allies – NATO member states. “After all, you would not agree to our joint participation in resolving a dispute that could arise between two of your allies, members of the Warsaw Pact, would you?” he stated.

I refuted this “argumentation”, emphasizing that the Cyprus issue primarily concerns Cyprus itself, a sovereign, neutral state that does not belong to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. We need to jointly assist this country in accordance with the UN Charter to shield it from continued external interference that threatens the very existence of the state, I said. It is not by chance that the UN is involved in the Cyprus issue, rightly considering that the ongoing crisis poses a threat to international peace and security.

            After some discussion, Kissinger stated that he is willing to revisit this issue with me again in approximately a week when his deputy Hartman returns from his trip to Turkey and Greece. He mentioned that, in general, he does not dismiss the possibility of reaching an agreement with us on coordinated actions in relation to Cyprus, albeit discreetly without significant public attention.

In conclusion, he mentioned that he anticipates a comprehensive reevaluation of the entire Cyprus matter during his upcoming meeting with A.A. Gromyko next month.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE USA

(A. DOBRYNIN)

Printed 2 copies eg
1 – USA Desk of the MFA of the USSR
2 – to file

No. 683
28 May 1975 

08.11 – 10 - 12

14.11 – 13 – 17