Skip to content

November 23, 1958

Journal Entry of Ambassador Volkov: Conversation with Djuanda


From the journal of

with Prime Minister DJUANDA
20 November 1958


Copy #1

Iskh. #227/ss
23 November 1958

Today, according to prior arrangement, I visited Prime Minister Djuanda.

As we had agreed with him during our first meeting (see R.M. Volkov's meeting of 13 November), I relayed to Djuanda the official invitation to visit the Soviet Union from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comr. N.S. Khrushchev.

Having thanked me for the invitation, Djuanda confirmed his desire to visit the Soviet Union in April-May 1959. The prime minister stated that yesterday he had spoken with Sukarno regarding this matter and the president approved of Djuanda's plans to visit the USSR.

I said that it would be good to agree on when would be convenient to make the matter public, that is to publish an announcement of Djuanda's invitation and his upcoming visit to the Soviet Union. I noted that this announcement should probably be published simultaneously in our countries. I also inquired for Djuanda's opinion regarding the manner in which it will be published: will there be a response letter to comr. N.S. Khrushchev's invitation or will it be a Communique. Having stated that if the prime minister is not prepared to tackle this issue, it can be postponed for later consideration. I said that in this regard I intend to follow Djuanda's discretion.

The prime minister said that he intends to respond officially to comr. N.S. Khrushchev's invitation in the form of a letter. "In accordance with the present procedure," continued he, "I must immediately report the invitation to the Cabinet of Ministers, despite the fact that I have already discussed this matter with my deputies Hardi, Idham Halid and Leimena. I plan to report the invitation to the Cabinet of Ministers during its meeting next week," said Djuanda. To this he added that he has no objection to the suggestion that the invitation and his visit to the Soviet Union be published simultaneously in our countries following the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Speaking of the timing of the visit, the prime minister stated that he would like to go to the Soviet Union following parliamentary recess, which will take place from 10 January to mid-April.

I noted that it would be good if Djuanda stayed in Moscow during the May holidays and could observe the parade and demonstration.

Djuanda affirmed that he would like to be in Moscow on May 1st in order to observe the May celebrations.

In answer to my question regarding which cities Djuanda would like to visit and which attractions he would like to see in Moscow and outside of Moscow, as well as who will accompany him on the visit, the prime minister replied that he always dutifully takes part in the drafting of the schedules for his visits. He added that he would like to familiarize himself with Soviet Union's approach toward problems of energy, economic organization and planning, heavy industry, and agriculture. Stating that so far he is not yet prepared to set forth in detail his wishes regarding objects and locations for visits, Djuanda said that he would appreciate if we made some suggestions.

He stated that the rank and number of accompanying officials will be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers. However, emphasizing that he is expressing personal opinion, the prime minister said that he would like to be accompanied by the Minister of Education, Training and Culture, Prijono, who could study the pioneer organizations and youth movements. Djuanda also let it be known that he would like to go to Moscow with his wife.

I said that we would like to know how much time Djuanda plans to spend in the Soviet Union, so that our appropriate organizations could better prepare the program for the visit. "If there arises a desire to meet with our leaders," said I, "it will be taken into consideration."

Djuanda said that he hopes on such a possibility, and stated that he can leave Indonesia for no more than three weeks, including the trip both ways.

We agreed to return to this question later.

I stated that I am ready to hear his thoughts on economic issues, of which he had spoken during our [meeting] last week.

Djuanda said that first he would like to confidentially inform me of the Indonesian government's decision regarding the establishment of UN armed forces. Djuanda said that both he and the temporary acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hardi, had studied this issue. "The Indonesian government," said he, "has also received a report on this issue from its UN representative, Ali Sastroamidjojo."

"I can inform you," said Djuanda, 'that Indonesia's position on this question generally corresponds to your government's opinion. Like the Soviet government, we foresee a threat of intervention by foreign powers, if the UN adopts the proposal to establish permanent armed forces under its aegis. We understand that if the deployment of these troops is carried out by direct decision of the General Assembly, then it will be easier for the Western countries to take advantage of their numerical superiority and outvote the voices of the minority, represented primarily by Asian countries, against which the UN armed forces would usually be deployed first.

"We also believe that the decision to deploy armed forces should be made by the Security Council, as provided by the Charter, which would give us greater assurances that the right decision will be made, given the existence of the Soviet Union's 'veto' power.

"We also realize," continued Djuanda, 'that in practice, the majority of the UN armed forces, regardless of their composition, will be financed by the Western powers, which will obviously influence the nature of the UN forces.

"There also arises the question of where to station the UN permanent forces, if they are established. Apparently, there is a proposal to station these forces in different countries, in particular, a likely proposal is to station them in Indonesia. We cannot agree with this, since we are convinced that stationing any type of foreign forces, even if under the flag of the UN, will aggravate the situation and cause difficulties within our own army.

"Such is the position of the Indonesian government. Basically, we cannot agree with the establishment of these forces. Our representative to the UN, Ali Sastroamidjojo, has already been given secret instructions in light of the above. We have also instructed him to carefully survey the opinions of other countries on this question and determine which of them could share the Indonesian position on this matter."

Having expressed my gratitude to the prime minister for the confidential information, I stated that I am happy to point out that our positions on this question do not diverge. I promised to relay promptly his statements to the Soviet government.

Moving on to another subject, Djuanda addressed me with the request to relay to the Soviet government his wish to hasten the completion of the work of the Soviet and Indonesian economic delegation. He emphasized the importance and the political significance of a prompt decision regarding the construction of a metallurgical facility in Indonesia. Djuanda said that in the course of negotiations with our delegations, certain minor questions have arisen which are causing the finalization of the agreement to be somewhat delayed. He asked me to help expedite responses from Moscow on certain aspects of the agreement, so that the protocol could be signed, and planning, construction, assembly and other work could be commenced. The prime minster noted that he is personally taking part in the examination of these questions. He expressed readiness to meet with me in order to expedite the implementation of the general agreement.

Referring to information from comr. Kolybalov and our other specialists, I said that, as far as I am aware, the opinions of the Indonesian and the Soviet side correspond on the fundamental issues. However, as far as I know, certain questions are yet to be resolved by the Indonesian side. For example, no location has been determined for the establishment of rice growing farms in Kalimantan. The establishment of these farms is significant because they could be quickly put into operation and yield a good result.

I also noted that it is unclear to us and to me personally what is the plan for supplying raw materials to the super-phosphate manufacturing plant, since the operations discussed in the course of the negotiations pertain only to the manufacturing plant and do not touch on the questions of providing the necessary amounts of phosphorite and other minerals. "As far as helping expedite decisions from Moscow on certain articles of the protocol, I will try to [line cut off]

On his part, Djuanda stated that he has already ordered the minister of agriculture to determine specific sites for establishing rice farms in Kalimantan and to convey this information to the Soviet delegation.

Djuanda expressed agreement with my statement regarding the chemical fertilizer factory and stated that the Indonesian side would like to hear suggestions from our delegation on this matter. Further, Djuanda stated that right now Indonesia is holding talks with the American Import-Export Bank regarding the establishment of a synthetic urea factory in Palembang. "With the establishment of this factory we will fulfill our need for nitrogen fertilizer. However, we are in need of phosphate fertilizers. This is the topic currently being addressed by the Soviet and Indonesian economic delegations." The prime minister said that he will study this question from the Indonesian delegation's report and, in case there arises a need, will turn to me for assistance.

I said that our delegation has already been informed by the Indonesian side of the location of one of the proposed rice farms, apparently on instructions from the prime minister, but the location of the other rice farm on Kalimantan has not yet been named.

Djuanda stated that he will discuss this matter with the minister of agriculture.

In conclusion, I stated that I am ready to meet with the prime minister at any time in order to discuss questions of economic cooperation, and in particular concerning prompt and more effective implementation of the agreement on economic cooperation between our countries.

Having thanked me, Djuanda promised in the near future to take advantage of my readiness to meet with him.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes. Interpreted by 2nd secretary, comr. Yu.A. Sholmov.



Notes from the journal of B.M. Volkov, Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia, on a meeting with Djuanda Kartawidjaja, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, on November 20, 1958. Volkov relays an invitation from Khrushchev to Djuanda to visit the Soviet Union and the two discuss details of the visit. They also discuss the establishment of a United Nations armed forces and work on a Soviet-Indonesian economic delegation.

Document Information


Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 091, opis 14, papka 13, delo 5, listy 153-157. Obtained for CWIHP by James Hershberg and translated for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas. Included in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 26.


The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date



Diary Entry


Record ID