Pishevari, the Chairman of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, lists conditions for opening talks with the Iranian government in Tehran on the status of Iranian Azerbaijan.
April 5, 1946
Memo from Atakishiyev, Kerimov, Ibragimov, and Gasanov to Bagirov on April 4 meeting with Pishevari
[handwritten at the top: “To Cde. Bagirov” Top Secret
from a telegraph report from Tabriz
On the evening of the 4th of April a meeting was held with Pishevari. He was familiarized with the assignments of the Senior brought in by Ibragimov and Kerimov as well as the orders of the Senior received by military telegraph on 3 April.
[Translator’s note: “the Senior” here may refer to a Senior Military Adviser, General of the Army Tyulenev, or generically to any high-ranking leader.]
Pishevari agreed to hold talks with Tehran on the following conditions:
1. The talks are to be held in Tabriz or, in case of emergency, in Mianeh, in order to feel the support of the people and have a chance to consult with them quickly.
2. Pishevari, Padegan, and Shabustari should conduct the talks.
3. Pishevari considers the final end of the talks to be:
a) recognition of the autonomy of Azerbaijan in the form of an enjumen;
b) to have their own troops and their own command staff, but with subordination, as with all Iranian troops, to the General Staff. In case of need the troops of Azerbaijan will defend Iran from foreign enemies;
c) Azerbaijan is to retain the right to provide for internal order with its own police without gendarmerie and other personnel being sent from Tehran;
d) official communications in Azerbaijan are to be conducted in the Azerbaijani language, but correspondence with Tehran in Persian;
e) study in schools is to be conducted in the Azerbaijani language until the 3rd grade; after the 3rd grade Persian will be introduced in addition;
f) state land is to be left for the peasants, but distribution of land among the peasants is to be paid at state expense with subsequent gradual payment by the peasants of the value of these lands to the state;
g) recognition by Tehran as legal measures heretofore taken by the national government and no criminal prosecution according to Iranian law is to be initiated regarding the democrats, for example: for expenditure of state resources, confiscation of property, convictions of people, expulsion from Azerbaijan, execution, etc.;
h) increase the number of deputies from Azerbaijan in the Iranian Majlis in proportion to the population of Azerbaijan;
i) not to permit the return to Azerbaijan of people expelled as enemies of the democratic movement.
Pishevari announced [“to us” crossed out] that he will carry out the orders of the Senior and does not conceal that in this case he will be the one to carry out the orders [ispolnitel’], but he does not agree in spirit.
He thinks that all this is leading only to the liquidation of the democratic movement and everything won by the people.
In the course of the conversation Pishevari was nervous, speaking all the time about the independence of the democrats, the treacherous role of Qavam, [and] raised the question of the withdrawal to the USSR of the activists of the National Government and others.
Pishevari earnestly requested that we ourselves write the Senior about the results of his conversation with us and not force him to write [them], since he is very tired, nervous, and in no condition to wield a pen [a question mark is handwritten in the margin here].
It was agreed to meet again on 5 April with the participation of Shabustari and Padegan.
Atakishiyev, Kerimov, Ibragimov, Gasanov
On 4 April Kombakhsh arrived from Tehran; he said that Pishevari had summoned him. He expects to be received by Pishevari. I don’t know why Kombakhsh was summoned. I will find out from Pishevari and let you know.
Minister of State Security of the Azerbaijan SSR
General-Major Yemel’yanov [signed]
5 April 1946
Description of an April 4th meeting with Pishevari, President of the Azerbaijan People's Government in Iranian Azerbaijan, listing his conditions for talks with Teheran. Pishevari is reportedly nervous about what will happen to the separatist movement.
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