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March 22, 1975

Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 1 of the Maritime Front

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation



[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps; handwriting

across the upper part of the page]






(10 km southeast of LÜNEBURG) 0100 22 March


Map 1:500,000, 1961 edition


1. As a result of five days of battles the troops of the Maritime Front have defeated the main forces of the first echelon army corps of the SGA and, having reached the river Weser, have accomplished the immediate objective of the Army.


Two of the seven first-echelon divisions (the 11th mpd and the 4th brtd) have been totally defeated and losses of about 50% have been inflicted on the rest.


About 60% of the nuclear attack equipment of the ground forces and about 50% of the combat aircraft have been destroyed.


In spite of the fact that the combat abilities of the enemy have been sharply reduced nevertheless he numbers in his grouping:


- 14 divisions, of which eight are at 50% strength;


- 123,00 personnel;


- 1,550 tanks;


- 57 means of nuclear attack;


- and 970 field guns and mortars, and also 280 aircraft, including 66  [nuclear weapons] platforms.


The enemy has also not been deprived of the ability to further build up his forces by mobilizing and bringing them from other theaters of military operations.


In this situation the enemy intends to disrupt the offensive of our troops, defeat them, and restore the position on the border with powerful nuclear strikes, air strikes, and the commitment of the second echelons of the SGA and TsGA [Central Army Group].


The launching of a counterattack in the zone of the Maritime Front by the forces of five divisions (the 1st Army Corps of the "Orange", and 14th and 15th td of the "Browns") is possible from the line DELMENHORST - DIEPHOLZ in the direction of CLOPPENBURG-[WOLSBURG] beginning on the morning of 22 March.


The commitment of the second echelon of the SGA might be supported during 22 March by the launching of mass nuclear attacks and also air strikes of up to 200 sorties.


In view of the above it is necessary to take into consideration:


- the possibility of a mass enemy nuclear strike on the missile group of the Maritime Front, its aircraft, and its troops,


- the high combat activity of enemy aircraft, especially its effect on the troops of the 3rd Army (about 500 sorties a day),


- the concentration of the majority of support personnel and equipment support to the operations of ground forces in the directions of counterblows and the widespread use of radioelectronic warfare to suppress the control of the weapons and troops of the Maritime Front.


2. The 4th Army (6th md (3A), 10th and 14th md, 22nd td, 4th arbr) with the 1[st battalion]/36[th] isbr is to destroy the battery of the 150th Sergeant battalion in the area northeast of OLDENBURG, the Honest John battery of the 3rd td, the "k" [Browns'] [battery] of the 1st mpd, and the aircraft at the EWER and WITMUNT [possibly Wittmund] airfields. Seize the area DELMENHORST, WILDESHAUSEN, [BARNSTORS], and [HASLINGEN] in night operations and support the commitment of the 3rd Army from a line west of BASSUM (excluding) [HASLINGEN].


At 0720 22 March launch three nuclear strikes on the 1st mpd  of the "o" [Orange] and together with the formations of the 3rd Army destroy the 1st mpd of the "o" in a meeting engagement with a strike of the main forces in the direction of ACHIM, WERLTE and by the end of 22 March seize the area (excluding) OLDENBURG-GARREL.


Beginning on the morning of 23 March develop an offensive in the direction of KIR[C]HATTEN, EMMEN and with part of the forces [in the direction of] KIR[C]HATTEN, AURICH.


Organize a defense as [you] reach the coast of the North Sea.


Suppress enemy command and control radio communications at the division level in the main direction of operations and also during the commitment of the 3rd Army [and suppress] the radio communications of  one division in the direction of operations of the 3rd Army.


The Army is to be additionally given: 11 nuclear missiles (3x10, 5x20, 2x100 kt), one P/V [regimental sortie] of ShA [ground attack aircraft] and one P/V of RA [reconnaissance aircraft].


The left boundary is WESTE (15 km northeast of UELZEN, (excluding) SOLTAU, SYKE, (excluding) MEPPEN.


The CP is in an area 10 km northwest of VISSELHÖVEDE.


3. On the right the Independent Maritime Army is conducting an offensive operation in the Jutland direction.


The boundary with it is NEUSTADT-GLEWE, BOIZENBURG, and on to the river ELBE.


On the left the 3rd Army is being committed at 0745 23 March from a line west of BASSUM, [RADEM] in the direction of VERDEN, RHEINE with the mission of defeating the main forces of the 1st Army Corps of the "o" in coordination with the forces of the 4th Army in a meeting engagement and by the end of 23 March seizing the line QUAKENBRÜCK, BRAMSCHE, OSNABRÜCK. The offensive then develops in the direction of BRAMSCHE, WESEL.




General of Armor Eugeniusz MOLCZYK




Division General Stanislaw ANTOS



Three copies made

Print Nº 020/3/73]


This document describes the developing military situation in the hypothetical "Soyuz-75" military exercise. The Polish Maritime Front has successfully defeated NATO after five days of battle and reached the Weser River in Germany, which empties into the North Sea. However, Western forces retain the capacity to remobilize. Therefore, the document directs the Maritime Front to establish a defense of its position on the North Sea.

Document Information


Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU). Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.


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Leon Levy Foundation