February 9, 1983
Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 'Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow'
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
N o t e
about the talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov,
on February 9, 1983 in Moscow
KGB: Comrade Zinyov – 1st Deputy of the Chairman
Comrade Kryuchkov - Deputy of the Chairman
Comrade Shumilov Head of KGB Representation
Comrade Grushko Deputy Head of 1st Main Directorate
Comrade Kalyagin Head of 11th Department
Comrade Gromakov Head of 4th Department
Comrade Blinov Interpreter
MfS: Comrade Wolf Deputy of the Minister
Comrade Damm Head of Department X
Comrade Salevsky Interpreter
Welcome by the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. M. Chebrikov.
Myself, and my accompanying brothers in arms here, are very delighted to be here in Moscow, the heart of world revolution.
It is good that we meet here today. Even though this is not always about important, earthshaking problems – it is still important to confirm themselves that we are toeing the correct line and implement correctly the decisions of the party.
I am especially delighted that we, as the first foreign comrades, can greet Comrade V. M. Chebrikov as Chairman of the KGB. And even the first ones in the new building. It is almost like in sports where the GDR frequently ranks as Number One.
First of all, dear Comrade Victor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, again our heartfelt congratulations to the appointment as Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, and the thus expressed high trust by the party of Lenin. I am convinced that the workers place great hopes in your person.
Five months ago, I have talked to Comrade Fedorchuk. With delight we have received the information about his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs.
We are again pleased to note the clear line by the party leadership after the November plenum, and that such a tested Chekist was appointed to such an important position.
Tonight we will see him and give him our highest regards.
At the same time, I am conveying the heartfelt greetings and best wishes for success in your work from the General Secretary of our party, the Chairman of the National State Council and the National Defense Council, Comrade Erich Honecker, and all members of the Politburo.
I have already mentioned the extraordinary importance of the letter by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Comrade Y. V. Andropov, at the occasion of my birthday.
All members of the Politburo have been informed.
Heartfelt greetings from all members of the [MfS] council, SED county leadership [in the MfS], and from all our employees.
At home we call ourselves Chekists. But here we only call ourselves employees in order not look immodest.
However, we have it in writing that we are an eminent division of the Cheka. This letter was signed by Comrade Y. V. Andropov. We make efforts to comply with this assessment.
In the name of all [MfS] employees I simultaneously want to give our cordial thanks for your conveyed congratulations to the 33rd anniversary of our Ministry's formation.
We evaluated your greetings at our celebratory event. Our position of friendship with the Soviet Union is identical with the opinion of the larger part of the GDR population. This was also on display during the festive solemnization of the 25th anniversary of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship here in Moscow.
Many thanks that we can use our stay in Moscow, which is, as you know, due to a special occasion (the acceptance of high awards, and the awarding of Soviet brothers in arms), to consult according to tradition between ourselves about some problems of our joint struggle against the common enemy.
The high awards we are allowed to receive we see as an especially great honor bestowed by the party of Lenin and the Soviet people, as a high praise of the struggle by the Chekists of the GDR, of all patriotic forces and fighters at the invisible front.
We are here in Moscow at a time
- when the great anniversaries of the CPSU and the Soviet people still have lasting and radiating effect- the 65th Anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution, the 60th Anniversary of the Foundation of the USSR, and last but not least also the 65th Anniversary of the formation of the Cheka.
- when the new great peace offensive by the Soviet Union- this is about the implementation of the content of the speech by Comrade Y. V. Andropov at the festive event for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's existence, as it also reflected in the results of the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty- has huge global implications and inspires the struggle of all peace-loving and realistically thinking people.
May I also emphasize and reconfirm in this context and at that occasion:
In the GDR, starting with our party leadership and deep down into all classes and layers of our people, we notice very clearly and impressively with what great amount of recognition, deep satisfaction, and agreement, the policy of CPSU and Soviet Union under the leadership of General Secretary Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov is viewed, and what it sets off.
We can assess, with all respect due, that this real and sober policy and the quick offensive reaction has yielded great effect. It strengthens the ranks of the fighters for peace and socialism, in the GDR as well in general on an international scale.
I consider it important to note in this context, that our party has significantly increased through its mass-policy and public relations activities (especially the press, but also radio, and television of the GDR) its efforts towards an effective support of the CPSU's offensive approach, and thus of the peace offensive by the Soviet Union and the socialist community of states, and this way also of -as an essential component- the unmasking of the policy of imperialism (selected examples in the appendix).
As known, I had rather recently on September 9 and 10 last year the opportunity to hold extensive meetings with Comrade Fedorchuk and other leading comrades of the KGB. We talked about important, and still important current political and operative problems. We were also in full agreement on the assessment of the international situation as well as the class struggle situation, also with regard to problems and difficulties facing the socialist states.
The correctness of our identical assessments has been reconfirmed multiple times in the meantime.
I am seeing here the following problems and issues:
In September last year, we came to complete agreement in our assessments when we extensively talked about aggravation of the course of confrontation by the United States and NATO, about increased efforts to weaken the unity and cohesion of the socialist community of states, about importance and necessity to utilize the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.
The CPSU Politburo has underlined, in the last paragraph of its communique on the Prague meeting, to devote greatest attention to the question of unity and cohesion of the socialist community.
Here I want to address some delicate and sensitive problems.
One should pay more attention to those issues of unity and cohesion.
This is my personal, political opinion.
Sometimes you can feel a certain restraint by the Soviet Union when it comes to timely reactions to certain phenomena.
You have to exert more influence to support the pro-Soviet elements, so those can become more effective in some socialist countries.
Furthermore, you have to support the honest and loyal friends of the Soviet Union in order for them to remain in certain positions, respectively be able to advocate certain positions that are important for the Soviet Union.
There is no problem with us in the GDR.
Especially this [our] situation at home is allowing me to pose a question this way when drawing comparisons with the situation in fraternal countries.
I do not want to limit this just to socialist states. Thus we sometimes have lost ground because we did not intervene timely and preemptively. Afterwards we had to struggle ourselves through problems.
I am saying this because we are “thinking” people and not “parrots”. We analyze what Y. V. Andropov has said.
In particular the last paragraph of the communique on the Prague meeting made me [saying this].
Of the many things that occurred since that time (September 1982) I just want to emphasize this:
- On the one hand far-reaching Soviet proposals for arms limitation and disarmament. A proposal for an agreement between member states of the Warsaw Treaty and member states of NATO (other states may join) about mutual renunciation of military force and maintaining of peaceful relations.
Those proposals were met with broad resonance globally, even in political leadership circles of Western states. This came even from those circles we previously viewed as enemies (Generals). Especially these struggles by exposed people one has to link with the struggle of other parts of the peace movement.
These forces must receive -of course invisibly- our support.
As for our parties, the task is also before our fraternal organs to support more effectively the large movement in capitalist states against the U.S./NATO course of confrontation and armament.
I remember well the talks with Y. V. Andropov about the peace movement and the tasks resulting from this for the State Security.
- On the other hand aggressive imperialist circles increase their preparations for war, and escalate the course of confrontation, sanctions, and boycott, of trade and economic war, as well as attempts of threats and blackmail against the socialist states.
As we know, all this requires measures to strengthen [our] defense capacities what in turn has consequences for developments in various areas in our countries; this requires a substantial increase in discovering all hostile plans, activities et cetera and significantly more efficient preventive, offensive work to thwart those plans, and the activation of hostile-negative forces within our states (intensification of work against the enemy).
Just because of this, we as the leadership have to conduct strong analytical activity.
Many things we miss, what we get to know in hindsight, i.e. that problems were coming up which could have been solved preemptively.
- In addition there have changes occurred in the FRG since our recent talks [with Fedorchuk], which are especially relevant to the GDR as an immediate neighbor state. In spite of demagogic maneuvers, it is absolutely clear that the Bonn government led by the CDU is decisively supporting the confrontation and armament course of the United States. The nationalist and revanchist line of this government becomes ever more apparent. Also, there is an increase of neofascist tendencies in FRG domestic developments. If this government should be confirmed as a result of the March 6 federal elections (this is in just four weeks), we have to be prepared for an increase in influence by extreme right forces and a further aggravation of the FRG's anti-socialist course. (Handover information “On Situation in the FRG” - here situation overall explained somewhat more extensively in advance of federal elections.)
A proof is the meeting [FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut] Kohl, [FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich] Genscher, [British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher.
The MfS is interested to hear from the Soviet comrades what are the thoughts within our Soviet fraternal organ, and what conclusions are drawn for our joint struggle and -linked to that- the utilization of potential of all fraternal organs, especially
- in the implementation of the speech by Comrade Andropov at the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR
- in the implementation of the Political Declaration and the overall results of the Prague Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty.
So much for my brief remarks.
Request to the Soviet comrades to outline their position.
Thanks for congratulations to my appointment. This appointment is a great sign of confidence by the Politburo and Y. V. Comrade Andropov personally.
Together with the members of the leadership council and the other leading comrades we have a strong leadership collective.
Also thank you for the greetings of Comrade Erich Honecker.
For us this is very important and valuable.
Myself I want to convey to Comrade Mielke, the members of the delegation and, through the person of Comrade Mielke, to all employees of the MfS heartfelt greetings from Comrade Y. V. Andropov with the best wishes for successful work.
He knows that we are getting together to talk.
Comrade Mielke, at the beginning you have talked extensively about all proposals and measures of the USSR peace offensive.
It is nice to hear that the policy of our party, especially the peace offensive, is met with support and agreement among the members of the party and the population of the GDR.
This is about the concrete realization of the peace program, the course of the XXVI [CPSU] Party Congress, as well as of the November plenum according to current requirements and conditions.
On the Situation in the Soviet Union
Life in the Soviet Union is shaped by implementation of the decisions at the November plenum and the official speech by Comrade Y. V. Andropov at the festive event for the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the USSR.
The main result of recent months was the demonstration of unity between the party and the people on all levels and in all layers [of society] in those days so important and eventful for us.
The Soviet people, the entire people have unanimously supported the election of Comrade Y. V. Andropov.
He enjoys a very high authority in the party and the population as a talented and skilled party and state official, as a far-sighted politician who possesses eminent qualities and characteristics.
To make it short: The leadership is in reliable hands!
For us Chekists it was a special event. All have worked with him for 15 years, have learned from him. He has taught us to fight permanently and unforgivingly against the enemy at the frontline.
It is easy to talk with him about it. He knows the work quite exactly.
All forces are geared towards implementing the line of the November plenum and decisions based on it in real life.
In the country there rules a spirit of practicality, a spirit of uplift and of the search for reserves by all collective and every individual in order to find someone's place for the solution of these questions.
For us it is relevant to define the main focus of Chekist work. So this is about
- Deficits in the functioning of transportation
The country and the scope of transportation is very large. Thus it is of great importance.
Still under the [KGB] leadership of Comrade Y. V. Andropov the IV Directorate to secure transportation was created.
Organization of this directorate is completed on the central and territorial level, and is fully working. There are already the first operative results. Many informations have already been forwarded to the Central Committee.
A couple of important “special incidents” have been prevented.
Many cases of bad leadership activities were uncovered.
Some people were put on trail for violation of the laws.
Great work has been done in creating an unofficial basis [i.e. recruiting agents] in all areas of transportation:
Water and Sea Transportation
The leadership of the Transportation Ministry got broadened by the Central Committee. Now there exists a better organization and accuracy in their work.
[Cheka founder Feliks] Dzierzynski had created this operative line for transportation. Even the enemy is writing about this.
Since December 20, 1982 daily turnaround norms get fulfilled for the first time.
Of course, not all problems are already solved. Yet the attention given to transportation issues is yielding results.
This is very important as there are many problems between ourselves in this area.
- Another problem is an increase in efficiency of the economy's quality.
The improvement of black metallurgy, of the construction industry. “The economy has to become economic!”
In the KGB an “Economic Directorate” was created to secure these problems.
Recently a major consultation was held. Comrade Zinyov has explained the tasks to solve in this area.
This directorate is in a status of organization. The question is solved on the central level. It will be completed at the basis level.
So far only short time has passed, but there are already first informations and results. We already feel the benefits.
This work is not absolutely new to us. However, it has to be organized anew. The annual plan has scheduled a meeting on this field. There also is a consultation planned in the area of transportation.
I remember talks in Warsaw some years ago on issues of the work of State Security in the economy.
In the context of creating collectivized agricultural units [LPG], we has the following slogan: “Who is finding the best peasants who organize the LPG, will be awarded. The Chekists most know the people in the villages! It does not have to be necessarily a communist, but an honest citizen of his home country. If the Chekist then catches in addition also spies, then it is even better!”
I also explained it this way [former Polish General Secretary Edvard] Gierek.
At the X Party Congress, following our suggestion, the slogan on plan fulfillment was expanded to “Plan Fulfillment with Certainty [also: 'security'; German term 'Sicherheit' has both meanings]!” Especially during the last two years we always have pointed to the fact that we as State Security have to fulfill new tasks:
- is the plan getting fulfilled
- who against it and when
- how is quality
- how is discipline
- are the security norms respected
We have now begun this work on a large scale.
Our foreign intelligence is very much involved in the economy (SWT; Sector Science and Technology, the Stasi equivalent). We have acquired very interesting things [from the West] but the most decisive thing is the technology.
Now we have acquired a technology for cracking [of crude oil] which generates a direct profit of 50 million Rubles.
Rapid implementation is decisive.
In the Minister Council there is a commission for new technology. It is chaired by a Deputy of the Chairman of the Minister Council. Comrade Kryuchkov is a member of this commission.
These commission reviews and controls how these things [acquired from the West] are implemented in the economy.
There was already a discussion about this commission at the XXVI Party Congress. It went back and forth about application of the technology, which was “allegedly” secret for the civilian sector. At the plenum Y. V. Andropov again talked about how that this technology has to be applied for the civilian sector. A fast application will also improve the mood of the population and thus strengthen our situation.
Another problem is the strengthening of discipline, the increase of a sense of responsibility. The struggle for consolidation of party and state discipline, the economic discipline.
Of course, we first have drawn conclusions among ourselves. Our task is inter alia to uncover abuses. The work became more active.
We have now arrested two members of the Committee for Foreign Trade.
One of them was deployed abroad and spilled information there about an object (not a military one).
He received 165,000 Dollars for this. He was unmasked and arrested. The decisive thing is that he could not continue this activities. The second case has similar characteristics.
Together with our leadership and the party organization we create some order there so that such will not happen again. Such things also occur in other foreign trade organizations.
We will now pay much attention to these problems from the Chekist perspective. Who is violating the order, has to face the party, the state, the court. In this regard we are tough.
The good people will happy about this when there is consequent action against those things.
These are important conclusions drawn from the November plenum. We could certainly talk about this in more detail. Yet such are the main problems.
On the Problem of Foreign Policy
There is the Prague Declaration by the Warsaw Treaty member states. Our proposals are on the table.
We are using all our options to implement these decisions and proposals. The declaration itself says a lot but it does not solve all problems. If an agreement would be signed, this would be very good.
But there is a tough fight. This struggle will continue. We have to work towards the implementation of these decisions. For this we are mobilizing all our options.
Are there any news from Geneva [INF negotiations]?
The talks are ongoing. There are no news. They [Americans] only have to offer the zero option. You know this variation. I do not have to explain it.
For us, this option is absolutely unacceptable.
The Chinese and the Japanese already protest against the relocation of the missiles behind the Urals, although there have been no decisions made in this regard at all, or any concrete measures have been undertaken.
The U.S. course on this issue is very tough. There are no concessions.
The central question is the missile deployment. Recently Gromyko was in the FRG (you have the information). The result of it is the following: The missiles will be deployed in the FRG!
If no other compromises come up, the missiles will be deployed.
One can talk about all positions in detail. However, as the situation looks, the missiles will be deployed. There are no news. We receive our information daily from the [Soviet] delegation [in Geneva]. There are no news.
We still can talk since the missiles are not deployed yet. If the missiles will be deployed, we will have to move toward different steps.
It is our policy to strengthen defense and not to make any concessions. The deployment will not give us a scare.
We are at the eve of a new situation in the world. We will not allow that missiles will be deployed, and we will remain passive.
The situation is very serious.
We have information that the United States are having talks in order to be able to deploy medium-range missiles in Turkey.
We will react to that.
Overall, the situation is getting more complicated.
These are important issues.
If you have opportunities to acquire information on this, it would be very good for us.
The peace movement is very important. It has a certain influence. However: It is not decisive!
For stance, the demonstrators are now “asked to pay” in order to secure “alleged” police protection. For that one should have to pay now. Will there be any provocation during a demonstration, the participants have to pay “compensation”.
This is undermining the demonstrators. We have to look for different paths. We cannot pay for all of this. From where should we take the money.
The information we handed over is about an analysis of the situation in context of the elections, not the peace movement.
The central issue is the missile deployment.
The first round of talks in Beijing is over. So far there have been no real results.
The Chinese set 4 conditions:
- no assistance for Vietnam
- withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea
- withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Mongolian People's Republic
- withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
Only after complying with this conditions, they want to talk about bilateral problems.
We have told them our position. Now we will have the 2nd round in Moscow. The Chinese proceeded in a Chinese way. Only just 3 conditions:
- no assistance for Vietnam
- withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea
- withdrawal of Soviet forces from all Asian countries (without concrete listings)
However, in their propaganda they announce they are setting only 3 conditions. This would constitute a step forward.
We are of the opinion that we draw overall more benefit from the first round than the Chinese. No country is negotiating under pre-conditions.
Our Politburo trusts that the Chinese do not want to enter into negotiations. This is obvious for us.
The Chinese leadership does not want a normalization of relations with us.
This is important for all socialist states. Like the United States, the Chinese conduct a policy of differentiation towards the individual socialist states.
This is why I phrased this so exactly.
It also has to be expressed this way on the party level.
In China itself there exist different opinions and people. They understand that they want to continue to live in peace. The ordinary people also understand it this way. They can remember how we previously lived and acted together. For that reason the Chinese leadership accepted certain steps in order to feign results.
This was a consequence of pressure from within. Yet in order to block these negotiations, they come up with those pre-conditions.
We will prepare seriously for the 2nd round and define our line.
We must not provide any pretext for the Chinese to say that they want to negotiate, but the Russians do no want to. Therefore we refer in all our published statements to our willingness to negotiate.
On March 1st the second round begins in Moscow. Let us see what the next round will bring.
The Chinese play with us because they know that we desire a normalization of the situation.
They do not act in the same way everywhere vis-a-vis the socialist countries. They want a splitting and differentiation, and to demonstrate that there exist different positions on our talks with China.
Regarding the questions
- Middle East
Comrades Wolf and Kryuchkov should talk in detail.
Correct. However, about Mozambique there should be again a principled talk at the top [party] level.
How is it supposed to continue. How can all socialist countries coordinate. There is a danger we will lose this position [Mozambique].
Comrade Kryuchkov knows our positions on these issues exactly (Middle East, Africa, Mozambique).
In Mozambique there exists indeed a very serious situation.
Our cooperation is good. We are conducting joint operations.
There exists a comprehensive joint working plan. Problems do not exist [between us].
This also squares with my assessment. The exchange of information is working. Support is given. The implementation of [cooperation] documents will continue. There are no new proposals in principle.
We value the course of our cooperation with great satisfaction.
Handover of operative documents as a present (i.e. as a list).
(actual handover to be done by KGB representation [in Berlin] since documents are very voluminous!)
Many thanks for these informations.
Everything runs normal in [our] collaboration. Excellent. Many thanks to you personally, Comrade Mielke, for your active part.
On the more sensitive issues:
To exert greater influence on unity and uniformity, on stronger support of the pro-soviet forces, and not to be too much restrained since thus we lost some positions. Yet here facts are required.
We do not have to search for examples: Poland. This is only one example. It is not important here how it looks under Jaruzelski, although the situation is still extremely dangerous. According to our information, the situation is still very complicated.
This has major relevance for us. There is obviously no “soundproof wall” between Poland and ourselves in the GDR.
Therefore there are very serious problems.
There are a couple of other examples: Mozambique where coordination by the socialist states is weak, or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY]. Just the day before yesterday we had talks with the PDRY. Even in the leadership of the KGB [State Security] of the PDRY everybody is supporting somebody else.
There are certainly some problems in the development of those countries. This has influence on the situation.
You are ourselves are doing a lot for the strengthening of unity. However, each country has peculiarities of its development.
I am assuming the strategic plan of the United States. China as an example.
There is something which concerns me more. We are suddenly faced with surprises.
Let us take Afghanistan. There an entire army is based! Every day there is fighting, every day there are casualties. I am in favor of this “interference”.
Obviously this is the most extreme example.
We understand your concern.
This is about timely coordination. Yesterday Comrade Wolf correctly defined the Soviet comrades as the patron for a multilateral conference of our foreign intelligence organs.
A couple of problems have been listed, but unfortunately solutions for these problems wear on.
This is why I am talking about them.
It is not meant as criticism, charge, or a demand.
I am viewing this from my purely Chekist cooperation, how can we further help each other to act preemptively. Maybe the diplomats also have reported the situation incorrectly.
Every state has acquired during its existence its own state relevance.
Let us take Poland. They have conducted a joint [party] plenum without our influence. They decided to modify the constitution in order to protect the private agricultural economy. We had to tell them our opinion about that. Yet they had passed this at their plenum.
I am viewing this somewhat differently. Let us look at ideological diversion, the peace movement, and the activity of the church.
Now there is starting a big wave of propaganda in the West in the context of measures against the church in the Soviet Union. Example: Announcement of Reagan's views about the role of Christianity in the Soviet Union.
We have to coordinate timely about those problems. I talked with [Hungarian Minister of the Interior] Comrade [Istvan] Horvath about the political-ideological diversion, but the party leadership does not undertake anything concrete against this.
Our information system is good.
We may not disregard even small things. As the leadership, we have to analyze everything.
I just have to talk this openly about those issues. Here I can do that, as a good friend of the Soviet Union.
If it is wrong, one has to say this a recommendation. However, it is fact that we are working with delays.
This is not a charge. These are my concerns.
For instance, the assessment on China we just heard. Yet in the [GDR] party leadership there exists a different assessment. What is to be done? I do not expect a solution, no concrete response.
Comrade Mielke raises very important questions that also concern our Chekists – namely preventive information, so that nothing takes us by surprise.
In May 1981 we analyzed at our All-Union meeting with L. I. Brezhnev and Y. V. Andropov all questions of our past journey and defined the concrete tasks for our organs as stipulated in our laws. This was just about the Chekist work, i.e. the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy and the morale, the construction industry et cetera.
The demand was to allow for “no surprise”.
Our organs coordinated their work from this perspective; this means we also have to deal with such questions not explicitly assigned to the State Security in order to implement the line of the party.
We have to continuously improve and qualify mutual information.
Thus thank you for the information you gave today. We have also handed over material. This is helpful for our work. We have a bilateral agreement. We have agreements in the field of foreign intelligence and other fields.
We have to arrive at improved quality. The events in Poland were not completely surprising. The same is true for 1968 in the CSSR [Czechoslovakia].
We knew in advance how the situation is going to develop, that such kind of processes were occurring.
We have done everything that is needed to localize this. We imperatively have to qualify our information exchange.
We have mapped an entire program for the international conference.
There are two issues:
1. On Surprise
Thank you for compiling the catalog with the “surprise criteria”.
We have worked our way through it. When the specialists come to Berlin, we will tell our opinion on this document. Thereafter it is necessary to talk about it on the top level.
These consultations have to be continued.
Many thanks for the comprehensive work done.
The work is not yet definitely finalized.
It still has to be improved through question of Electronic Warfare (“EloKa”, [German acronym]).
It is said there this is a matter for the GRU [Soviet military intelligence service].
However, we have found out a couple of very important results which have to be considered.
The main question here is the problem of transmission. This is the weakest link.
2. Surprise in Domestic Terms
Here we have an underestimation within the leadership of some parties and therefore in the organs of State Security.
For that reason I want to return to the question of establishing as specific unit within the 1st Main Directorate.
On the first point of registration some initials steps have been undertaken, with regard to registering of intelligence findings about the development of crisis spots.
This applies especially to ideological diversion. “One” is arresting them, and the other says: “These are dissidents. They can live.”
Here I do not want to say that arrest is the only option. However, we need to have at least a certain assessment what these people mean.
We [MfS] approach from a class-based point of view, and the other addresses this somewhat “more liberal”. For instance, the Hungarian assessment of the “Solidarnosc” union or of the church question.
I am very grateful for the information about Lithuania. This has inspired me even further, since the campaign has already begun to run. In this case we have advised each other.
Let us take the attempts to establish a peace movement independent from the state [in the East].
The document on the church we have received for the first time. This is correct.
The Poles have invited the Pope; they great speeches what a good man he is for Poland.
Some say these are Polish [internal] affairs.
However, this an impact on the enemies who work under the church cover.
We have several 100,000 enemies. We have to deal with his and operate politically correct.
Those attempts to establish a peace movement independent from the state are not a specific issue of the GDR. Reagan does not make a statement on Christianity in the Soviet Union for nothing. It is aiming at establishing such also in other countries. Reagan's declaration is the signal. Also the conference held recently in West Berlin.
The peace movement [in the West] is a power. This why it gets so attacked. The enemy is organizing a parallel peace movement [in the East]. Those are the questions that interest me.
Or the protection of the environment. This used as well in order to rally the enemies.
Women write to Comrade Honecker. They want to talk openly about “peace”. Should one arrest them?
They write about Jena [city in GDR with a major dissident group] we has arrested artists, although no artist was arrested. All newspapers [in the West] are full of this.
Therefore there exists a need for all fraternal organs to mobilize all forces to actively work against those new forms of enemy activities, against those forces, in order to provide political pretexts to the adversary.
Of course, a differentiated approach is needed within the individual countries.
Y. V. Andropov has ordered an instructional decree for art and culture.
(meeting between Comrade Demychev and the Minister for Culture from the GDR.)
The enemy wants to internationalize all these movements. Therefore I am posing these questions again since those things have gained in importance; and because within the leadership of some fraternal parties there exists a certain underestimation on those issues, and there are different opinions.
Those problems are of importance for all of society. This is not just a matter of the State Security.
One can solve this only through coordination with the party leaderships of the fraternal organs. There exists no coordinating organ. Bilateral cooperation should be strengthened.
The Soviet Union just has to bear the main responsibility for the questions: Who whom? War or Peace?
Therefore bilateral cooperation also has to organized this way with the other [fraternal intelligence organs].
I want to support your remark not to allow for an underestimation of ideological diversion. This is a very important question.
Y. V. Andropov has educated us in this spirit for 15 years. We are monitoring these processes attentively.
All elements who violated the laws of the Soviet Union have been called to account before courts. We do not allow anybody to violate the law.
Actually all the people who wanted to work against the state, have been called to account and are accordingly accommodated.
The enemy is eager to exploit the changes of the situation.
On the Peace Movement:
There had been attempts made here with us to establish so-called “organs of trust”. They want to organize the “societal control” of compliance with international agreements.
Those groups we have undermined and dissolved. Some individual elements still exists. They are professors, academics.
They wanted to organize peace marches.
It came to nothing. Shortly the trial will be held.
A group of employees of an institute was arrested for enemy activities. Five people were sentenced. This trial will make waves.
You will receive an information report in advance with the details.
The enemy can interpret this differently, but you will receive the exact investigation results.
A few days before the trial you will receive thus report.
This practice proves itself. We will continue with it.
I want to address a couple of questions that currently concern ourselves:
1. Single phenomena of nationalism
This corresponds to the specifics of our country.
There are single phenomena, also of hostile character, which we observe attentively (leaflets, publications).
There are no problems with the Orthodox.
- some sects
Major influence originates from the Middle East, especially from Iran.
There are efforts towards the establishment of an Islamic Republic (with parts of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan).
Here we have a connection between nationalism and religion.
Those issues are closely monitored in order to prevent those phenomena from expanding.
The party organs are very intensely working on that. For instance, in the Baltic Republics special meetings of the party organs were held. There the Chekist measures were not emphasized. There was a good coordination [between party and KGB].
Many thanks for the support on problems of electronic warfare (exchange of specialists and information). Overall this still has to be expanded.
Thanks for the announced specialists to audit the control unit of the party.
Thank you for the information that there is work ongoing concerning the problem of cooperation to achieve a better refining of basic material (Professor [Peter Adolf] Thiessen).
It would be good to let Professor Thiessen know along through another line that this problem is addressed. We have done this. This is a moral issue.
I also want to hand over an interesting report for Y. V. Andropov (meeting between [SED Central Committee Secretary for International Relations Hermann] Axen and [General Secretary of the French Communist Party Georges] Marchais). Very interesting what position Marchais is embracing.
Currently there runs an extraordinary demagoguery [in the FRG] against the SPD chancellor candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel who, according to the opinion of the Deputy CDU Chairman Rühl [sic, Volker Rühe], should be not only the candidate of Comrade Y. V. Andropov, but also of Comrade E. Honecker.
This of great importance since the CDU/CSU is conducting the struggle against the SPD with this motto (election campaign).
In [SED central party newspaper] “Neues Deutschland” the letter from Comrade E. Honecker to Federal Chancellor Kohl regarding the Swedish proposal to establish a peace zone was published.
State Secretary [for Church Affairs Klaus] Gysi has had an interesting meeting in the United States with church representatives (at that occasion also with Reagan [at the National Prayer Breakfast]). An extensive written information about this is going to follow.
This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.
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