February 15, 1985
Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic
Ministry for State Security
Berlin, 15 February 1985
Highly Confidential Matter
O r d e r N u m b e r 1 /85
Tasks of MfS units concerning early uncovering of acute intentions of aggression and surprising military activities by imperialist states and alliances, in particular in order to prevent a surprise nuclear missile attack against states of the socialist community
In order to effectively implement tasks assigned by the party and state leadership to uncover peace-threatening and anti-socialist goals as well as intentions of the adversary, operative and operative-technological units of the MfS have to increase their efforts to gather indications and information in order to early uncover acute intentions of aggression and surprising military activities by imperialist states and alliances against states of the socialist community.
This mandates to intensify the use, as well as further development respectively creation, of those [agent] positions, respectively of sounding out and observation options, in the adversary's political, intelligence, and military command centers as well as its lines of communication.
Absolute priority in information gathering to implement these tasks goes to early identification of intentions of military aggression, in particular with regard to a surprise nuclear missile attack against states of the socialist community.
Gathering intelligence on the adversary's decision process preceding military measures is of special importance.
In order to ensure consequential implementation of these set of tasks
I a m o r d e r i n g:
1. All options at the disposal of operative and operative-technological MfS units that are able to gather information, primarily from non-socialist states and West Berlin, on early recognition of intentions of military aggression, in particular concerning a surprise nuclear missile attack (abbreviated from now on as KWA), have to be opened up in systematic and targeted manner.
2. In order to guarantee coordinated and targeted planning and launching of measures required to gather information, the Main Directorate Foreign Intelligence [HV A] will be tasked with coordination.
This includes the discharge of the coordinating function, the guarantee of a continuous centralized situation overview and assessment, as well as analysis and processing of incoming information on the KWA complex, the central orientation for [MfS] units, as well as the support of operative units for the handling of appropriate agents [IM, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter/ Unofficial Collaborators].
3. All information that will be gathered on the KWA complex by MfS units through IM or by operative-technological means, has to be forwarded immediately to HV A Department VII for analysis. [HV A Department VII] is also responsible for synchronization and analysis of those type of information vis-a-vis myself, my deputies in charge, and the heads of foreign intelligence of the [GDR] Ministry for National Defense [MfNV] and the KGB.
4. The heads of operative MfS units have to ensure that collaboration with IM, who have capabilities to gather information on the KWA complex respectively can be developed into respective positions, will be taken under their personal control, including the guarantee of instant communication in all situations and circumstances.
5. My deputy and head of the HV A has to submit to me for approval implementation instructions regarding this order. They have to define specific information needs and reporting duties, as well as required regulations on information flows and analyses of these informations.
6. This order comes into effect immediately.
This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.
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