June 24, 1957
Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the State of Soviet Foreign Policy
Suslov chairing. Com. Molotov has the floor.
Molotov: Comrades, I have already spoken about the fact that I wish further to touch on international issues. It seems to me that in this regard com. Khrushchev's efforts are not entirely successful. We all understand and consider it necessary to conduct, support, and stimulate those measures which assist the lessening of international tensions. This is the basis for our work on strengthening peace, on delaying and averting a new war. And we must by all means possible be careful that this policy gives the results that we want to derive from it.
In connection with this, I consider that when com. Khrushchev, in a conversation with the editor of the American newspaper, The New York Times, Turner Catledge, published on 14 May spoke about the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, he committed an error, an incorrect [step]; he spoke as follows: "Speaking more concretely about international tension, the matter, obviously, reduces in the final analysis to the relations between two countries-between the Soviet Union and the United States of America."
Molotov: And further, he says: "We consider that if the Soviet Union is able to come to an agreement [dogovorit'sia] with the United States, then it will not be hard to come to an agreement with England, France, and other countries."
Molotov: I consider this incorrect both in essence and in tactics. It does not accord with the Leninist policy in international affairs which has been approved by the 20th party congress. (Agitation in the hall)...
Molotov: ...we can fight against imperialism and win out over imperialism only by making use of contradictions in the imperialist camp. If we imagine that we can come to an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and therein see the expressed essence of our policy, then we forget the basic Leninist position on making use of "cracks", contradictions in the imperialist camp. We must not unite the imperialist and capitalist states around America, [must] not push for that and [must] not depict the situation in such a way that the Soviet Union must only agree with the United States of America, and all the remaining countries will supposedly play an insignificant role. No, comrades, now that we have become a great power, a powerful force, and have huge support in our socialist camp in the East and the West-in these conditions we must be particularly careful to deepen any split, any disagreements and contradictions in the imperialist camp, in order to weaken the international position of the United States of America-the most powerful of the imperialist powers. But imperially strong America cannot dictate everything to the other imperialist states. For that reason we support all sorts of contacts with non-socialist countries and consider it to be very important. We support contact with little Denmark, Norway, Burma, Egypt, and so on. Moreover, we bear in mind that the use of contradictions in the camp of the capitalist states has a very great significance. And only in that way, squeezing not only America, but also other states which diverge from or waiver within the capitalist camp, only in that way can we weaken America itself, which is struggling against us. For that reason the issue of the use of the stated contradictions, that we not forget about these contradictions-that is our most important issue in the whole of our foreign policy
[Ed. Note: After numerous interruptions]
Molotov: Let me finish. From a different angle, there is another shortcoming here. How can one reduce the matter to the relations between the USSR and the United States of America, forgetting about the socialist camp? Com. Khrushchev's formulation ignores all of the remaining socialist countries besides the USSR. One must not, however, ignore the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or the other socialist countries...
Kirilenko: Answer this question: who are such dogmatists, how are we to understand them?
Molotov: Maybe you are not up [plokho razbiraetes'] on this matter, com. Kirilenko, but how are the others relevant here [pri chem tut drugie]? I am talking about something that requires the attention of the comrades present at this plenum. For this reason I am saying important things, although maybe you do not agree with this. There is a measure of truth here, in any case. We have never formulated the issue of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and America as did com. Khrushchev. Once in 1924, Trotskii tried to throw out the slogan that now America had made a beggar of Europe. That was an anti-Marxist thing. Perhaps com. Khrushchev forgot this and has forgotten the lessons which the party had on that count in the past? But it doesn't hurt us to give a reminder about that. (Noise in the hall.)
I, comrades, want to say something further about the second mistake of com. Khrushchev in the statement to the editor of the newspaper The New York Times. Com. Khrushchev speaks in this way-I am citing from Pravda:
"If, for instance-N.S. Khrushchev adds as a joke-our minister Gromyko and your secretary Dulles met, in a hundred years they wouldn't agree on anything, and, perhaps, only our grandsons would wait long enough to get any results from these negotiations."
Voice. Read on.
Molotov: Read on yourself.
Voice: It is being said as a joke there.
Molotov: One does not play with the authority of the MID of the USSR in front of the bourgeois governments. It is incorrect in its essence, and it is tactically harmful to the Soviet state. And however much you say, these things must not be condoned, because they bring harm to our state, and let us tell com. Khrushchev that right to his face [priamo v glaza]...
Khrushchev: Imagine: the President in the presence of the other Finnish leaders invites guests to a steam bath, but the visitors spit and leave. That offends, insults them. When we returned to Moscow and they started to upbraid me for visiting the Finnish steam bath and Bulganin began to join in as well, I said: Molotov wants to depict me as an unprincipled person because I went to the bath. How can you not be ashamed of yourself? You here won't go with anyone. If you got your way, you would lead the country to the end of its tether [do ruchki], would argue with everyone, would lead [the country] to conflict. Look at your telegram from San Francisco; what did you write in it? You wrote that war could start right now. How could the foreign minister behave so?
Molotov: Don't make things up [Ne vydumyvaete], com. Khrushchev.
Voice: Com. Molotov, there is nothing left for you to do but drag out the dirty laundry [ubornuiu vytashchit']; you've stooped so low.
Mikhailov: Com. Khrushchev, both in former trips, and when he was in Finland, worked for the people, for the party, and you, com. Molotov, should be ashamed to spit on this work; it is not worthy of you.
Molotov: I disagree with com. Mikhailov. (Noise in the hall). The First Secretary could have behaved in a more dignified manner in Finland.
Voice: Tell us, how was it undignified?
Rudenko: And you consider it dignified to visit Hitler?
Voice: Better to go to a steam bath than to engage in conspiratorial activities.
Suslov. Com. Molotov, you reduced questions in international relations to a steam bath. It's possible to say that the CC reached correct foreign policy despite you.
Molotov. A lie [nepravda].
Pospelov. The July 1955 plenum recorded this.
Voice. On Yugoslavia
Molotov. That was discussed; there was a CC resolution; I voted for it. Comrades, on the Yugoslav issue I want to dwell on one point. At one point in the heat of polemics on the Yugoslav issue, com. Khrushchev imputed that I did not understand that on some issues the Chinese comrades could correct us. I understand this and recognize it. But I maintain that in the given case and in a series of other cases, things were ascribed to me that I did not say. I said something else. Once, when, on the basis of a ciphered communication from Beijing, I referred to the fact that com. Mao Zedong, criticizing the Yugoslav comrades, pointed out that they were behaving like Laborites and not like communists-on the basis of that case, I asked the question: why do we not understand what the Chinese comrades understand? On the given issue we should have figured it out earlier than them. That is what I said on the subject
Pospelov. You said: you are going to the fascists cap in hand [na poklon].
Molotov. There were exaggerations in relation to Yugoslavia, but not that sort. In a CC resolution in the summer of 1953, we wrote that the Yugoslavs should be treated like other bourgeois governments. You can find that resolution of the CC Presidium. Comrades, you must not say something that hasn't happened. But it was said by me, although the resolution was mistaken...
Molotov. Does our press, the selfsame Pravda, ever mention the name of Stalin? No, it modestly remains silent about Stalin, as if for 30 years Stalin did not play a prominent role in the history of our party and of the Soviet state.
We recognized his mistakes, but one must also talk about his achievements. Otherwise, the party itself is injured.
Voice. Why did you not made a statement about that at the 20th party congress?
Molotov. It was after the 20th congress, what I am saying to you. Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to attest that Stalin was such a communist that, God grant, every one should be; but after Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing so. This does not increase the authority of our party, since we are not giving a firm, clear answer; but that is what is demanded of us, and we should not permit anything else.
Khrushchev. You want to turn everything back, in order then to take up the axe yourself.
Molotov. No, that is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that is not what you want, and moreover, that is not what I want.
Note the following fact. There is a decree of the CC Presidium of 28 April 1955 on the archive of I.V. Stalin: "To confirm a commission to examine the documents from the archive of Stalin, staffed by coms. Khrushchev (chairman), Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pospelov, and Suslov." And, all the same, after 28 April 1955, the commission has not once met. They do not want to meet, and, after all, more than two years have gone by...
[Dmitrii] Shepilov. Bulganin already said that he did not meet with me at any meetings.
Voice. The members of the CC Presidium told what assessment you made, your approach to this issue.
Voice. Why is your surname in particular in this group, and not another, if you are not privy [to this matter]?
Khrushchev. You are against the cult of personality, and I, no less, have fought and fight against the cult of personality. But if you are such a fighter, then why did you, after Stalin's death, as editor of Pravda, falsify the photograph and place a shot of Malenkov next to Mao Zedong in the newspaper, when this did not actually happen [v prirode etogo ne bylo]?
Shepilov. It is true, that happened, and I was punished for doing so. I considered that the basic problem was our friendship with China, the closeness of the two heads of government-the symbol of this eternal friendship, and I did it in those interests; that was my mistake.
Khrushchev. For that the CC Presidium reprimanded you...
Mikoian. Comrades, first of all I want to talk about some facts which have brought the party leadership chosen after the 20th party congress to its present state, when the plenum meets amidst the crisis of the party leadership. Now we have a crisis in the party leadership; that must be frankly stated.
Voice. No, there is no crisis.
Mikoian. I am talking about the crisis in the CC Presidium.
[Averki] Aristov. But the CC Presidium is not the leadership of our party. The leadership is the CC.
Mikoian. Com. Aristov has spoken correctly.
After the 20th party congress showed ideological unity, we considered that collective leadership was the guarantee of the success of our party, and tried in every way to uphold that unity. It seemed that everyone tried. There were disagreements on separate issues, disputes, but insofar as they did not turn into a system, they did not harm the cause...
The events in Poland and Hungary were a great test for our party and our leadership, [and] for the CC Presidium. I was very glad, [and] everyone else was very happy that in those days our CC Presidium was wholly unified and firm. On such serious issues, unity was gratifying.1 It was pleasant for me that the comrades with whom we disagreed, like Molotov, Kaganovich, [and] Malenkov, in this matter behaved as was appropriate, although it should be noted that on the issue of the new Hungarian leadership, com. Molotov did not agree. Malenkov behaved well in Hungary, and it was believed that he had come into line [voshel v obshchuiu koleiu]. That is how it was until recently.
After the February 1957 CC Plenum, from the point where the issue of the organization of the sovnarkhoz [large collective farms] was decided, the atmosphere began to worsen; an unstated dissatisfaction on the part of some members of the Presidium was evident; disagreement was noted, [and] it was felt that some people were not saying everything [they thought]. Then it was still bearable, but the atmosphere continued to poison the situation...
Until recently there was no sign of the formation of a group in the CC Presidium, but there was some impression that com. Molotov [and] com. Kaganovich were sometimes silent, as if they had come to an understanding. They avoided arguing with one another. For instance, I did not avoid argument with Molotov or Kaganovich, but they avoided argument between themselves. Perhaps there were no grounds for disagreement? There were. Recently, Malenkov also began avoiding arguments with them. There was one case in which he agreed that he had not acted entirely properly; that was in relation to Yugoslavia. In connection with the incorrect speech by com Tito in Pula, Soviet communists and the communist parties of other countries delivered a dignified rebuff. As a result, by its own fault, the Yugoslav party ended up practically in isolation from the other communist parties. After this, the Yugoslav leadership began to speak out in conversations with our comrades and made known its desire to improve relations with us in its open statements.
On com. Khrushchev's suggestion, we discussed this issue in the CC Presidium and decided to instruct [Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia] com. [Nikolai] Firiubin to engage in an appropriate conversation with com. Tito at the instructions of the CC Presidium.
Several days before this, information about the fact that one Yugoslav diplomat tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to win over one important leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] to the Yugoslav side, was sent around to the members of the CC Presidium. Thus, in connection with a discussion of measures to improve relations with Yugoslavia, com. Molotov introduced a proposal that the CC CPSU inform all fraternal parties that Yugoslav diplomats were engaging in the recruitment of communists in fraternal parties. The adoption of com. Molotov's proposal would have led, of course, to the disruption of the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, because such an appeal by us to all parties could not be hidden from the Yugoslav leadership, and, in this, it would see duplicity in our policies and the absence of a true wish to reconcile. This was, in essence, Molotov's wish to put a fly in the ointment [vlit' lozhku degtia v bochku meda].
Then they talked very calmly about this; there were no insults. Khrushchev said: Viacheslav, you again want to continue your line on disputes with Yugoslavia. I also calmly spoke twice, criticizing com. Molotov; com. Bulganin criticized him. Malenkov sat opposite and stayed silent. I know that Malenkov was against this; on many political issues he was not close to the views of Molotov and Kaganovich, but he sat and kept silent...
Mikoian. Generally there was unity in the Presidium on the Hungarian issue, but I must say that com. Molotov held an incorrect line in relation to the new Hungarian leaders.
Imagine that tomorrow, on 4 November, our troops had to move out [vystuplenie] all over Hungary, but by this evening it was still unclear who would be at the head of the new government of Hungary, by whose summons and in support of whom our troops were mobilizing. Why? Khrushchev and Malenkov were in Yugoslavia meeting with the Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs over the course of two days in order to obtain their agreement for the use of our troops. I was busy with getting [Janos] Kadar, [Ferenc] Muennich, and others out of Budapest; there was still no government, [and] they were discussing whom to move into the government. We proposed Kadar. Molotov insisted that [Andras] Hegedus be at the head-the former prime minister. He asked: who is this Kadar? We, he implied [mol], did not know him and were slighting him. We could not agree on the composition of the government. Zhukov said: I cannot put off the operation; there is already an order to our troops to move out. Molotov insisted on reinstating the old leadership.
Molotov. That's not correct; we spoke about Muennich.
Mikoian. You proposed Hegedus; before his departure to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev proposed Muennich; others proposed Kadar-we argued all day. If there had been no argument, why not agree right away on the composition of the government? We had it out [rugalis'] with you, argued fiercely. Bulganin and other comrades should remember.
Khrushchev. Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoian], when, during the Hungarian events, Malenkov and I returned from our trip to a series of people's democratic countries and Yugoslavia, we had formed the opinion that we must support Kadar's candidacy. Some called for Muennich's candidacy. He is an honorable comrade who likes us; I did military training together with him in the Proletarian Division. He is an excellent comrade, but in the given situation, com. Kadar is the best candidate.
Mikoian. Only after com. Khrushchev's arrival was it possible to specify the composition of the government headed by Kadar. Com. Kadar is from the working class and is a serious person, and that has now been justified. It is good that com. Khrushchev reminded [us]. There was the following case: Molotov calls and proposes a meeting. On what topic? [Matyas] Rakosi wrote a letter to the HSWP, [saying] that they were not allowing him back into Hungary and requested that he remain here. Molotov asked: who decided, how, why? He considered that the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium was called for. And when we met at the next regular meeting [i.e., no special session had been called], he insisted that Rakosi and [Erno] Gero be given the chance to work.
Molotov. Who insisted? That is not exact.
Mikoian. After all, you demanded the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium in order to discuss Rakosi's letter, which came to the CC CPSU Presidium with an accusation against the new leadership of the HSWP. Two days later [cherez den'], at the next meeting of the CC Presidium, you spoke with a criticism of the resolution of the CC Plenum of the HSWP that at present and in the near future, the interests of the HSWP demanded that Rakosi, Gero, Hegedus [be prevented from working] in Hungary, but remain in the Soviet Union for a specified period. You demanded that Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus return to Hungary. If we had heeded Molotov['s advice], we would have lost the trust of the Hungarian party; the Hungarians would have thought that we were playing a double game. We argued with Molotov: Rakosi did not see what was happening, became detached from reality and led the party into a catastrophe. While located in Moscow, he called certain of his supporters in Budapest on the telephone and, essentially, led a group struggle against the new Hungarian leadership. In connection with this we told him: do not live in Moscow; live in another city, and don't mess things up [ne port' dela].
Khrushchev. When the Hungarian government delegation visited us, Molotov said to Kadar: why are you not taking Rakosi with you? This question once again upset the Hungarian leaders. They thought that we were supporting them [only] on a temporary basis, and that then Rakosi would once again come to power in Hungary.
Mikoian. It's true; during the reception, com. Molotov scolded Kadar [as to] why they weren't taking Rakosi back to work in Hungary. Such behavior by com. Molotov was incorrect.
Molotov. We were talking not about Rakosi, but about Hegedus.
Mikoian. You were talking about Rakosi.
Mikoian. In relation to the [Presidium] Saturday meeting, at which Bulganin said that Khrushchev acted incorrectly. What does that consist of?
The people's democratic countries request that, when we order equipment for the next year, the orders be given out at least six months' in advance, so that blueprints can be drawn up and inventories can be ordered. Otherwise, it is impossible-to order in January and receive the products in January. This is an elementary thing. Not only our friends, but also the capitalists demand this.
This is an indisputable issue, but arguments have begun around it: will we be able to pay for the equipment? Here we order, but what will we pay with? I provide information: in all, we buy 16 billion rubles in goods, and now we are talking about a preliminary order for 3 billion rubles in equipment, and these are needed goods. Why should we not be able to pay? We will be able to. There is no issue here. The total volume of trade will be approximately the same as last year's.
Finally, what does this mean politically? On the whole, equipment is being supplied by the GDR and Czechoslovakia. If we do not strengthen East Germany, where workers are supporting their communist government, our army will end up in the fire. And, after all, there is an army of a half million [men] there. We cannot lose the sympathy of the German populace. If we lose their sympathy and trust-that will mean the loss of East Germany. And what would the loss of East Germany mean? We know what that would be, and for that reason operate on the basis that we must use the capacity of East German industry in full. Then the workers of the GDR will have work and will give us what we need; otherwise we will have to give the GDR both goods and food, without receiving equipment in return. I consider that our position is absolutely correct.
Mikoian. But we are told: you will order, but will we be able to pay? This is an issue unto itself-a great political issue. I kept calm, although I am also a quick-tempered person, but Nikita Sergeevich caught the scent of the whole political edge of the issue. Seeing that a majority against the draft was forming, he said the following phrase: "I would like on this issue in particular to hold a vote and to remain in the minority." The socialist camp has been created because it is important to strengthen it and not to permit wavering. If East Germany and Czechoslovakia today are left without orders, the whole socialist camp will crack. Who needs such a camp if we cannot ensure orders? After all, the issue stands as such: either feed the workers of the GDR for free, or provide orders, or otherwise lose the GDR entirely. That is why Nikita Sergeevich blew up [vzorvalsia]. I also almost blew up.
Voices. Blew up.
Khrushchev. Now it is clear that they had an understanding to fight us on this issue.
Mikoian. I also think so...
Comrades, after the Hungarian and Polish events, our prestige abroad temporarily weakened somewhat. First, we bared our teeth to the enemies, the Americans, for Hungary, and bared our teeth for Egypt and achieved a halt to the war which had started there.
Then they again conducted a policy of disarmament in order to turn the sympathy of the petty-bourgeois elements toward them. Molotov says that the Leninist policy of using the contradictions of the imperialist camp is not being put into practice. But he makes [only] one citation. First of all, he incorrectly interprets it. But even so, let us assume that he is correctly interpreting it. Look at our party's policy on splitting the bourgeois world. Our comrades went to India and to Burma, and managed to undermine the influence of the imperialist powers on the countries of Asia.
Mikoian. Earlier we had no access to the Arab countries; English influence had such a hold on the Muslim religion, that we had no access there. Three imperialist powers gathered together and decided all of the issues of the Near East without us. But when we sold arms to Egypt, we bared our teeth to our enemies, and Nasser turned out to be a strong leader, so that now they cannot any longer resolve the issues of the Near East without us.
Is that not a realization of the Leninist policy on using the contradictions of the imperialist camp? In the given case we are supporting bourgeois nationalists against the imperialists.
Mikoian. Com. Voroshilov went to Indonesia. Indonesia is a bourgeois state, in many ways feudal, even, which only recently won its political independence. They met Voroshilov triumphantly not only because he is a good person, but because he represents the Soviet Union. Remember the age we are living in, and the strength we have. The Indonesians are a 70-million-strong people; they have a smart President, Sukarno, but in order to strengthen his power with the people, he needs a visit from Voroshilov, in order to strengthen his influence through him. What strength we have and communism has...
They accuse com. Khrushchev of being hot-tempered and harsh [goriach i rezok]. But there they went and met without him. You can't imagine the precipitousness and fervor of coms. Molotov and Kaganovich at the meeting of the Presidium! In the course of less than 10 days at three sessions of the CC Presidium on the three foreign-trade issues this now open grouping held trial battles, specifically on trade with Austria, on orders for equipment in people's democratic countries, on trade with Finland. After this, an attack started along the whole front. It is true, Finland is a bourgeois country and borders us, but is that really important to us? We know this through war with the Finns and the Germans. The Finnish people knows how to make war, and our task, not to make war, is the greatest task for our state. For that very reason coms. Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Finland and succeeded there...
Further, what did we do in foreign policy? Com. Khrushchev proposed that a letter be written from com. Bulganin to the Norwegians. At that time we had been arguing with the Norwegians after the Hungarian events, so let's now write a letter to the Norwegians, but say politely that if you meddle in military affairs, we will wipe you off the face of the earth [sotrem s litsa zemli]. We approved this, and it turned out to be a good idea.
Khrushchev. To speak about serious issues in a friendly tone.
Mikoian. The people from MID [Midovtsy] have now begun to write drafts of notes and letters. Well before, they put together documents very badly, in a criminal, crude way of speaking, stereotypically; it was impossible to read them.
That has made a huge impression. They sent letters to the English as well. They were influential. They addressed the French people. They didn't write to Eisenhower, not to everyone, but only to those of whom I have talked. Does this mean that we know how to see and use contradictions? We have been using the contradictions of capitalism everywhere in our foreign policy.
Molotov has picked on one sentence of com. Khrushchev's: the USSR and the USA are the only possessors of atomic weapons, and now decide the questions of war and peace.
Khrushchev. Or the following fact: when we proposed to the President of the USA, Eisenhower, to call England and France to order during the English and French attack on Egypt. Was that not a use of contradictions?
Mikoian. I am concerned about time, and for that reason do not talk about that. Remember the circumstances: there was an uprising in Hungary; our troops occupied Budapest, and the Anglo-French decided: the Russians are stuck in Hungary, [so] let's hit Egypt; they can't help; they can't fight on two fronts. We'll pour dirt on the Russians, they say, and we will thump Egypt; we will deprive the Soviet Union of influence in the Near East. That is what they decided, and we found both the strength to keep troops in Hungary and to threaten the imperialists that if they do not end the war in Egypt, it could lead to the use of missile weapons by us. Everyone recognizes that with that we decided the fate of Egypt. Even before that, we made a move that com. Khrushchev talked about. Since the Americans were conducting a different policy from the English, and did not want to dirty themselves with a colonial war, [or] that their "friends" be so dirtied, but to do in Egypt themselves [a samim ukhlopat' Egipet]. We said the following to the Americans: let's introduce American-Soviet troops together in order to restore peace in Egypt, which would accord with the goals of the United Nations. This produced a huge effect.
From the point of view of using the contradictions of imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has never been such a broad practice, such rich results, as in recent years in our Central Committee with the participation of com. Khrushchev...
Voice. Correct (Applause).
1 Ed. Note.: It is especially ironic to hear Mikoian praise the opposition's unity in 1956, since he himself was the main dissenter from the decision to invade Hungary. Unanimity of decision was only formally maintained because Mikoian was in Budapest, protesting long-distance, when the actual decision to intervene was made on 30-31 October 1956. For more on this, see "The Malin Notes on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956" Translated, annotated and introduced by Mark Kramer, CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 385-410."
The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.
Associated People & Organizations
- Arab countries--Foreign relations--Soviet Union
- Communist countries--Internal relations
- Protest movements
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 20th Congress
- Anti-imperialist movements
- Chinese Communist Party
- Hungary--History--Revolution, 1956
- International communist movement
- Soviet Union--Foreign relations--Yugoslavia
- Soviet Union. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Arab-Israeli conflict
- Soviet Union--Foreign relations--United States
- China--Foreign relations--Soviet Union
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