Skip to content

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Chalfont at 6:50p.m. on 1 March 1967]

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT FOR THE RECORD

The Prime Minister held a meeting with the Foreign Secretary and Lord Chalfont at 6.50 p.m. on Wednesday March 1 at No. 10 Downing Street. Sir Burke Trend, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Sir Solly Zuckerman, Mr. Halls and Mr. Palliser were also present.

1. The meeting approved in principle the attached outline Brief for Sir Solly Zuckerman’s visit to Bonn.

2. The draft non-proliferation treaty, the problems of controls (Article 3 of the draft treaty) and the possible relationship between the treaty and the British approach to Europe

 

The Foreign Secretarysaid that he had no doubt of Sir Solly Zuckerman's ability to explain the technical issues to the Germans or of Lord Chalfont's to explain the technical issues in their political context when he visited Brussels on March 6 for talks with the EURATOM Commission. But we needed to establish whether our purposes should be to persuade the Europeans to accept control provisions which the U.S. Government wanted but to which the Russians were indifferent; or whether we should adopt a more European point of view. The Soviet Union would not refuse to sign the treaty without an article embodying the I.A.E.A. safeguards; and if we brought pressure to bear on the U.S. Government they too would accept it. If there were no such article in the treaty, member countries of EURATOM signing the treaty could nevertheless continue to operate EURATOM safeguards. In his view, having regard to the current British approach to Europe and to the fact that we ourselves would willingly give up the proposed article 3 if this were the only way to get the treaty, our posture in the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries.

Lord Chalfont agreed that it was immaterial to the Soviet Union whether the treaty contained a safeguards article or not. But the Russians insisted that, if the treaty were to provide for safeguards, these should be under I.A.E.A. and not EURATOM. The present American position was that a treaty without a safeguards article was unacceptable. The U.S. Government might conceivably be persuaded to abandon this position but only with great difficulty. The U.S. Government believed that Congress would not ratify a non-proliferation treaty without a safeguards clause. The draft article would impose I.A.E.A. safeguards on all civil nuclear activities of non-nuclear signatories. The British attitude was that, despite our position as a nuclear power, we would accept the I.A.E.A. safeguards voluntarily and outside the provisions of the treaty. Accordingly he suggested that our tactics should be to use our unique position as a European power, with an existing nuclear capability but uncommitted to the safeguards article, to seek to establish the real extent of the anxieties of our potential partners in Europe and do what we could to set those at rest. If we failed to do so, we could then seek to persuade the U.S. Government to drop their insistence on the inclusion of safeguards within the treaty.

After further discussion, the Prime Minister said that Sir Solly Zuckerman and Lord Chalfont should take the following line in their forthcoming talks in Germany and with EURATOM. They should explain our reasons for being relatively unconcerned at the likely affect of the operation of I.A.EA. safeguards; but that we equally would accept a treaty without a safeguards article. Without in any way appearing to speak as “American missionaries”, they should explain that the U.S. Government had grave doubts about Congressional ratification of any treaty without such an article. This did not mean that we were urging the European countries to accept this article for the sole reason that the Americans wanted it. We thought that by a joint study of their anxieties, we might in the light of our experiences be able to set these at rest; and this was particularly the case because we were examining the whole question as a potential new member of EURATOM, with a powerful contribution to make to that organization once we had joined it. Our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles.

The Prime Minister said that it should emerge from Sir Solly Zuckerman’s exchanges with the Germans to what extent it would be possible to allay their anxieties, on the basis of the approach he had just outlined and of the technical arguments set out in the attached brief. If the Germans remained unsatisfied by these arguments Sir Solly Zuckerman should not undertake immediately to revert to the charge with the Americans. He should first report on his discussions to London; and, in the light of this report, it could be decided what further instructions to send him before he left Bonn; and what line it would be appropriate for Lord Chalfont to take with the EURATOM Commission in Brussels.

 [signature]

March 2, 1967

 

Distribution:-

Foreign Secretary

Lord Chalfont

Sir Burke Trend

Sir Paul Gore-Booth

Sir Solly Zuckerman

 

[…]

 

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN’S VISIT TO BONN

 

1. The main object of the visit is to persuade the Germans that they will not be denied any aspect of the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

 

(a) if they are denied opportunities for developing nuclear weapons

(b) and if they accept a general application of safeguards, whether they be

(i) EURATOM

(ii) IAEA

or (iii) Any other agreed safeguards to be administered through any Agency.

2. In technical discuss the Germans should be pressed to state the problems they envisage in specific and not in general terms. We should then respond with the counter arguments.

3. We can illustrate our own experience in developing nuclear energy for civil purposes without any dependence on spin-off from military work. Most of the AEA has never been exposed to military work. Canada is a prime example of a highly sophisticated nuclear power in the civil field, without ever having done any military work.

4. The UK already accepts IAEA safeguards at one of our civil power stations. We have said we would be prepared to accept them universally if that were to advance the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. In accepting safeguards at one of our civil power stations, we exercise the right to refuse Soviet inspectors.

6. Effective safeguards must be seen to be effective and call for international rather than self or regional inspection.

7. IAEA is required to operate in a manner designed to avoid hampering a state’s economic or technological development.

8. IAEA is required to take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets.

9. In answer to the argument that nuclear explosions could be used for peaceful purposes, the Germans can be assured that:

(a) the technical and economic advantage of these have yet to be demonstrated.

(b) if they can be shown to have worthwhile economic advantages, these advantages will be made available to the non-nuclear weapon powers. Similarly for any technological “fall-out” if there should be any, at some time in the future.

10. The Germans may be worried by the prospect of France developing as a nuclear weapon power, while not a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty and not subject to its safeguards clause. But if France were to sign the treaty immediately she would already be regarded as a nuclear weapon power and therefore not subject to safeguards under the treaty. In so far as she is still developing a military potential she is doing so in spite of Euratom safeguards.

 

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.



Related Documents

October 28, 1966

J. A. Thomson (Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office) to J.E.D. Street (Head of the Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign Office), 'German Views on Non-Proliferation'

Before and after de Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Britain's second EEC application, Britain's position in Europe and its relationships with existing EEC states shaped the UK's role in the NPT negotiations. Prior to 1967, London canvassed opinion in EEC capitals, particularly in Bonn. As the NPT negotiations wound their way through the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (of which the United Kingdom was a member) in 1967, British representatives reported deep-seated concerns in Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Luxembourg City, Paris, and Rome that a non-proliferation agreement might threaten the continued functioning of EURATOM, namely that its power might be subsumed into the IAEA, opening non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) up to commercial espionage conducted by inspectors representing the nuclear-weapon states (NWS).

February 22, 1967

Non-Proliferation and Our Entry into E.E.C.

The Harold Wilson government was continually focused on the issue of demonstrating that Britain should be seen as a “European” power with interests compatible with the existing EEC membership. This high-level Foreign Office note queried what the UK could do when pulled in different directions by the need to finalize a non-proliferation treaty while avoiding unnecessary damage to its European interests. This memorandum was drafted against a background of rumblings from EEC capitals that by tacitly supporting NPT proposals put forward by U.S. officials the Wilson government was being anti-European.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, Sir Burke Trend, and Sir Solly Zuckerman at 10:30a.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

May 18, 1967

Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 'Non-Proliferation'

By the early summer of 1967, Foreign Secretary George Brown felt compelled to comment that "if the situation should arise in which there is a direct confrontation between the United States and Russians on one side—and the members of EURATOM on the other, on the issue of the acceptability of EURATOM safeguards we should have to consider our position very carefully: the whole success of our European policy might depend on the choice we made. For the present it should therefore be a major aim of our policy at Geneva to see that things do not reach such a state." This came only a week after Wilson formally launched the UK's bid to become a member of the EEC, and two days after De Gaulle cast doubt on Britain's fitness to join the community.

September 21, 1967

Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson

When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

October 2, 1967

Letter from Derek Day (Foreign Office) to Michael Palliser (Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister)

Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.

January 26, 1968

"Defence And Oversea Policy Committee: Non-Proliferation: Memorandum By The Minister Of State For Foreign Affairs "

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

Document Information

Source

TNA, Records of the Prime Minister's Office (PREM), 13/1888.Contributed by Malcolm Craig.

Rights

The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date

2023-02-15

Type

Memorandum

Language

Record ID

300408

Original Classification

Confidential

Donors

Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)