Notification from the Central Committee on the Romania-Soviet Relationship and Our Policy towards Romania

Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Zhongfa [63] No. 328

[Top Secret] (Only for relevant comrades in provincial party committees and central departments. Please return after reading)

Notification from the Central Committee on the Romania-Soviet Relationship and Our Policy towards Romania

To all central-level departments; party committees in provinces (cities) and autonomous regions; central-level ministries; and party organizations:

On April 24th, the Romanian ambassador visited comrade Peng Zhen personally and, unofficially, notified the Central Committee about the recent Romanian-Soviet relationship. The Romanian ambassador mentioned the following issues:

1. Khrushchev uses principles between capitalist countries in relationships among socialist countries and fraternal parties. He wants to integrate economies in the CMEA like the western common market and turned Romania into a puppet. Romanians strongly reject this idea. Because of this, Khrushchev once intimidated representatives in CMEA during a visit, saying: follow me if you are willing to; otherwise, you can do whatever you prefer.

2. When dealing with the problems of the socialist revolution, Khrushchev only cares about the economic side while neglecting political factors. Thus, Khrushchev’s policy promotes the development of opportunism. By being willing to compete with capitalist countries, [Khrushchev] already created chaos in the international communist movement. The CCP’s criticism of Thorez is correct.

3. The Moscow Statement correctly evaluated Yugoslavia’s political program. Yugoslavia has not changed. Even if it changed, [dealing with Yugoslavia] should be discussed and decided among fraternal parties.

4. It is unnecessary to deploy missiles in Cuba. Big issues like this should be discussed with fraternal countries. Dej expressed his concern to Khrushchev.

5. Khrushchev said the cause of peace has relied on him and Kennedy. What about other political forces?

6. In 1960, Dej refused to hold the Bucharest conference several times. However, Khrushchev forced him to do so. During the German national congress, Khrushchev shouted at the honorable Chinese representatives while clapping at the Yugoslavian representatives. This is a blatant violation of the Moscow agreement, and we cannot bear it. They did not try to oppose international capitalism but tried to oppose China and Albania.

7. Instead of negotiations, Khrushchev uses the model of leading and being led when approaching relations with other fraternal parties. [The Romanians] expressed dissatisfaction with Khrushchev’s interventions when he visited Romania in 1962.

8. Stalin said it is Leninist for proletarians to raise the flag of ethnic independence. Now the Soviets don’t mention this anymore. Stalin has mistakes, but many of his sayings are correct and respected by the international communist movement.

9. The Romanian Central Plenary has decided to express its position on what is happening to the communist movement. The Plenary permitted the right of the Politburo to announce this to fraternal parties. The form and the range of this announcement have not been decided.

Comrade Peng Zhen expressed his sympathy and understanding for the Romanian ambassador’s words, and Peng discussed our viewpoints. Peng pointed out that everything that violated Marxist-Leninism would eventually be abandoned by our practice.

The Romanian ambassador’s talk proves that the Romanian-Soviet relationship has deteriorated. The Romanian-Soviet conflict is now sharp. Not only are there conflicts in interests, but also a series of divisions in mindset and principles. Moreover, Romania has decided to struggle with Khrushchev. To do that, Romania is preparing work domestically and inside the party. At the same time, it is seeking support from left-wing fraternal parties. The turning of Romanian indicated that Khrushchev’s “weak majority” was collapsing, and this is a great piece of news for us. We should welcome that. However, we also need to see that Romania did not publicly depart from Khrushchev. If Khrushchev was willing to compromise with the Romanians, their relations might improve. Nonetheless, the Romanians will not listen to the command [of Moscow] as before. Their conflicts are hard to mediate and will erupt sooner or later. At the same time, we must point out that the Romanian party was still not close to us in many important problems related to principles. 

According to the situation above, we should change our past policy towards Romania. Now we should be more active and try to persuade Romania to turn left. Therefore, the ministries and departments should pay attention to the following points:

1. Actively but steadily increase propaganda and friendly activities. The reception of Romanian delegations should remain at the same level as other Eastern European countries, but we should be more welcoming to them in practice. We should try our best to meet their reasonable needs, but do not try too hard. When meeting personnel from the Romanian embassy, we should also hold a warm, welcoming attitude. Every reasonable request raised by them should be satisfied. At the same time, we must fully appreciate the complex situation of Romanian personnel and be vigilant during contact to prevent pro-Khrushchev elements from taking advantage of loopholes. If we have confidential matters, we can talk directly to the Romanian ambassador or to the relevant Romanian person in charge through our embassy in Romania. 

2. When contacting [Romanians], we need to express our enthusiasm, humility, tolerance, and forgiveness on the consistent basis of Marxism-Leninism. Listen to the opinions from the other side. When they have good points, we can praise them. To the pressure they are facing, we can express our sympathy. To issues that are not true, we can state our viewpoint but avoid criticizing the other side or putting pressure on them. If the other party says that their anti-China behavior in the past was unintentional, you can express your understanding of their situation. If the other party complains about their unfriendly behavior in the past, you can say that it was a thing of the past and that you hope to strengthen our unity in the future.

3.  We should meet the additional orders proposed by the Romanian side in 1963 as much as possible. We should be prepared to assist in principle with their need to import iron ore, cotton, and other materials. If they request that we import oil and some machinery, we should also give these requests priority consideration. We should agree to the Romanian side's request to provide cargo for the new Far East shipping route and strive to respond as soon as possible. Regarding cultural exchanges and scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries, these can also be appropriately increased if the Romanian side is willing to do so.

4. In terms of publicity and reporting, we should gradually increase coverage of the domestic situation in Romania as Sino-Romanian relations evolve. We can provide some objective reporting to support Romania's resistance to Soviet pressure, but it is not appropriate to comment on Romanian-Soviet relations at this time.

5.Regarding the Romanian-Soviet conflict, we should avoid discussing it when interacting with personnel from capitalist countries. Do not initiate discussions about it with Soviet and Eastern European personnel; if they bring it up, we should just listen without commenting. Conversations with embassies and delegations from North Korea, Vietnam, and Albania can occur under appropriate circumstances, but do not disclose everything. Treat fraternal parties in capitalist countries according to the principles applied to socialist countries, making distinctions as necessary.

All regions and departments, upon receiving this notice, should handle matters related to Romania according to the above principles. Strict confidentiality should be maintained regarding the Romanian ambassador's visit to Comrade Peng Zhen; this information should not be disseminated or passed on externally. For party members and cadres involved in relevant work, a general explanation of the current state of Romanian-Soviet relations and the changes in Romania's attitude towards China and Albania can be provided. The instructions of the above-mentioned precautions should be appropriately conveyed, and they must be strictly enforced.

Central Committee

9 May 1963

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