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September 3, 1968

The Position of the Communist Party of Cuba Towards the Conference of the Communist Parties and the Problems of the International Revolutionary Movement

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CONFIDENTIAL

 

The position of the Communist Party of Cuba towards the conference of the Communist Parties and the problems of the international revolutionary movement.

 

The Cuban position on the main problems of the international revolutionary movement was expressed again in F. Castro's speech of August 23rd this year.

The Cuban line differs from the platform of the international workers' movement in its assessment of the current world situation, strategy and tactics and the prospects of the socialist revolution, as well as in the methods of socialist construction.

The world communist movement, in Cuba's opinion, is weakened not only by Sino-Soviet differences, towards which Cuba declares neutrality and avoids engaging in polemics, but also by a dogmatic interpretation of Marxism.

Cuba formulates general reservations about the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement, and in particular about the line of peaceful coexistence, which, in Cuba's opinion, does not ensure the security of small states. x /

The Cuban approach to the problem of disarmament stems from the conviction that there is currently no system of guarantees for all countries. In Cuba's opinion, any partial disarmament steps only strengthen the position of the imperialist states. For these reasons, Cuba has not signed the Moscow Treaty on the partial ban on nuclear tests and abstains from voting in the UN on resolutions aimed at partial steps to limit nuclear armaments.

Cuba, in its own way, also assesses the general situation in the world. The fight for peace - in Cuba's assessment - makes sense insofar as it does not lead to the abandonment of a consistently revolutionary policy towards imperialism.

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x/ "The concept of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, if it does not ensure the integrity, sovereignty and independence of all countries - including small ones - is in its essence contrary to the principles of proletarian internationalism "… "If we want peace, we should achieve it for all nations, equally" /from the Declaration of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party of May 21, 1967/.

[end p. 1]

According to Cuba, the threat of nuclear conflict is simply blackmail by the imperialist states and "is a more effective weapon for the imperialists than their nuclear arsenal" (declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of May 21, 1967).

Based on these premises, Kuba expresses full solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of the nations, which it considers to be basically only an armed struggle, and demands such solidarity from all SCs. The position on this issue, according to Kuba, constitutes in the present times, X/ the basic criterion of proletarian internationalism. x /

Cuba is inclined to recognize the struggle of national liberation movements against imperialism as the main front.

Cuban assessments tend to blur the class sense of the division of the contemporary world, emphasizing instead the division into poor and rich countries, industrialized (including European Communist states) and backward [zacofane] countries.

The above is the basis for the Cuban position on economic competition with capitalism. According to Cuba, this is an unrealistic and harmful concept, as it focuses the socialist camp on the welfare of its own societies, which leads to, among other things, a reduction in the Communist states’s aid for backward countries and national liberation movements.

In the Cuban assessment, economic relations with European socialist countries are intended by the USA as a tool for internal disintegration and division of the Communist states.

The Cuban line in internal affairs is characterized by a complete abandonment of material incentives, the proclamation of moral incentives as the only stimulant in economic and social life, and a course towards shifting the distribution of income from individual to collective consumption, which is supposed to express the Cuban concept of simultaneously building socialism and communism.

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x/ The fragment of the above-quoted Declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba is significant, and reads: "We provide and will provide assistance - whenever they turn to us - to all revolutionary movements that fight imperialism in any part of the world" ... "We will never agree to the status quo that imperialism wants to impose on humanity".

[end p. 2]

Cuba refuses to participate in the meetings of the communist movement because it realizes that its line would be isolated. It also wants to avoid joining - by the very fact of participating in the meeting - in the criticism of the Chinese Commuist Party's divisive activities.

Formally, Cuba made its participation in the Moscow conference dependent on the presence of Vietnam, which, given the known position of the Vietnamese party, would mean that the Cuban Communist Party would not take part in the conference.

The Czechoslovak events have not so far caused any significant changes in Cuba's public position towards the conference.

As it would seem from the information gathered so far, Cuba had no intention of participating in the rival meeting of the splinter parties in Albania, nor had it – so far – shown any great interest in the initiative of the Communist Party of Japan to convene a conference of anti-imperialist forces from five continents to aid Vietnam.

 

3.IX.1968

 

Edited by E. Noworyta

 

[end p. 3]

This report describes how the Cuban Communist Party's position diverges from the broader international communist movement and how it desires to maintain neutrality in Sino-Soviet disputes.

Author(s):



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Document Information

Source

AMSZ, D.VI-1969, 36/75, W-2, p. 1. Contributed and translated by Radoslav Yordanov.

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2025-01-14

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301470

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Confidential

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