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March 19, 1958

A Report from Comrade Sluczanski based on a Telegram from Comrade Siedlecki regarding the Agenda of the March Conference

As long as the correspondence

abstract is not an appendix to the

documents of a given case, it must

be absolutely destroyed.Top secret!


Correspondence abstract No. 3336 [trans. note:  number filled into a preexisting form]

from Pyongyang [city filled in] on 19.3.58 [date filled in]


Comr. Sluczanski


Comr. Siedlecki informs us in telegram No. 70 of the 18th of this month
Our 68

Agenda of the March conference:

1. Guidelines of the 5-year plan.

2. About the unity and cohesiveness of the party.

3. Organizational matters.


Re. 1. The fundamental task of the plan is to resolve at least in principle the problems of food, clothing and housing. Heavy industry: to develop above all those of its branches which are tied most closely to the above-mentioned issues. Here, I will give only 2 of the most important problems.


a. the construction of machines: to develop also the production of machine tools, with the exception of the more complicated ones,

b. in view of the shortage of their own raw materials for the textile industry, to develop the production of synthetic textiles based on cellulose and calcium carbide.  Light industry: as its main task, textiles, shoes, generally broaden the assortment, raise the quality. Construction program: 10 million square meters in the cities and 200 thousand houses in the countryside. The global value of industrial production grows 2.6 times. The minimal crop plan for ’61 is 3 million 760 thousand tons.  Transportation becomes a bottleneck. Because of this, the only factory mentioned during the information [session] was Wonsan, where Poland is helping to organize the production of new train cars. Another plenum will be convened before the summer, devoted to reorganizing trade, which has become another bottleneck in the development of the totality of the economy. Shortly, a session of the parliament [Supreme People’s Assembly] will take place, to make a resolution about the harvest.


Kim Il Sung, among other things, stated the 8 basic economic indicators foreseen for 1961 and stated that all, with the exception of steel, are higher than the corresponding indicators for Japan of 1955.” [trans. note: no visible opening quotation marks]


Re. 2. Factionalism, particularism, sectarianism, cliquishness led to the closing down of the party long before liberation. In the North, after liberation a battle was fought with this. The defeat of these manifestations of bourgeois ideology is the “main task of our time.” There was no such battle in the South. This is why the party was shattered there during the war, and the further outcomes of this harmful behavior should have been closed down then in the North. Until recently, there existed the belief that there are no revisionists in the DPRK. The August group was a manifestation of revisionism. It is symptomatic that its activity occurred in the period of the reaction’s attacks against the international workers’ movement and against the USSR. From the ideological angle, the factionalists:


a. denied the leading role of the party in favor of the Front of National Unity and Trade Un[ions], for example, they assumed that the FNU, and not the party, is the decisive authority for the army. They spoke up against the “excessive interference” of the party in state matters, technology and science.


b. They spoke up against the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They pulled former landowners and kulaks into the state apparatus. In the courts, political crimes were allowed to go unpunished by excusing the guilty with their lack of political upbringing. For example, soldiers’ who escaped to the South.  The conference devoted a lot of attention to the principles of democratic centralism, intra-party discipline and democracy.


Re. 3.  The August group was initially viewed as a political faction. Later, it was agreed that there had also been preparations for the use of armed force. At the conference, the principle of overseeing and criticizing sternly and punishing magnanimously was adopted. But treating people in positions of responsibility differently, that is, sternly. In their case, there can be no lack of awareness. The most guilty are to be directed to the court. 9 persons, including Kim Du-bong [Kim Tu Bong] and Pak Ui-wan [Pak Ui Wan], were removed from the CC and the party. In their places, 9 new ones were chosen, including 3 army men: the chief of the political council, the chief of air forces and the leader of the 2nd army. 8 new candidates were chosen, among them the current ambassador to the USSR was chosen. The auditing committee was also fortified. Among others, the vice-minister Ri Dong-geon [Ri Tong Gon] went into it.  Kim Il Sung, chairman of the Central Commission of Party Control, and Ha Ang-cheon [Ha Ang Chon], head of the science department, were brought into the presidium. The issue of fortifying party work in the army was discussed as a separate point. It was decided to introduce party committees in the military.



Comr. Cyrankiewicz

Comr. Gomulka

Comr. Jedrychowski

Comr. Loga-Sowinski

Comr. Morawski

Comr. Ochab

Comr. Rapacki

Comr. Zambrowski

Comr. Zawadzki

Comr. Albrecht

Comr. Gierek

Comr. Jarosinski

Comr. Kliszko

Comr. Matwin

Comr. Wierblowski

Comr. Dluski

Comr. Czesak

Comr. Naszkowski

Comr. Winiewicz

Comr. Wierna

Comr. Sluczanski



Comrade Sluczanski outlines economic problems in North Korea and describes the state of the Korean Workers' Party, referencing the "August Group."


Document Information


Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.


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