The Chinese-language version of Liu Shaoqi's report on the Chinese Civil War and the future of China, presented to Stalin when Liu arrived in Moscow in summer 1949.
July 4, 1949
Report from the Head of the Delegation of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party, 'The Current State of the Chinese Revolution'
This document was made possible with support from Blavatnik Family Foundation
Translation from Chinese
to the VKP(b) CC
to Cde. I. V. STALIN
We are sending you the attached report
Head of the delegation of the CC of the Chinese Communist Party
[Chinese signature] Liu Shaoqi
4 July 1949
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
At the present time the revolutionary war of the Chinese people has basically already been victorious and will soon end in complete victory.
By the end of May 1949 the Chinese People's Liberation Army had already seized 2,900,000 square kilometers of the richest areas of the country, which comprises 30% of the entire territory of China (30% due to the fact that Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet occupy the majority of the country's territory). Two hundred and seventy-five million [Translator's note: circled in colored pencil] people live on the territory liberated by the People's Liberation Army, which is 57% of the total population of China. The People's Liberation Army has seized 1,043 cities, including such large cities as Shanghai, Nanking, Beijing, Tianjin, and Wuhan, which is 51% of all 2,000 cities of China that are county-level [uyezdnyy] cities and above.
In three years of combat operations the People's Liberation Army has killed 5,590,000 Guomindang troops. At the present time the Guomindang army, including the personnel of rear establishments, has only 1,500,000 men left, of which approximately only 200,000 men can be considered combat-capable troops. On the other hand, according to the latest information, the People's Liberation Army already numbers 3,900,000 men in its ranks, four field armies numbering 2,400,000 men, and the remaining personnel are distributed between military regions, local troops, the armies of the Main Command, military establishments, and military schools. There are 7,500 men in the air force and 7,700 in the navy.
[handwritten note in the left margin: "1. Do they have pilots? Are there sailors?"]
During the summer and autumn of this year the People's Liberation Army will be able to liberate the provinces of Fujian, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi, and in the winter will be able to liberate the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xikang, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. The military operations against the Guomindang will end with this. It still remains to liberate Formosa [Taiwan], the island of Hainan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The question of Tibet needs to be solved politically and not through military operations. Formosa, Hainan, and Xinjiang will be liberated next year. In connection with the fact that part of the Guomindang troops on the island of Formosa might come out on our side, the liberation of Formosa might occur before this date. We would like to liberate Xinjiang sooner, if possible, but a great difficulty for us in this matter is clearing the enemy from the route leading to Xinjiang and supporting movement along it. A shortage of the necessary means of transport is also a great difficulty (to get from Gansu to Xinjiang it is necessary to cross a long route passing through a desert region, where there is no food or drinking water). If we are able to overcome these difficulties then we could liberate Xinjiang considerably earlier.
We also have political victories along with the military victories. The American imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] Guomindang have already been completely isolated. All the democratic parties and groups are on our side. The popular masses are fervently welcoming the People's Liberation Army and opposing the imperialists and the Guomindang.
We think that now one cannot doubt the victory of the Chinese Revolution. However, some time will still be required to win a complete victory in connection with the limitations on the actions of our troops from communications and natural conditions.
We have always considered the possibility of an armed intervention against the Chinese Revolution from the imperialists. The instructions given us about this question from the VKP(b), with which we fully agree, have even more increased our attention in this regard. At the present time we have not slackened our vigilance with respect to the probability of an armed intervention by the imperialists but, judging from the current international situation, evidently there is no possibility of the imperialists sending more than 1,000,000 of their troops for a broad intervention in China. Such actions on their part would only move back the time of the final victory of the Chinese Revolution, but they are not in a position to destroy or even slow down the Chinese Revolution. On the contrary, they would put the imperialists in a quite difficult position.
It is entirely possible that the imperialists will send 100-200,000 troops to occupy three or four Chinese ports or to perform various acts of sabotage. We have already carried out some preparations, considering the probability of such actions by the imperialists. There is no naval defense in connection with the fact that we do not have a navy and air force. The aforementioned armed attack by the imperialists might present a difficulty for us and cause us damage, but our military forces will not suffer defeat. Such actions by the imperialists would rouse the Chinese people and its army against the imperialists and they would drive out the forces of the interventionists.
As a consequence of this, we think that if we act correctly then it is possible that the imperialists will not try to carry out a direct armed intervention in China. We will have to watch out so as not to give the imperialists reasons to carry out an armed intervention. At the same time we need to liquidate the imperialists' agents, the remnants of the Guomindang forces, as quickly as possible, which will in turn increase the imperialists' difficulties if they undertake an armed intervention in China.
There is a great probability that the imperialists will pursue a policy of a blockade of the Chinese Revolution. They have even already begun to pursue it. It presents some difficulties for us, especially in the area of shipping and foreign trade, but it will not be able to stop the rapid victory of the Chinese Revolution.
The victories of the Chinese people in the revolutionary struggle are taking place after the Second World War, when the world proletariat and popular democratic forces, especially the Soviet Union, helped the Chinese people, and this was the decisive condition of the victories of the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party is making use of these conditions. The Chinese Revolution has the experience of the successful organization of an anti-imperialist, united, national, united front, the experience of an agrarian revolution, and long-waged armed struggle in rural localities, surrounding cities, and their subsequent capture. The Chinese Revolution has the experience of waging clandestine and overt combat in the cities and combining this struggle with the operations of our armed forces. Finally, we have the experience of building a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party in such a country as China. All this experience will probably be useful for other colonial and semi-colonial countries.
II. THE NEW POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
The revolutionary war in China has basically ended with victory and a final victory will be won in the near future. Our subsequent task is to end the war more rapidly, cleanse the country of the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek Guomindang, restore and develop the economy as rapidly as possible, and to learn to build and govern the country.
In August of this year we decided to convene a new Political Consultative Conference and create a coalition government. We are actively pursuing preparatory work right now. The new PCS is being convened not just by the Communist Party or by several parties, but is being convened by all the democratic parties, people's organizations, representatives of national minorities, and representatives of Chinese citizens living abroad - 23 organizations in all, which are preparing this convocation of the PCS together. The democratic and unaffiliated public figures are quite satisfied with such a method of convening the PCS.
At the present time the Preparatory Committee to convene the PCS has already been created. It has 134 members, of which 43 are Communists, 48 are progressive figures who will unquestionably support us, 43 centrists, but 12 of which are centrists with a rightist inclination. There are 15 among the progressive figures who are clandestine Communists. Leadership in the Preparatory Committee is furnished by the Communist Party. A permanent presidium of 21 people has been created in the Preparatory Committee. Leadership in this presidium has also been furnished by the Communist Party.
In the Preparatory Committee it has been decided to allow the participation of 14 more democratic parties and groups in the upcoming PCS, which can nominate 142 of their representatives. There are 102 representatives in the PCS from outlying area [s mest], 60 from the army, and 206 from mass popular organizations, national minorities, and Chinese citizens living abroad. A total of 45 organizations with 510 representatives will participate in the PCS. Communists constitute a majority of these representatives.
We think that the PCS of China is a suitable organizational form of a single national front in the Chinese Revolution with which the popular masses are well acquainted. Therefore we intend to leave the PCS as a permanently functioning body, but local PCS's will be created in outlying areas where this is necessary.
[handwritten in the left margin: "2. But will there also be provincial governments?"]
In the PCS we intend to adopt a common political platform to which all the parties, groups, and organizations will adhere. A Central Government will be elected in the PCS, a declaration will be drawn up and published, and a new national anthem, emblem, and flag will be approved.
The organizational makeup of the new Central Government has not yet been determined. Besides a Military Council, in the new Central Government a Finance and Economics Committee, a Committee for Cultural and Educational Affairs, and an Administrative and Legal Committee (this Committee will deal with questions of state security, internal affairs, and justice) will be created in the Cabinet of Ministers, and it is also proposed to create [the following] Ministries: Rail Transportation, Agriculture, Forestry, Trade, Metallurgy, the Textile Industry, Fuel, Communications and Railroads, Post and Telegraph, etc. Cde. Mao Zedong is slated as Chairman of the Central Government and Cde Zhou Enlai as Prime Minister. Cdes. Liu Shaoqi and [Ren] Bishi will not be in the Government.
[handwritten in the left margin: "3. What is this?: Is this in fact a president?"]
We understand the nature of the new democratic state and the character of the new government in China in the following manner:
This state is a popular-democratic dictatorship created in a union of workers and peasants with the guidance of the proletariat.
This dictatorship is directed against imperialists, feudal forces, and bureaucratic capital.
[handwritten in the left margin: "4. What is "bureaucratic capital"?]
The working class is the guiding forces of this dictatorship. The working class in alliance with the peasantry and revolutionary intellectuals comprises the man strength of this dictatorship. At the same time, the petty bourgeoisie, liberal bourgeoisie, and their representatives and political groups which can cooperate with us are being enlisted in this dictatorship in every possible way. This is how the organizational makeup of this dictatorship appears.
The fact that a popular democratic dictatorship is not a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but is also not a dictatorship of the proletariat needs no clarification.
[handwritten in the left margin: "5. Yes!"]
The popular democratic dictatorship in China has common aspects with the "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants" which Lenin spoke of in the 1905-1907 Revolution. However, it also has a difference.
What is common is that leadership is exercised by the proletariat and the basis of this dictatorship is an alliance of workers and peasants. However, the popular democratic dictatorship in China includes representatives and political groups of the liberal bourgeoisie which wish to fight imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capital. This is the difference. [handwritten in the left margin: "Yes!"] This circumstance is explained by the fact that China is a semi-colonial country and that in a period of revolution and after its victory we will need for a long time in a concentration of all the forces in the fight against imperialism and its agents. [handwritten in the left margin: "Yes!"] This is also explained by a feature of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. This is in complete accord with what Cde. Stalin said in 1926 in his speech at a meeting of the Chinese commission of the Comintern Executive Committee that in the future a revolutionary government in China will be "primarily an anti-imperialist government".
In its form, a popular democratic dictatorship in China is a regime of assemblies of people's representatives, but is not a form of a regime of bourgeois parliamentarianism. [handwritten in the left margin: "Yes!"]
It approaches the regime of the Soviets, but is different from a dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of the Soviets since representatives of the national bourgeoisie are in the assembly of people's representatives.
The popular democratic dictatorship in China has its inner and external conflicts, an inner and external struggle.
The so-called external conflict and external struggle mean that the dictatorship has conflicts with imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capital, and with the remnants of the Guomindang forces and thus should fight them. These conflicts remain the main conflicts and a fight for a comparatively prolonged period after the overthrow of the Guomindang government.
The inner conflict and inner struggle mean that inside this dictatorship are conflicts and a struggle between different classes and different parties and groups. These conflicts and the struggle will gradually increase in the future; however for quite a long period they will occupy a secondary place compared to the external conflicts.
[handwritten in the left margin: "6. Perhaps! Collective agreements with private industrialists [s promysh-kami] (strikes)"]
Some think that "conflicts between the proletariat and the bourgeois will immediately become the main conflicts after the overthrow of the Guomindang government or after the completion of land reform, and the struggle between the workers and the capitalists will immediately become the main struggle". We think that such an interpretation of the question is incorrect because if this government directs its main fire against the bourgeoisie then it would mean that it is or is beginning to grow into a dictatorship of the proletariat and such actions would lead to an alienation from us of the national bourgeoisie, which at the present time might still cooperate with us, to the camp of imperialism. [handwritten in the left margin: "Yes!"]. The pursuit of such a policy in China at the present time would mean a dangerous, adventurist policy. In February of this year in a conversation with Cde. Mao Zedong Cde. Andreyev approved the CCP policy of drawing the national bourgeoisie to our side, and later the VKP(b) CC also pointed to the need for us to draw the national bourgeoisie to our side. We completely agree with these guidelines [ukazaniya].
After the overthrow of the Guomindang government conflicts between labor and capital objectively exist and they will gradually intensify. As a consequence of this, the working class ought to wage an appropriate struggle with the bourgeoisie and only then can the interests of the working class and the popular democratic dictatorship be defended. [handwritten in the left margin: "Collective agreements, excluding strikes"]. But along with this [we] still ought to pursue a necessary and proper compromise agreement and a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in order to concentrate [our] forces against the external enemy, and to also overcome the backwardness of China. Many steps will be needed from the present until the complete nationalization of national capital is carried out and a long period of time will be needed. The length of this period will be determined by the various conditions of the international and domestic situation. We think possibly 10-15 years will be needed to do this.
The popular democratic dictatorship in China is accomplishing the unification of the country. This will be great progress for China and the unification of the country will occur under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, in connection with China's backwardness and the lack of development of communications, the existence in the past of the spheres of influence of the imperialists, and the feudal fragmentation in the country a system of a single economy has not yet formed in China and therefore at the present time we are forced to give local governments quite broad rights of self-government in order to thereby increase the activity and initiative in the provinces [na mestakh]. [handwritten in the left margin: "7. There will be local (provincial) governments?"] We consider it incorrect and harmful to a system of excessive centralism into effect. [handwritten in the left margin: "Yes!"]
We would like for Cde. Stalin and the VKP(b) CC to point out to us whether our views presented above are correct.
The majority of senior figures of the Chinese democratic parties have already arrived in Beiping [Beijing]. There are more than 10 such democratic parties and groups in China. They are small organizations, engaging in political activity. The total number of members of all these parties and groups does not exceed 30,000. Twenty thousand of them are in the Democratic League. This League has a comparatively large influence among some part of the intelligentsia. These parties and groups do not pursue work among the workers and the peasant masses. Organizationally they are scattered and do not have internal cohesion. For example, all these parties and groups were entirely unable to submit a list of their representatives to take part in the PCS since there are quarrels among them. Lists of their representatives could only be drawn up when the CCP stated its opinion to them about the candidacies. However, in each democratic party and group there are several leaders who have some influence among the popular masses, thanks to their having engaged in political activity in China for a long time. Their party organizations are held together only in these leaders. There are three categories of people in each party and group: rightists, leftists, and centrists.
The remnants of the Guomindang and imperialist agents are trying to penetrate these democratic parties and groups in every way in order to secure a legal status for themselves. Regarding this, we have given a serious warning to these parties and groups. All these parties and groups are united only in that they are fighting against Chiang Kai-shek, the Guomindang, and imperialism. But some of them have recently had ties with imperialist elements and have cut these ties only a short while ago. As regards land reform part of them share the opinion of the CCP with a strained interpretation, but some of their exhibit clearly nationalistic tendencies on the question of relations with the USSR. All the democratic parties and groups in an official situation accept the platform worked out by the Communist Party and officially declare their readiness to support the CCP as the main leader. [handwritten in the left margin: "8. But the group of compradors?"] There is no definite official political party of the national bourgeoisie in China besides the agents of imperialism, the Chiang Kai-shek Guomindang. There are no such reactionary bourgeois parties yet in China which European countries have.
The mass popular organizations which will participate in the PCS play a quite substantive role in the practical political life in China. Some of these organizations already have a large number of members, and all these organizations are attracting more and more new members. In the past these organizations played an important role in the fight against American imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. In the future they will play an even more important role. The majority of these organizations perceive the leadership of the CCP, or are completely under CCP leadership. Besides the All-China General Assembly of Trade Unions created in China long ago, congresses of representatives of women's, student, and youth organizations have been held recently. The All-China Democratic Association of Women, the Youth League of a New Democracy, and the All-China Association of Students were created. In view of the fact that in the past Chinese youth had a multitude of their own different organizations they have been united into local and All-China Associations of Youth which temporarily serve the cause of the unification of the youth movement. After the defeat of the Guomindang the Guomindang trade unions, youth organizations, the Youth Union of the Three Principles of the People of Sun Yat-sen, and the Guomindang women's organizations are already in an illegal status and they are quickly collapsing; their leaders either fled or have halted their activity. Some progressive elements among them became associated with the CCP even before the defeat of the Guomindang. The Chinese Federation of Labor headed by Zhu Xuefan is leading the way for some of the working masses, but it has already merged with the All-China Association of Trade Unions.
In February of this year we received a guideline of the VKP(b) CC about increasing work among manual laborers, office workers, young people, and women. We agree with these guidelines [SIC, plural]. This work is being organized in all the cities at the present time, but in connection with the fact that in the past there was a large interruption in this work at the present time there is a need to again train personnel to carry it out. Now there are schools in each organization to train cadre in which several hundred to several thousand students are being taught.
[Translator's note: Two vertical lines were handwritten next to this paragraph in the left margin, obviously to stress its importance] Thus, there is not yet an opportunity to perform this work quickly. We would like for several experienced Soviet comrades to come to China to help carry out this work.
In the not so distant future all-Chinese congresses of cultural and educational and research workers will be convened in Beijing in which their own organizations will be created on a China-wide scale. They will be under the leadership of the CCP.
3. QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
We completely agree with the latest guidelines of the VKP(b) CC about foreign policy questions, foreign trade, and loans.
At the present time, after the imperialists have suffered defeat in their policy of giving complete support to the Guomindang in the struggle against the Chinese Revolution they are using the following methods in order to continue the fight against the Chinese Revolution:
1. They continue to help the Guomindang and other possible forces in the fight against the Chinese Revolution.
2. They are using every measure in order to penetrate the revolutionary camp in order to demoralize it and harm the Chinese Revolution.
3. They are trying in every way to provoke relations between the Chinese Revolution and the USSR, and also the world Communist movement.
4. They are trying with various means to show the CCP their desire to cultivate it and are striving at the same time to lure the CCP onto the path of drawing closer to the imperialist countries.
We clearly see these designs of the imperialists and have sufficient experience in fighting them. In no event will we allow the imperialists to accomplish these designs. We have already warned the democratic parties and groups about all these questions and have mobilized the people's vigilance.
The Chinese Revolution has to successively destroy the dominance of the imperialists in China militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. This directive was entered in the decisions of the 2nd CCP CC plenum and remains firm. At the present time in the regions occupied by our forces the elimination of the military and political dominance of the imperialists takes place right after the overthrow of the Guomindang there. Their economic and cultural influence has also been considerably weakened. However, all the same there remain economic enterprises and cultural institutions under the direct control of the imperialists. Their diplomatic officials and correspondents still remain as before. The question of the tactics and method of actions in all these questions deserves attention.
We think that at the present time and in the future we will have to hold to the following principles in our foreign policy work:
[handwritten in the left margin with a vertical line to indicate that it applies to all points: "9. Yes"]
1. Wage a struggle against the imperialist countries in order to exercise the full independence of the Chinese people.
2. In international matters stand on positions together with the USSR and the countries of new democracy, fight against the danger of a new war, and defend peace and democracy in the entire world.
3. Make use of the differences between the capitalist countries and inside these countries.
4. Develop trade relations between China and foreign countries on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual preferential treatment, especially with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy.
We do not have recent information about the capital investments of the imperialist countries in China. According to Japanese data of 1936 Britain, the US, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium had capital investments totaling $1.8 billion US. One billion dollars of this amount belonged to Britain, $220 million each to the US, $210 each to Germany, and Italy, $500 million [handwritten in the left margin: "from whom?"] were railroad and political loans, and $450 million were invested in foreign banks and financial institutions, $380 million in export-import trade, and $360 million were invested in the mining industry and in other industrial sectors. However, after the defeat of Japan the capital investments of Japan, Germany, and Italy in China were confiscated. [handwritten in the left margin: "10. by whom?"] Britain, France, and Belgium have some losses in their capital investments in China, and the capital investments of the US have declined somewhat. At the present time foreign countries have the following enterprises in China: [Translator's note: the following items were circled individually:] banks, insurance companies, export-import offices, seagoing ships, and piers and warehouses. The companies of the Kailan coal mines with an annual production of four million tons of coal in which Britain has half the capital, the British tobacco processing plants in Tianjing and Shanghai, the American power plant in Shanghai, and some municipal enterprises have comparative great importance. The remaining enterprises of foreigners in China do not have great importance. Industrial and mining enterprises in China under the direct control of the imperialists likewise no longer have great importance While pursuing some necessary restrictions at the present time we are in general allow further operation of the economic enterprises of the imperialists of China. [handwritten in the left margin: "11. What kind of restrictions?"] However, some imperialists have already shifted their active capital from China or are keeping to a position of passive waiting and seeing. We still do not have a decision about at what moment and by what methods to solve the question of the capital investments of the imperialists of China: confiscate them or to act in some other way. We are very occupied by military matters right now, and have not yet begun other work to resolve this issue. Nevertheless, we need to get ready to solve it.
The imperialist countries have their propaganda organs and cultural institutions in China. According to old available information, besides newspapers, magazines, and telegraph agencies, Britain and the US alone have 31 universities and special schools, 32 regional educational institutions, 29 libraries, 26 cultural organization, 324 secondary schools, 2,364 primary schools, 3,729 religious missions, 93 religious organizations, 147 hospitals, and 53 philanthropic organizations.
The CCP CC has already decided to halt the publication of foreign newspapers, magazines, and telegraph agencies which already exist and the activity of foreign correspondents and this decision is already being carried out in the provinces. Considering that in Shanghai the imperialists have several very important economic facilities in their hands the CCP CC has approved the suggestion of our Shanghai comrades to temporarily refrain from putting the above decision into effect, but we are preparing to carry it out in the future all the same. With regard to the schools and hospitals of the imperialist countries in China we are permitting them to continue their activity for now on condition that they observe our laws, but we will not permit them to open new schools and hospitals in China. In the future when we are able to accept these educational institutions and hospitals, we will take them under our control.
We are permitting the continuation of the work of foreign religious organizations on condition they observe our laws, but at the same time we are making anti-religious propaganda. We are confiscating and distributing the lands of the religious missions and churches with the permission of the believers. [handwritten in the left margin: "12. Yes"] We are also confiscating and distributing the lands of other foreign institutions and organizations.
We do not recognize the diplomatic officials of foreign countries in China and treat them like foreign residents. As a result of our pursuing such a policy on this issue the people understand that China has already raised itself up and the CCP is not afraid of the imperialists. In addition, this provides us with an opportunity to avoid much trouble, since members of democratic parties and groups no longer dare to maintain ties and meet with the diplomatic officials of the imperialist countries and even ordinary people also do not dare to meet with these foreigners of the imperialist countries.
The diplomatic officials of the imperialist countries everywhere in China are turning to us with requests and trying to strike up relations with us in order to get actual recognition of them from us. No one in Chinese history has dared to pursue such a policy with respect to foreigners in China which we are pursuing at the present time, but as a result of our pursuing it foreign residents, feeling distinct discomfort, are addressing requests in large numbers to permit them to leave China. At the same time, we too are also experiencing some discomfort in connection with this. [handwritten in the left margin and across the page: "13. Differentiation. Whoever does not recognize the China government - do not give them any trade relief with China (a crisis in the US will force the US to value trade with China). Use Chinese merchants for this]."
There are approximately 120,000 foreign residents on the territory of liberated China of which more than 65,000 live in Shanghai alone. Fifty-four thousand foreigners live in Manchuria, most of which are Soviet citizens, and then Japanese take second place.
After the formation of the new central government the question will immediately arise of establishing official diplomatic relations with foreign countries and about our participation in the UN and other international organizations and at international conferences. It is possible that for a certain period of time the imperialist countries will ignore us or present us with some conditions which would restrict us, seeking this in exchange for their recognition of us. What should our policy be in this question [?] Of course, we will not agree to accept conditions which would restrict our actions, but should we undertake active measures to provide ourselves with recognition from these countries in order for us to be able to get ourselves a legal position to conduct international activity? On the other hand, ought we not wait and not be hasty with getting recognition from [handwritten in the left margin: "14. It's better not to be hasty."] these countries, but engage in a purge of our home front in order to avoid trouble? [handwritten on the right side of the page: "Yes"] After the formation of a new government of China will the USSR and the countries of new democracy be able to recognize the new government of China alittle faster even if in their policy the imperialist countries ignore us? [handwritten in the left margin: "15. Yes!"] If the imperialist countries embark on a policy of recognition of the new government of China then in such an event we plan to establish diplomatic relations with these countries and then we would like for the USSR to be able to recognize us before these other countries.
We plan to reexamine each treaty and each agreement which was concluded with foreign countries by the Guomindang government. We will hold to the following principle when doing this: we are prepared to recognize and accept for subsequent implementation all treaties which are in the interests of the Chinese people, peace and democracy in the entire world, for example the UN statute, the Cairo Declaration, and the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the USSR. We are ready to liquidate all treaties harmful to the interests of the Chinese people and peace and democracy in the entire world, for example, the treaty on trade and navigation between China and the US. We plan to recognize some treaties after appropriate revisions in them.
[handwritten in the left margin: "Yes"]
After recognition of the new China by foreign countries we plan to take part in the work of the UN and other international organizations, but especially in various international organizations relating to Japan.
[handwritten in the left margin: "16. "Yes!"] We will undoubtedly be united with the USSR in our policy in the field of international relations, and we have made several explanations to the democratic parties and groups in this respect. Some unaffiliated people have criticized our policy for it being inclined only to the USSR but Cde. Mao Zedong replied to them that our policy will indeed be inclined only to the USSR since if we do not stand with the USSR in the struggle against the imperialist front and strive to go along a middle path this would be a mistake. After such explanations all the democratic parties and groups signed and published a statement together with the CCP against the North Atlantic Pact [NATO].
We would like to get the guidance of the VKP(b) and Cde. I. V. Stalin about various foreign policy questions. [handwritten in the left margin is a not entirely legible word, perhaps: "Right"]
IV. A QUESTION ABOUT SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS
An enduring friendship between the great peoples of the USSR and China has extraordinarily great importance for our two countries and for the entire world. It has decisive importance especially for the independence of China and its development. The CCP CC fully understands the importance of this matter. Without fail, the CCP will not spare efforts in the cause of strengthening the friendship between our two peoples.
In the past the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship and alliance has brought great benefit to the Chinese people. The new government of China will adopt this treaty and it will be a still greater contribution for the peoples of China and the USSR, and especially for the Chinese people. We completely desire to accept this treaty. [handwritten in the left margin: "sign [[pod."]]
It will be necessary to deal with this treaty during the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the new China. In general, one can act in one of the three following alternatives with respect to this treaty:
1. The new government of China declares it full acceptance of this treaty and the continuation of its operation without any changes whatsoever.
[handwritten in the left margin: "17. "Decide the question with Mao's arrival in Moscow"]
2. The representatives of both governments conclude a new treaty of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China anew in the spirit of the initial text of the treaty in order for some stylistic changes and changes in content to be inserted on the basis of the new situation.
3. The representatives of the governments of both governments exchange notes that this treaty remains as it is temporarily, but they are ready to again reexamine it at a suitable moment.
Which of the above three alternatives is good?
Some people of the democratic parties, students, and workers have raised questions about the presence of Soviet troops in Port Arthur [Lüshun], the independence of Mongolia, and the shipment of machinery from Manchuria by the Soviet Union.
[handwritten at the bottom of the page: "We shipped some Japanese capital from Manchuria, but far from all!"]
We have given the following explanations to these people:
When we were not able to defend our coast ourselves, if we had not agreed to the deployment of Soviet troops in Port Arthur this would have been helping the imperialists.
On the question of the MPR we said that in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations the Mongolian people had demanded independence and we should recognize the independence of Mongolia. However, if the MPR wishes to unite with China, then we would welcome this. Only the Mongolian people have the right to decide this question. [handwritten in the left margin: "18. Yes"']
On the question of the shipment of machinery from Manchuria by the Soviet Union we said that these machines belonged to the Japanese and the Soviet Union shipped out the equipment as captured equipment for use in their socialist development, and from considerations that this equipment would not fall into the hands of a Chinese reactionary party which would use then in a fight against the Chinese people. The USSR acted absolutely correctly.
Were these explanations correct [pravil'ny]?
[handwritten in the left margin: "P." [Translator's note: meaning "P"[[correct"]].
We would like to decide the questions of the establishment of postal, telegraph, rail, and air communications as quickly as possible, and also to create a mixed Soviet-Chinese aviation company. How does this need to be done?
How is it best to decide the question of the establishment of relations with the countries of people's democracy of Eastern Europe and trade with them? [handwritten in the left margin: "19. Yes. By direct negotiations with them.] [handwritten across the page: We will help"]
For a long time we were in a rural region, waging partisan warfare, and therefore we are very little acquainted with foreign affairs. At the present time we have to govern such a large country, pursue economic development, and conduct diplomatic activity. We still need to learn much. The guidelines and help to us from the VKP(b) have very great importance in this regard. We are in extreme need of these guidelines and help. Along with sending Soviet specialists to China to help us we would still like for Soviet instructors to be sent to China to give lectures, and delegations would be sent from China to the USSR for familiarization and study. In addition, we would like to send students to study in the USSR. [handwritten in the left margin: "20. Yes."]
On the question of relations between the VKP(b) and the CCP Cde. Mao Zedong and the CCP CC think:
The VKP(b) is the main headquarters of the international Communist movement, but the CCP represents only the headquarters of one sector. The interests of the part should be subordinated to international interests, and therefore the CCP is subordinate to the decisions of the VKP(b), [handwritten in the left margin: "No!."] although the Comintern does not exist [any longer] and the CCP is not part of the Informbureau of the European Communist Parties. If differences arise between the CCP and VKP(b) on several questions then the CCP will obey while presenting its point of view and vigorously carry out the decisions of the VKP(b). [handwritten in the left margin: "21. No!."] We think that it is necessary to establish close mutual relations between the two Parties as much as possible, mutually exchange suitable senior political representatives [handwritten in the left margin: "22. Yes!"] in order to solve questions of interest to our two Parties and, in addition, to seek more mutual understanding between our two Parties.
Cde. Mao Zedong wishes to visit Moscow, but now he cannot secretly come to Moscow and it remains for him only to await the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China when he can legally visit Moscow. [handwritten in the left margin: "23. Yes. At the end of 1949, after the establishment of diplomatic relations"] Please consult about the time of Mao Zedong's arrival in Moscow and how it is best to do it.
Please give guidance on all the above questions.
We fully agree with the conditions proposed by Cde. I. V. Stalin with respect to a Soviet loan to China in the amount of $300 million US and are grateful to the Soviet Union for its aid to the Chinese people.
[handwritten in the left margin: "24. But silver?"]
We hope that the VKP(b) CC and Cde. Stalin will constantly and without any constraint give their instructions and criticize the work and policy of the CCP.
Head of the delegation of
the Chinese Communist
[Chinese signature] Liu Shaoqi
4 July 1949
Translated from Chinese [by]
[signature] (S. P. Andreyev)
Russian translation of a long Chinese report on the Chinese Civil War and the future of China. Liu Shaoqi claims that the war "will soon end in complete victory" for the Communists. He outlines plans for the Political Consultative Conference and a new central government. He also discusses the future Chinese foreign relations
Associated People & Organizations
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