An evaluation of information sharing between the DPRK military intelligence service and Directorate II of the General Staff of the Polish Army on US and NATO troops.
Report from Roman Misztal to Citizen General [W. Jaruzelski]
This document was made possible with support from The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
GENERAL STAFF P[OLISH] A[RMY] - DIRECTORATE II
CHIEF OF P[OLISH] A[RMY]
Gen. of the Branch Józef Użycki
Com[rade] Gen. Misztal
On the whole, I accept the proposals (except 4, which is dangerous). Cooperation should be conducted in accordance with proposed principles as well as our decisions communicated orally. I believe that a return visit should take place next year (unless there are very urgent requests).
GENERAL STAFF P[OLISH] A[RMY]
No. pf 5563/ORG/89
1989, JUN. 7]
I inform Citizen General that between may 29 and June 1989, at the invitation of the Chief of the General Staff of the DPRK Korean People’s Army gen. of the Branch Choe Kwang a delegation of Directorate II of the General Staff of the P[olish] A[rmy] visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, composed of:
- Brig. Gen. Roman MISZTAL
- COL. Henryk KRZESZOWSKI – deputy for information matters
- Lt. Col. Zbigniew KLISOWSKI – delegation secretary.
Our delegation was accompanied by the [following representatives of the KPA of the K[orean] P[eople’s] R[epublic]:
- Brig. Gen. Kim Da Sik [sic; proper spelling unknown] – chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the DPRK’s KPA – host
- Col. Chwan Kwan Ho [sic; proper spelling unknown] – deputy chief of the I[ntelligence] D[irectorate] for information matters
- Col. Chan Kir Sen [sic; proper spelling unknown] – deputy chief of the intelligence directorate
- Col. Pak Kwan Su [sic; proper spelling unknown] – translator
- Meeting with chief of the DPRK KPA General Staff;
- Working talks with the chief of the Intelligence Directorate (plenary and one-to-one);
- Visit to the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom and within this framework:
- Meeting with Gen. Choe Ui Ung [sic; proper spelling unknown] – senior member of the Military Armistice Commission for the DPRK;
- Meeting with officers from the Polish mission to the NNSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission);
- Visit to the signals intelligence brigade;
- Visit to the special operations detachment;
- Sightseeing tour – monuments of culture and historical objects.
I. MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF GEN. Choe Kwang
1. Polish side:
- Delegation form Directorate II of the P[olish] A[rmy] General Staff;
- Ambassador of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) in Korea;
- Military attaché of the PRL embassy in Korea;
- Korean side:
- Chief of the Intelligence Directorate;
- Deputy directorate chief for information matters;
- Chief of international contacts directorate;
In his statement, the chief of the general staff recalled, in very pleasant terms, his visit to the PRL and his contacts with Citizen General [Jaruzelski]. He asked me to pass on greetings.
Welcoming our delegation, he expressed the hope that this first contact of the intelligence chiefs of the PA and the DPRK KPA would turn into permanent cooperation between the two services.
In reply, I passed on greetings form Citizen General, thanking for the invitation. Then, referring to the visit agenda, I underlined the hosts’ hospitality, the high standard of the talks, and the excellent skills level of the soldiers in the detachments visited. After these congratulatory remarks about the hosts, I requested that the DPRK KPA chief of staff permit that the DPRK KPA chief of intelligence visit Poland, adding that Citizen General will send an appropriate letter.
[handwritten notation: “letter drafted” “Kluki”]
Following the official meeting, which lasted 40 minutes, the DPRK KPA chief of staff gave a dinner for all those present at the official meeting.
I inform Citizen General that I had been informed by the chief of protocol of the DPRK KPA general staff and our ambassador that during our visit with Gen. Choi Kwan it is customary to bring a gift from Citizen General, which is what I did. I brought a copper epergne with the [Polish national] emblem and those of the individual branches of the armed forces.
II. THEMATIC TALKS
1. Plenary sessions
During the plenary talks, the chief of the intelligence directorate of the DPRK KPA general staff repeatedly underlined the scarcity of reconnaissance means and forces and, at the same time, requested all kinds of help, namely:
a) Information sphere:
The Koreans are interested in receiving from us:
- Information and source materials on the military doctrines and strategy of the United States and the operational art and tactics of the country’s armed forces;
- Original military field manuals on the rules of training and tactics of American subunits (especially platoon-battalion);
- Military dailies and periodicals published in the US;
- Reports and accounts of scientific conferences organized by the American armed forces;
- Information materials on weapons, military technology and armament models;
- Materials concerning the methodology of information work.
In reply to the Koreans’ requests and demands, I informed them that our intelligence interests include, in the first place, the European NATO member states, therefore we have limited capabilities of meeting their requirements. Nevertheless, we will do our best to help them as much as possible.
I expressed the opinion that with us acting as intermediaries, they will be able to purchase some kind of non-classified, official information.
Also, in response to requests of the Korean side, I provided them with non-classified information (in Polish) regarding the lines of development of the US military doctrine, the NATO armed forces and the organizational structure of the this pact, as well as the general structure of the armed forces of the United States.
At the same time, on the basis of reciprocity, I asked the Koreans to provide us with materials and information on the changes in American policy in the Far East and on Japanese military technologies, including electronic devices of the latest generation.
b) In the field of signals intelligence
[handwritten notation on the margin: Col. … - illegible]
The Korean side expressed great interest in purchasing signals intelligence equipment, in particular:
- Radio receivers;
- Mosaic printers;
- Equipment [used to] analyze radio signals;
- Computers and minicomputers (32-bit and higher);- 500 km of four-strand telephone cable.
These requirements were in a way confirmed by the visit to a radar intelligence detachment, where the hosts presented their rather poor equipment bases, which includes:
- Equipment for radio interception of uncoded radio transmission over the SKYNET-4 system (satellite communications between the US and American bases in the Pacific);
[handwritten notation: “re item b): During the KPA I[ntelligence] D[irectorate] will be acquainted with signals intelligence equipment. Orders via C2 Eng. Kluki.”]
- Equipment for interception of short-wave voice transmissions between American command structures in the Far East;
- Equipment for interception in telex communication networks.
All the presented devices were made in the USSR or China in the 1960s, and thus are very obsolete.
I promised our hosts that during the visit of the DPRK KPA delegation to Poland, we will acquaint them with our technology and present relevant offers of sale of this equipment.
c) In the field of general military reconnaissance
The DPRK intelligence chief made repeated requests that we share our experiences in the sphere of training process organization, as well as the theoretical principles of lifting special groups behind enemy lines. He further requested assistance in supplying those groups with appropriate equipment and devices (without specifying the requirements).
It should be stressed that during the visit to the special detachment, the hosts demonstrated an very high standard and operational precision of the soldiers of the special detachment, even though they have very primitive equipment.
In reply to the above mentioned demands, I proposed that we attempt to fulfill them during the DPRK KPA intelligence chief’s visit to Poland next year.
2. One-on-one talks
During one-on-one talks, the DPRK KPA chief of intelligence proposed starting cooperation in the field of strategic human intelligence. In his opinion it would consist of:
- Help (in the sense of not hindering) to the employees of Korean diplomatic missions in Warsaw in their activity directed at (operational expenses) [together] with the staff of the South Korean representation (were it to be established);
- Using Polish Army officers working at the Polish Military Mission at Panmunjom to carry out certain intelligence tasks in South Korea (e.g. photographing air defense installations, purchase of military press and publications);
- Execution of certain intelligence tasks by employees of our [diplomatic] missions in South Korea on behalf of the DPRK KPA intelligence service.
In reply to the above, I said that:
- We treat employees of Korean diplomatic missions as envoys of a friendly, allied country and therefore as we do not monitor their activity. We could interfere only when they maintain contact with a person engaged in hostile activity against the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL). We shall notify the DPRK government of each such instance;
- P[OLISH] A[RMY] officers working in the Panmunjom mission report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ), which controls their activity. In such circumstances, it remains to be tested in detail whether it would be possible for PA officers to perform certain tasks on behalf of the Korean intelligence service. When we analyze this problem in detail we shall give the Korean side an appropriate response.
- Cooperation with our employees working at the Seoul PRL mission is not possible for two reasons. First – because there is no such mission yet; second – Directorate II of the General Staff of the Polish Army is not interested in the region and therefore it is not planning to send its employees there.
Therefore, discussion on this issue is pointless.
During the Panmunjom visit, Brig. Gen. Choe Ui Ung, senior member of the Military Armistice Commission, also in a one-on-one conversation requested that we consider extending the length of service of our officers with NNSC mission (up to two-three years). He argued that it was necessary to enhance the effects of the cooperation, which in his opinion, can be achieved when we become better and more profoundly acquainted with each other.
I promised to pass the above proposal to the MSZ for [further] consideration. At the same time, I explained that the mission reported to that ministry and all the matters that concern it fall within its remit.
1. The primary purpose of the talks for the Korean side was to initiate informal cooperation of [the two] intelligence services.
The Koreans emphasized their philosophy to the effect that they had been [as they see it] threatened by American imperialism and, therefore, needed comprehensive assistance in their fight against this imperialism.
They did not specify what kind of help they had in mind. Nevertheless, we could infer with considerable certainty that the Korean side aimed to gain [access] (through Directorate II of the General Staff of the PA) to intelligence material reconnaissance means, but [they did not speak of] partnership in this field.
2. It is surprising that the Koreans should have raised the issue of operational cooperation. This topic, according to the chief of the DPRK KPA intelligence directorate, has not been discussed within the framework of bilateral contacts with the friendly [intelligence] services. This is further confirmed by the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) Col. Gen. Mikhailov when we spoke about the contacts of the Soviet comrades from the MID with their counterparts.
3. Let me stress that none of the Korean interlocutors criticized the process of establishing intergovernmental contacts with South Korea, which the [normally] do on other occasions.
In reply to requests and demands addressed to us by the Koreans, I expressed understanding and readiness to cooperate. I have not revealed to the Korean side any specific decisions regarding the forms, means, and scope of help. I only made general declarations, putting off relevant decisions until the Korean delegation arrives in Poland.
In view of the above I propose:
1. During the visit of the delegation of the DPRK KPA intelligence directorate to Poland: organize a show of signals intelligence equipment and the operational application of said equipment as well as a show of weapons [used by] soldiers of special detachments.
2. Should the Korean side express interest in the presented equipment, [we ought to] submit relevant trade offers (payment in convertible currencies).
3. Keep the level of information exchange on the basis of reciprocity.
4. Consider the purposefulness of assigning officers at the NNSC to carry out certain tasks on behalf of the Korean intelligence service. If approved, cooperation in this sphere to be carried out only through our military attaché in Pyongyang.
BRIG. Gen. Roman MISZTAL
Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army Gen. Józef Użycki rejects the use of Polish officers at the NNSC to perform certain intelligence tasks in favor of the DPRK, but agrees to cooperate with North Korea in other areas.
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