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Report, S. Biryuzov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. R. Ya. Malinovsky on Some Conclusions and Suggestions concerning the Operations of the Missile Troops in Operation 'Anadyr''

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I report some conclusions and suggestions concerning the operations of the Missile Troops in Operation “Anadyr’”


1. The formations and units of the Strategic Missile Forces involved in the measures in Operation “Anadyr’” have completely carried out the tasks assigned by the CPSU CC, the Soviet Government, and your 13 June 1962 Directive Nº 75273-ov.

The rail and maritime shipments, the concentration of units in the established areas, the equipping and occupation of the launch areas, and also the deployment of troops for combat operations were done on time with sufficient organization and without unusual occurrences. The material and technical support of the Missile Troops complete complied with the established requirements. All the missile armament delivered to the destinations turned out to be serviceable and ready for combat use.

The command, political bodies, and personnel of the Missile Forces displayed a deep understanding of the important missions with which they were faced and successfully coped with the responsibilities entrusted [to them].

The successful accomplishment of a quite complex group of measures was facilitated by the clear organization of their implementation, the high moral qualities of the personnel, and the deep realization by the personnel of the measures being conducted and the responsibility for their implementation. Favorable results were achieved also thanks to the great organizational and Party political work done by the commanders and Party apparatus in the troops which were sent.

I. Concerning the reliability of the missile equipment in the conditions of lengthy rail and maritime shipments and operations in a tropical climate.

2. After long transportation by sea in the closed holds (tween decks) of merchant ships the missiles delivered to the destination, the warheads, the ground equipment, the components and instruments were inspected and testing for function on site and found to be entirely suitable for combat use. There were no failures, faults, replacements of components or instruments not envisioned by the technical documentation.

On testing for function the missile armament returned with the troops was found to be mainly in working condition and fit for combat use, even after shipment in the open on the decks of ships.

The [inserted by hand: R-14] missiles and the ground equipment for it, and also the ground equipment for the [inserted by hand: R-12] missiles were found to be fully suitable for further combat use by inspection commissions. Because of increased corrosion on the conducting elements the [R-12] missiles, non-compliance with the requirements of the technical conditions of some component instruments, loss of the airtightness of the gyro instruments; dents on the bodies of the missiles and a loss of the hermetic sealing, at the insistence of a representative of the manufacturer [inserted by hand: the Orenburg] plant; it was found advisable to subject [it] to preventive maintenance at the plant, and then use [it] in the field [v voyskakh].

3. The missile armament on [inserted by hand: the island of Cuba] for one or two months and delivered there last month for combat duty functioned normally and was continually suitable for combat use. However, it is not considered possible to draw a conclusion about the possibility of a longer operation of the [R-12] and the [R-14] missile systems in the conditions of a tropical climate because of the brief use.

4. [The following] are necessary to increase the reliability of missile armament:

- determine a list of modifications of the existing [R-12] and [R-14] missiles and the ground equipment for them according to the operating data in the conditions of Operation “Anadyr’”;

- study the question of the advisability of putting requirements for the operation of this armament for operation during lengthy transportation into the TTT [tactical and technical specifications] for some newly-developed models of missile armament;

- raise the question with industry of the development and inclusion of the technical conditions for the preparation and maintenance of safety of missile armament when transporting them by sea in the collection of technical documentation for missile armament.


II. Concerning the Operations of Troops

5. The careless attitude toward the questions of concealment of the launch areas of the Missile Troops, which served as one of the reasons for the exposure of the Missile Troops to the enemy, ought to be considered the main shortcoming in the operations of the troops on [inserted by hand: the island of Cuba].

Considering the experience obtained and also the capability of modern spaceborne reconnaissance, [the following] are necessary to increase the survivability of the Missile Troops when they are at fixed emplacements:

- for all missile battalions having mobile missile systems [R-12, R-14], select and prepare one or two reserve launch areas for combat operations; equip these areas with SP-6 and SP-7 transportable pads;

- when designing and building new fixed complexes require the design organizations (TsPI-20 and TsPI-31) develop and practically implement a design for the concealment of the facility simultaneously with the development of the construction plan.

6. It is necessary to develop a mobile set of control equipment for missile regiments and battalions to ensure control of Missile Troops during the operations of units from reserve launch areas.


III. Concerning the Transportation of the Troops.

7. The experience of transporting Missile Troops in Operation “Anadyr’” showed the real possibility of transporting personnel and missile armament to great distances by rail and water while preserving combat capability. It was established that 16-18 trains and five cargo ships with a displacement of [inserted by hand: 13-22,000 tons], each of the type of Krasnograd, Omsk, and Leninsky Komsomol, are needed to transport one missile regiment of two battalions with RTB subunits armed with [R-12] missiles, and for an [R-14] regiment, 18-20 trains and six cargo ships.

8. The experience of the shipments showed that our railroad stations and ports are extremely poorly equipped for loading (unloading) missile equipment. I would consider [the following] necessary for these purposes:

- develop designs and conduct the appropriate retrofitting in the fixed or mobile versions of some railroad stations [SIC] for loading the missile armament of medium-range missiles;

- file a petition to equip one or two ports in the Baltic or Black Seas or the Pacific Ocean for the loading (unloading) of the equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces.

9. The experience of loading and unloading missile and vehicle equipment has shown its insufficient level of equipment with facilities for securing [them] to rail cars and merchant ships, and also for loading and unloading work.

It is advisable to include requirements for the installation of the corresponding adaptations in the TTT of the equipment being designed.

10. It is advisable for the security and concealment of missile armament to ship it in the holds and tween decks of merchant ships.

With this purpose it is necessary to raise the question to the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Shipbuilding and the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet about building merchant ships with hatch holds and tween decks 25-30 meters long and equipping all the main compartments with heavy cranes. In addition, it is necessary to speed up the development of Project Nº 595 and 1543 ships which are specially designed to transport missile armament. In all the ships being newly developed provide a height of tween decks equal to the height of dimension V of Soviet railroads.

11. The experience of transporting personnel on cargo ships together with combat equipment has shown their inadaptability for transporting people long distances with a large variation of air temperature. Individual ships (Atkarsk and Kimovsk) arrived at the ports of disembarkation having a temperature in the tween decks with the personnel of minus two and minus four degrees.

It is necessary to assign a task of developing measures to winterize, heat, and ventilate the tween decks intended for personnel.

12. As a final conclusion it ought to be said that the extraordinary centralization of control in the hands of the General Staff at all stages it was being carried out, which constrained the initiative of lower levels and reduced the quality of the decisions made on specific questions for the Missile Troops in the conditions [entered by hand: of the island of Cuba] ought to be considered a serious shortcoming in the preparation and conduct of Operation “Anadyr’”.

I am reporting for your decision.





[handwritten: authenticated [[illegible signature]]

Outgoing [message number] 472389

[[illegible initials]]


Document Information


TsAMO, fond 1, opis 14041cc, delo 1, ll. 226-232. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok and translated by Gary Goldberg.


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