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April 13, 1970

Report on Yugoslav-American relations fourteen months after President Richard Nixon's assumption of office.


Fourteen months have passed in the government of Richard Nixon as the Republican President of the USA. This is a period which allows for certain estimates concerning what the new Administration has contributed “of their own” to bilateral relations, and what it has retained from the politics of the earlier governments.

Political and other interests for the Nixon government considering Yugoslavia as a bilateral and multilateral partner have remained basically the same as during the time of his predecessor.

Independent international position of Yugoslavia / which here is first of all viewed as being dissident toward the USSR and then independent / continues to be the main cause and factor for the relatively meaningful interests of the USA /and more of less of the entire West/ for Yugoslavia.

The socialist character of the Yugoslav state is on the other hand /in its physical greatness/ the main barrier and factor in these relations, which along with other things remains valid in the opposite sense. That is, that different social features in two countries is a factor which basically in the first instance determines the relations between these two countries which is normal and unavoidable.

When I say this I do not think about that relations must be apriori bad nor that they have to worsen or that there is no possibility or room for their development. To the contrary. However, that what I wish to say is that the nature of society gives birth to unavoidable differences in actions and behavior which should not be hushed nor should we behave as if it did not exist or that we could in some way avoid them, but in the same way we should in no way apriori consider them to be an obstacle to normal, good and mutually useful relations.

This applies for the relations of the socialist self managed Yugoslavia not only with the USA but also with all of the capitalist countries. The specificity is in that the USA is the leading capitalist country and as such the main actor that is, the organizer of the battle against the spread of communism. The nature of our bilateral relations with the USA are to this extent delicate which does not have to mandatory /but can/ sound that their development is less possible.

Because the nature of our social being does not coincide with socialist states those differences in features of the society even on this side bring in a certain lesser or greater level of delicacy and organizational possibility for bilateral cooperation. To the extent that the partner is bigger and more powerful than to that extent the delicateness is greater. That is why we have the most delicate/ and most difficult/ relations with the USSR. Not only this but from this area there remain many open territorial claims towards our territory. A reality which our policies have to take into account.

For the efficiency of our foreign politics this especially is of great meaning that without prejudice we confirm the possibilities and limits of cooperation in all directions.

The period upon which we are trying to shed some light is the beginning according to Nixon the announced era from negotiations instead of confrontations. Neither did the negotiations gain completely the support of the citizens nor did the confrontation lose it, but in this period of about 14 months there was a little bit of one and the other. This has its reflections even on the relations of the USA – Yugoslavia. So if there is anything new in the policies of the USA toward Yugoslavia and there is, this is only one component or an expression of something new in the general policies of the USA. Nothing has /nor can it/ seriously specifically happen in our relations which does not correspond with the general policies of the USA or with our own. Maybe it can be said that Yugoslavia is in a more milder way “flooded” by the changes in the policies of the USA more so than some other countries /socialist, nonaligned and so forth/, which I do not consider to be bad nor troublesome.

This conclusion most likely called for greater explanation. It is known that the “politics of a lower profile” are now the slogan of the day in the USA. However, the lowest profile is related to a more cautious and less militarily present USA in various parts of the world. It at the same time means a greater presence of the USA wherever it is possible economically, scientifically or in another way by themselves or with their partners. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned in the military plan it was impossible to be “of lower profile” that is, (to have) change because it simply does not exist. If we can call it a military plan then I would mention the incident with their military attaché and the reaction of Ambassador Leonhart. And following that the American reduction of military personnel in Belgrade. In the economic, scientific, technical and cultural areas there were changes for the better. The profile and the width of the relations of Yugoslavia – USA today is greater than a year ago. The USA is more present in Yugoslavia and vice versa and we are present in the USA economically, culturally, artistically and to some extent even politically.

Bilateral Trends

a) Economic – they are in the last year in a constant growth. The main dimension is trade for which it is expected that even for this year it will significantly rise and that our exports for the first time will grow to more than 100 million dollars. Here I would simply repeat the well known, that is, that the growth of our exports depends on our capabilities.

An important new element in economic relations of our country with the USA and in general with the outside world is the formation “of the International investment company for Yugoslavia.” It is extremely certain that this formation will be a factor in the strengthening of mutually beneficial economic ties for the USA as well.

In the formation of this company the USA was the main and most influential factor. Our readiness for this type of cooperation was accepted here as a pleasant surprise along with a cautious interpretation /private not public/ that this was the beginning of the return of Yugoslavia to capitalism. I do not see any separate needs to have special polemics concerning this type of understanding, but at the same time we should not totally ignore them and pass over them completely indifferently because that immediately is interpreted here as a silent agreement. It is clear that in the long term view neither polemics nor debate but our actions will in the best way counter today's false assessment and expectations. It is not necessary to accept that in the USA there are no people who interpret our policies on joint investment with foreign private capital in a realistic way, that is, they see in it a function which serves both the strengthening of socialist production forces in our country, but the dominant view is the first interpretation.

Not only the relations with the USA but in general with the outside world and even on our internal needs this complex demands and deserves our very clear social behavior /economic, political and even with ideas/. It for sure calls for deeper and more precise theoretical, political and economic explanations and practical explanations and solutions, otherwise to fear that the rhetoric would pull us unexpectedly (in the wrong direction), so that the eventual need later for corrections would be more difficult. The special publicity of these operations are important and through this in general social control.

We are here often asked what is our policy concerning joint investment, and to which branch does this pertain. Is there a branch where you cannot have investment and similar (questions). We do not have and we do not know the complete answer. I suggest that in a whole this complex be given attention which it deserves, and which it does not have enough of currently.

b) Scientific and technical cooperation – even here one can speak about the widening of cooperation.

As England was once the leading industrial and trade country and represented the politics of liaise-faire likewise today the USA very actively represents the free integration of human knowledge. As a new phenomenon.

The Nixon Administration is simply continuing earlier begun work and more intensively it is conducting a scientific offensive, that is scientific cooperation has become a very powerful tool of the policies of the USA. That is the case with other developed countries, but the USA is the most visible because of well known reasons.

Along with the benefits which are brought to the partners of this type of cooperation I am sure there are in it (this cooperation) some risks and even direct detriments which sometimes can be larger than the benefit. The well known “brain drain” is among the first, so interference in internal affairs, and so forth. However, we have to be in the clear with this and that they not do this, and the USA not only behaves like this but all others including even the socialist countries – the USSR and others.

In this relation there is something inherit which stems from “the organic composition of scientific capital” and it creates an unfair relationship from which one cannot escape totally/similar to the difference in the price of raw material and the final product./

However, as in the trade of goods / because of the inherit unfair relations following nonalignment/ we cannot think about autarchy but something completely different, it is completely valid and for economic technical cooperation and other in the modern times. Tomorrow it would be even more such a case.

Our political scientific and technical cooperation demands the successful completion not only as a basis for the orientation but also for the operative working and most likely not only toward the USA.

From our experiences in this cooperation with the USA I can say that we should object to “the scientific closing within oneself” but also in this way even the superficial, for our interests either poor or inadequate incomplete opening. Along with very successful programs there are programs that we accept I would say almost at any cost. Some of the accepted programs are for us very important and useful while others are totally peripheral. Our own criticism and selectiveness is more needed. Every program and concrete agreement is always the result of dual discussions. As Americans normally suggest that which interests them more we sh ould remain at that which interests us more. Why would we not maintain the meetings and the consultations in the country and in an organized self managed basis come to an understanding concerning everything which would in this area of our relations with the outside world make them more efficient and developed from those today. As in the trade cooperation a responsible support from the state administration is necessary and this area asks for something similar in principle. /The producer is the main bearer while the state stimulates and de-stimulates./ We think that with the USA this cooperation would be possible to expand to already existing and into new areas. In the event that we have critical objections to the cooperation to date, I think that we should without hesitation raise them with the Americans. It has been shown that our justified and substantiated objections produce results.

The Dinar Funds of the USA in Yugoslavia

A total of 5,502 million new dinars / the total resources of the USA 6,828 minus that which has been paid off until December 31, 1969 1,326 – according to the information from the SSF/, I believe is a great burden for our economy and is in general an unfavorable factor which we do not treat as most problems demand. First what I want to say that in so much as time passes and our economy develops we will have less economic arguments for our general treatment by these funds on the part of the USA.

To some degree we have missed an opportunity, and I believe we are still continuing to miss an opportunity to use these funds more in the established sectors/scientific-technical cooperation, our export, and so forth/. Following this we would need to consider new sectors that could be useful, for example that their usage assist the speedy /for now at least partly/ convertibility of the dinar.

Even though our position is different than position of India, it would be useful to find out how India uses these funds /for example in development of agriculture, cultural – educational areas and so forth/.

Especially the indirect sector could be the military sector.

In the remaining period the spending of these resources would have to be of course stronger and more diversified built in to our policies.

Military Relations – it can be said that this does not exists except for the protocol – diplomatic part and our insignificant military buying in the USA. Given our military doctrine, international politics and the economic position of Yugoslavia, the situation of international relations and the tendency in them for concrete policies which are directed at our country by both the East and West, all ask a question whether this situation optimally favors our interests. I believe that it does not favor them. When I say this I am not thinking that we should basically change this sector of our policies, but I believe that we should do concrete adaptations which would better respond to today's trends and tendencies in international relations. The situation many years earlier when we almost entirely depended on the USA with respect to military supplies was not favorable for us, however, today is also not the most optimal when practically there is a lack of every kind of working connection with the USA in this area.

Assessing that the situation concerning relations between Yugoslavia – USA is today such that it would be possible to continue a dialogue even in this sector, and that there is an interest and readiness on the part of the USA /contrary to earlier times when they cut the sources of military supplies/. It is upon us to measure the degree and the intensity of these connections and that we enter them in a way and to the measure that we deem to respond to the interests of our country.

I add that there were exchanges of views Washington – London /before the visit of comrade Ribicic to London/ concerning military cooperation Yugoslavia - England and that the USA supported this, this was told to me in the State Department, and they also indicated they were not bothered by our military purchases in France /not even during the time of De Gaulle/ because that was a Western source of supplies.

If we assess that there are too many military American personnel in Yugoslavia in their military mission, it is possible and should be organized open discussions with them in which we lay out our reasons and arguments. The eventual reduction in personnel should not result in the worsening of relations but rather in their being made better.

It is useful to consider whether it would come into consideration the indirect use of dinar funds of the USA for our military purposes.

Visas – already for a relatively long time remains the fact that Yugoslavia is more open and free in its behavior concerning its visa regime than is the USA which surprises many of my counterparts here when I tell them this. In simplifying the visa treatment something was accomplished but this is all modest and it does not respond to modern and intensive communication of the citizens of the two countries which are constantly expanding. The obstacles for the free treatment as I said before are the policies of the government of the USA. The current visa regime falls into a conservative (category). The very beginning of this state was tied to emigrant politics and in recent times along with this either anti-communism or cold war.

One of these cold war remainders in our bilateral relations with the USA is the demand by our citizens to fill out the known questionnaire. I believe there are reasons and logic in publicly launching with the government of the USA an initiative that they abandon asking the filling out of these questionnaires. I know that they can /and they likely will/ call upon a refer to their existing laws, but I know that a solution can be found if there is a political interest.

There is no doubt that the abandonment of this practice would positively affect the atmosphere and relations.

Emigrants – are a minor factor in evolving relations less than I originally believed. The greatest number of them remains in the poor social categories. Only individuals have succeeded to enter the more influential circles. Among the emigrants who arrived over the past 2 years are a number of relatively significant intellectuals among who are some very capable and talented ones. They find work easily. The majority of them are not interested /they are pulled toward their jobs/ for political activeness, one part actively and loyally behaves and assists in development of relations of Yugoslavia – USA. The smallest group of these embraces the extremists – the emigrants.

Older emigrants except for something that sentimentally ties them, some perhaps property left behind, and they do not offer anything else. That is why to me it seems that our clubs of emigrants in the country and our consulates in the USA in is specific way have pre- dimentionalized and the consulates stresses too much the emigrant aspect. The result which they achieved with the emigrants are in general modest. It is another thing that we ourselves show them to be in the press to be greater and more meaningful than they are, and what we often say to ourselves either this or that is meaningful without really analyzing the reach of this significance.

I am not sure that we need two consulates – Pittsburgh and Cleveland, one is about 100 miles from the other.

Extreme emigrants – the policies of the government of the USA towards this category in the greatest manner influences the politics of all governments which give asylum to these terrorists and to those in Latin America and in Western Europe and Austria as well as Canada. This is a typical territory of the cold /and class/ war where the USA lead and upon who the other capitalist countries follow the politics of the USA. In other words, if it would come to a change in the policies of the government of the USA toward the extremists then almost certainly that the majority of other governments would follow their example. In this regard, I see this problem. In the past year it has come to certain reduction in public actions directed against our representatives /pickets and the similar/ but not to the provocative – enemy activities, in some directions these have even increased. The number of extremists in the USA has grown, their subversive agreements of action /toward our country/ are not falling off, here there are gatherings around the ex-king and a variety of other Ustashi-Chetnik-Ljotic groups and individuals who are active, and so forth. Earlier we had promised to be more sensitive in giving visas to the ex-king (groups) and the demands that the entries into the USA be conditioned with no public activities.

The fact is that sometimes even publicly some local and other state functionaries from the USA maintain connections with these groups, and we then have the need that every “10th of April” or for 29th of November or 1st of May that we have to warn the State Department, police and ask for protection, and so forth, all this speaks to the problem and indicates that it is not meaningless.

I cannot accept the current, according to regulations, response that these are small groups that in the USA nobody listens to them that they have no influence in the USA and so forth. I am not concerned that much over how much these groups or individuals have influence in the USA, but rather how their activities are reflected in my country. They exist not because of the USA but because of Yugoslavia.

To repeat that which I have many times said, that is, that I agree that this problem should not become an obstacle for normal relations with the USA and for their evolvement, because that is not deserved, but I repeat that we cannot behave as if the problems almost do not exist. We have to in our policy toward the USA in this regard placed ourselves so that things are clear that our mutual confidence and relations would be better if there were less activities such as these, that is if they did not exist at all. Very often whenever I get the opportunity this is also how I speak.

Even though it is not important, my last visit to New Orleans says something. As you know the last year – two we have constantly raised the issue concerning the continued existence of the kingdom's consulate in this city, in which we succeeded because the remainder have disappeared. I do not believe that it is by chance that I was declared right in New Orleans an honorary citizen which the local newspapers and televisions well covered. With this I want to say that by raising the problem in a responsible way this is not ruined but rather fixes things. At least in the area of New Orleans to some extent things have been changed in our favor, and to the detriment of the reactionaries. That is why I believe that it is good that the [DSIP] in the last period of time and for several times had tried to raise this problem with the USA Embassy.

I advise that in a responsible way that all of our republic leadership be made aware /and federal organs/ and that in their contacts with their American officials and private individuals, that they maintain this theme in their conversations. Basically we should demand that hospitality be taken away from extremist activities in the name of better relations between Yugoslavia - USA. It is better to lead if I can say this in this way everyday dialogue at the working levels than to gather and leave with an “explosion” of words. This similarly is valid for the intelligence activities which is a separate theme about which we will discuss when I come to Belgrade.

Before I finish this paragraph I should say that there is no difference in behavior between Nixon and Johnson toward extremists. The difference is maybe only in that they view Nixon to be closer to them.

Political relations – in these it has been noted less of an evolution than maybe was initiated at first by Nixon's letter to Tito. If I was to measure them through number and level of contacts and compared them with the earlier year there would only be modest progress. However, it is not unrealistic to expect that they would in the upcoming period become intensified /E. Richardson, Hillenbrand, eventually Rodgers). Concerning a possible visit by Nixon or Rodgers they remain reserved. Even though this is as it is – it is new in the relations of Yugoslavia – USA. For the first time in the history of relations an American President has visited our country and it was placed on the daily schedule and that by the American President himself. This by itself is good and useful for our international position and the same remains true for the State Secretary of the USA. This is reflected in the already mentioned somewhat increased interest in Yugoslavia.

How it will come to a visit of Nixon to Yugoslavia it is difficult for me to say. If it comes to this then for sure it would be in the moments when Nixon believes it is the most useful for the USA. The main criteria of this usefulness will be what and how does the USA contribute in the relations with the USSR and China, following this eastern Europe, and following that toward the nonaligned world, European actions, that is Yugoslavia – the West as a whole and of course their bilateral relations. Having this in view I do not believe that in the near future on the stage that there are enough factors which would make the visit actual for the USA /only if there are no surprises)/.

It is more simple as for the visit of Rodgers which is more likely and possible to occur over this year. A few days ago Rodger's assistant M. Hillenbrand very cautiously attempted to hear my reaction how we would eventually receive a visit by Rodgers before or after the NATO meeting. This was “salted” with the possibility of a visit of Rodgers to Spain at the same time. This is an old point in the policies of the USA toward us as well as to the same extent toward NATO. However, this meant something else in the era of the most intensive cold war period when the preoccupations of NATO were somewhat different than now. Now, in May NATO will among other things discuss the mutual military withdrawal from Europe /of the USA and the USSR/ about a conference of European security. In general the political goal of this American theme toward us remains the same but the conditions have greatly changed under which they are trying to achieve them.

Before I would suggest how we should react to this “hint” /I announced what I had said as my personal reaction/ we have to make clear what we expect from this visit and what we desire to achieve. I think that for us the bilateral plan is the most important. If it evolves successfully there will be a reflex in the international aspects. As one of the main bilateral goals I would put the easing of the usage of the dinar funds of the USA. This would be tied to the widening of cooperation in all areas including in the military /in the mentioned spirit/.

I know that these things demand discussion, analysis and the assumption of precise positions so I advise that the preparations for this begin regardless of whether the visit will be realized sooner or later. As far as we are concerned as far as I can tell I do not see a separate reason to force the visit nor to postpone it – it would be welcome to us. And I would say better sooner rather than later.

When I think about these visits and I compare them with the visits from western Europe I see that the USA is lagging behind as to the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but not when it comes to the heads of state. Not even from the eastern side from the Czechoslovak Republic crisis there has not been many trips by the Chief of State or government. The announced visits by the English and the French are welcome.

In the State Department, White House and among congressmen when we discuss the political position of Yugoslavia – the most questions I receive comes from our relations with the USSR, China and Albania. It is understandable why – because this serves them as a barometer or an indicator of triangular relations.

The next “in line” is the question does and to what extent the Yugoslav experience influence or will it influence other socialist countries including the USSR.

These two things illustrate in whole how Yugoslavia “is situated” in American global plans.

The greatest interest exists as well as sensitivity concerning our relations with the USSR where every move in relations of Belgrade – Moscow is very carefully followed, which has its advantages and weaknesses. I would add as a relatively new element that in public conversations they state that the USA has nothing against our better relations with the USSR. This for me and my coworkers has been said many times in the State Department. This also is true in the other direction, that is Soviet diplomats in conversations with us devote the most attention to our relations with the USA and they are interested in the most minute details.

In fact today the USA is mostly intrigued not to say worried, by our military cooperation with the USSR and it considers that they and the West “have lost a point” because they think that they pushed us more than we ourselves wanted toward dependency on the USSR.

About our nonaligned politics in the State Department they almost never discuss this if we ourselves do not first initiate a discussion and in return we often get very short answers without commentary. Normally they briefly respond that the policies of the USA evolve concerning the nonaligned from the time of the late Dallas who led the policy “who is not with us is against us” and for today this is no longer the case.

In fact the USA sees the nonaligned with a “torn policy.” To the extent that it troubles the Soviet or the Chinese pretensions then nonalignment is welcome, but to the extent that they interfere with the USA and the joint interests of the West then they are not. Because it bothers both superpowers, both equally ignore it. Along the way according to the estimate of the USA the changed balance to their benefit – the easing of the Cold War, the confrontation of the USA with the nonaligned is less needed or better said creates more harm than good, so that they more easily tolerate the nonaligned today. The nonaligned area for the USA is becoming an area of competition with USSR and China as states which the USA suggests, following faulty and unsuccessful up until now courses of action of military pacts and military intervention.

Even though they do not say this to us but they think that we are “too involved” on the nonaligned front, and that our actions are overcoming our dimensions. Similarly they see this like the USSR that we in fact desire leadership in the nonaligned world. However, our nonalignment nor that of our partners is not the only cause of our political disagreements with the USA but more than this it is the politics of the USA.

The main area /or more acutely/ of our political lack of agreement with the USA constantly is in the international area. This is also valid for a whole list of nonaligned countries who even by their social organization have similar organization to that of the USA. In the USA today they see more clearly than before that for example, with the exclusion of the Vietnam problem not only will they be able to solve some other for the USA more important elements but that it would also ease the fixing of relations with a great number of nonaligned countries. It is clear that a political solution for Vietnam and the Near East as the two sharpest problems would in a great way narrow the area of our disagreement with the USA.

To the extent that in the relations between the superpowers negotiations take up a more important place then it can be expected that the nonaligned policies in important areas will be eased.

Zones of Influence – I notice that officials in the State Department and outside of it are becoming sensitive and more often more decisively deny that there exist zones of influence in Eastern Europe, that is that there exists an agreement about these zones. They constantly say if there was something then that was between Churchill and Stalin but not with the USA, which is against this type of policy. I think it has something to do with the following: regardless of whether it exists – this type of different agreement concerning the division of influence in Eastern Europe it does not seem possible and likely that the Americans /or Churchill/ accepted the type of division of influences in Eastern Europe which exist today. Not only have the role and the influence of the USSR become predominant in Eastern Europe, but it desires to spread this influence and to completely exclude the USA from this region. In the policies of the USSR today begins to more clearly follow the contours of politics of one state /USSR – the countries of the Warsaw pact/.

In Eastern Europe there were a number of major crises following the Second World War which had as consequences more or less the strengthening of the Cold War, the hastening of armament and disrupting diplomatic and economic relations of East – West, but they did not provoke armed conflict.

Following 20 years of experience it has become relatively clear that the USA will not enter into a war with USSR because of the territory of Eastern Europe, especially in this nuclear age. /Allow me to remind you, even though the conditions today are different that Finland in the war with USSR in 1939/1940 remained militarily completely alone/. There are colleagues here in Washington who say that the USA will not go into the nuclear war even for Western Europe.

However, I believe that the Nixon Administration is showing somewhat more interest in Eastern Europe more than Johnson's.

- Nixon's trip to Romania,
- The expressed wish to meet with Tito,
- The separation in Nixon's last message to Congress of Eastern Europe as a geopolitical territory /not pushing it in the Soviet block/ and that statement that the USA would be prepared in cooperation with the Eastern European countries to go far if they themselves were ready,
- More vocally then other Western states the non-recognition of the Breznjev doctrine.

I am familiar with the fact that the USSR is very nervous about all of this and have reacted inadequately, they have asked what is the meaning of all this and have made it well known that “Nixon with his provocative policies will achieve contrary results than those he desires,” that is, they are simply threatened that they will not give in at all. Ambassador Dobrinjinin had an important role in all of this. We heard in the State Department that the new Administration has understood that if it wants to negotiate with the USSR they have to ease their ambitions toward Eastern Europe and that it is assessed with respect to the security and interests of the USA that dialogue with USSR is more important and as is avoiding a war then the Eastern European region. This does not mean that this region is being abandoned but that the possibilities of the USA in it are less than the new Administration believes, that is, that the policies towards Eastern Europe are measured /and are compared/ to the relations with the USSR. In the report Nixon openly speaks about the legitimate interest of the USSR in Eastern Europe.

In further light /along with the nonaligned component and its current policies the USA sees it more negatively than positively/ I believe that it is necessary to observe the behavior of USA toward us, even though that this for us means significantly less than it does for the rest of the Eastern European countries.

Nonetheless, the statement that the USA is ready to move toward cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe to the degree that they themselves are ready also does not pertain to us in its whole, especially not in the political field. I also do not believe it pertains to Romania. This conclusion demands caution and not to overestimate one's own importance /the relationship between the big – small/.

- The level of political consultations and contacts, are being held up and delayed by USA, but they are somewhat advancing them in relationship to the previous situation. This however they are not the only ones who are doing, comrade Breznjev also has been preparing for a long time to visit us.
- The exchange of political high ranking visits we are prepared to complete. USA has begun, but they are not in a hurry to complete them but they are also not taking them off from the daily agenda.
- On the other hand, the USA is gaining economic, followed by scientific and cultural and other cooperation. As I already said they are also interested in the area of the military. All this gives reason and cause to conclude that even our political relations despite differences and difficulties and many things that strain them, or “disturb” them are moving toward the better. I believe that this is not a temporary but rather a long term tendency.

Our social and economic reforms and the USA

The opening of Yugoslav society toward the outside world and its internal democratization on the basis of self management and market relations have been well received in the USA. Many factors both desired and undesired influence this. If I take only the economic area – foreign trade and the growth in our ties with the West at the expense of all regions here, of course it evokes satisfaction. Our decision concerning cooperation with international private capital likewise /does the same/. It is known that the exposure of our economy to greater global competition will give greater chances to those who are more competitive if there are no political – administrative interferences. They see very well the advantage of Western technology which they believe in the future will be even more convincing.

The free investment of our various scientific, educational and other institutions /and individuals/ in cooperation with our partners in the USA, likewise with good reason was well received. So, there are real and proven reasons that our reform and its consequences are well received not only in the USA but wider, because reform offers without precedent, the policies of a real peace loving coexistence both politically and economically.

However, among high officials and lower as well as average Americans, there exists hidden or open /they do not hide it that much/ beliefs and expectations that our economic – social reforms will lead either sooner or later towards some type of quasi capitalism if not total. Because of our international position this can be delicate because it can create illusions and misimpressions. Our example is being used as proof of the “theory of convergence” /“the joining of systems”/. To be honest in this last period of time there is less talk about meeting on “half of the journey” and more about the fact that socialism is entering even deeper internal crises and that capitalism is increasingly more successful – and because of this it is known what and who should change.

The best, I would say and only response to these mischaracterizations are our internal policies, and their results. To the extent that they increasingly with success move in the expressed directions underpinned by ideas and practicality, we will not have much need nor reason to denounce, renounce or to argue. In this view we have to be careful and cautious about the development of various expressions either pro-Americanism or anti-Americanism /like pro or anti Sovietism/ because our policies are not one nor the other. These types of developments sometimes overwhelm Yugoslav – American relations as I believe they overwhelm others as well. This here of course is registered and they create their own pro and contra list. However, the less possibility and reasons for these lists the better it is for us. They bring in uncertainty and they in the first instance do damage to us and our interests. Clarity and precision and the openness of our policies is absolutely necessary because as a small country with this type of structure that we have, we are confronted by false and dishonest interpretations, and by real and not ill intended misunderstandings. As for our internal democratic developments here it is increasingly easier to defend them. Djilas and Mihajlov, for example have become peripheral elements. Here it is easier and more useful to use our restrictive measures against them than to hear their “political thoughts.” Our position concerning increased level of democratization and openness of our society has eased here, for example, when we announce that we are prepared for the dual ending of visas but the USA is not. One other detail also says something: here not too long ago visited one of our vanguard film directors. When they asked him /and they offered him a good income/ if he would stay in the USA he responded to them that he would not. When they asked him why, he answered that he lives well in Yugoslavia and that he has greater freedom for creating than he would have in the USA. There are other examples similar to this, not to speak about the fact that when you present something with a little more detail to whatever public here our development, our goals and our ambitions, that this leaves an impression and is difficult to attack it. Many times I have had the opportunity to see this and to feel it myself. I mention this only so that I could cover our fundamental theme that socialist self management democracy is by far the most effective dam against undesired influences and something else that I want to underline and that is how important our behavior between ourselves within our country and how important this is, not to long ago this created suspicion and cast doubt on our unity and our might, integrity and so forth.

We have informed you that we are constantly meeting with the question “what after Tito.” This question especially is being linked to national relations and to the fate of the Yugoslav federation. These doubts in certain way are being heated by Soviet diplomats.

As you know there were articles even in American press on the last theme. We have done a great deal here to object to this type of writing. It seems as if they have undertaken some things because in the last month - 2 almost nothing is being written about this.

In the last 3 months as good news from our economic life arrives /production and increased exports/ that is immediately registered here. When I was recently in Philadelphia and New Orleans both speakers that introduced me in the auditoriums and gave the opening remarks, mentioned almost as if “by command” that we in this year have economically began better than any other European country. There are no articles or speeches that could be stronger than this.

About Leader's Exchanges

This has not passed the great test and it has not brought about significant results. It has not been damaging either. Its main defect as it is thought up on the part of the USA as a part of their propaganda – information (program). This as an approach and policy in relations between states and peoples is very narrow and should be in the main sterile. It is not only sterile only for us but also for some other states that are not socialists.

From some of our comrades who came in this program I heard that they were satisfied while others were not. Everyone noted something and learned something but all of this to a very modest degree. It would be good if the Americans would condition and organize these visits and trips, with some changes, that would create greater elasticity and freedom.

They themselves came to the conclusion that the leader's exchange title is not appropriate and they have changed it to International Visitors Program. This is a better name. I think that we could suggest that through this program we send more experts especially from the economy and other sectors rather than “leaders.” That these become working visits for which there would be an agreement ahead of time /in line with our interests/ all with the working program. We should attempt to especially widen this to include the economy. My objections come to that we should attempt to make this activity more useful for us and that we should free it from that which creates more damage than usefulness /when let's say this is awarded to our individual some Yugoslav political emigrant, who is by nature against Yugoslav socialism, acts as an interpreter and guide and who “along the way” through small and unintelligent questions attempts to learn something in the intelligence category, there are comrades who were rightly irritated by this/.

When I first come back to Belgrade I will bring with me a proposal as to how we should proceed.

In the end allow me to say that this letter has a goal to assist to bring to date our relations with the USA. It does not contain any major suggestions /especially not in the context of change in our policies/ but some points are highlighted, some are widened and some it attempts to correct with the goal that it assist in creating better and for us more useful relations with the USA. In so much that these relations for us are more useful then the greater interest we will have in widening them.

Report on Yugoslav-American relations written by a Yugoslav official representing the SFRY in Washington, D.C. Fourteen months after the beginning of President Richard Nixon's term in office the memorandum sums up general tendencies in U.S. politics in regard to Yugoslavia. Among the topics discussed are a general improvement of the relations in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural sectors as well as the SFRY's poltical position between the aligned countries.


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Yugoslav Archives, Fond No. 507, File. No. IX, Subject No. 109-V 1970. Translated for CWIHP by Tanja Rajic

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