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March 1, 1957

Resolution of the CC of the People's Party of Iran of 1 March 1957 Regarding the Events of February 1949

Translation from the Persian


RESOLUTION of the CC of the People's Party of Iran of 1 MARCH 1957 REGARDING THE EVENTS OF 4 FEBRUARY 1949


1. Concerning the substance of the events


In February 1949 Naser Fakhr Arai made an attempt on the life of the Shah. Regardless of the fact that the person who made the attempt committed this act based on his anti-monarchical and terrorist convictions, that is, being a dedicated person he thought that with this act of terrorism he could bring about changes in the country, or he committed it at the instigation of the imperialist circles and elements associated with the ruling circles of Iran, the NPI knew nothing about his attempt. Based on a policy rejecting any sort of terror, the Party and its leadership had no connection with this act.


Iranian reaction and its imperialist instigators, who had already long sought an excuse to declare the NPI illegal, immediately used this event against the Party, without any investigation and without having the slightest evidence in its hands, accomplishing its long-held dream of forcing the Party underground. Although the bill of indictment drawn up subsequently showed our Party's non-involvement in this event, reaction not only did not abandon its decision but on the contrary, made it harsher.


Cde. Kiyanuri in prison first informed Cdes. Joudat and Kasemi that NPI member Cde. Argani was connected with the terror committed by Naser Fakhr Arai and that Cde. Kiyanuri, as the one responsible for organizational work, had met with Cde. Argani. Thus, two Party comrades: NPI CC executive committee member Cde. Kiyanuri, responsible at that time for CC organizational Party work, and professional [kadrovyy] Party official Cde. Argani, were connected with this event. Although these comrades were not mixed up in the designs of Naser Fakhr Arai, who thought of shooting at the Shah, and also had no relation to his determination to accomplish this, but considering that they were associated with a terrorist act the NPI CC considers itself obliged to clearly explain the form and character of this connection and the degree of responsibility of NPI CC executive committee member Cde. Kiyanuri, and to also take the necessary steps to prevent a repetition of such phenomena in Party life.


2. The degree of responsibility of Cde. Kiyanuri


Having heard the report of the commission chosen on the 15th of March 1956 to hold a Party investigation, which familiarized itself with the case and the opinions of the commission members (Cdes. Iskanderi, Amir-Khizi, and Tabari) after meeting on this issue on the basis of the documents available the CC thinks that Cde. Kiyanuri is responsible for the following:


1. When Cde. Argani informed Cde. Kiyanuri about the plan to make an attempt on the Shah's life Cde. Kiyanuri not only did not vigorously advise him to refrain from a connection with a terrorist since this was in violation of the Party platform and especially in the circumstances then could lead to disastrous consequences but he promised Cde. Argani to raise this issue in the executive committee for discussion by the comrades. He later informed Cde. Argani that he had discussed this issue with several comrades.


2. Although the importance of this event was completely obvious, especially in the circumstances in which our Party found itself at the time, when the enemy was preparing a new attack on it, Cde. Kiyanuri reported about it to the executive committee casually and did not demand a completely clear decision on this issue. As succeeding events have shown, thanks to some incorrect methods in his Party work, Cde. Kiyanuri incorrectly understood the meeting's advice.


3. Although the CC executive committee considered intervention in this matter unacceptable for the Party, according to his own statement Cde. Kiyanuri, based on how he himself understood the executive committee's decision, informed Cde. Argani about this in such a form that Cde. Argani in turn understood this in his own way and considered it his responsibility to carry out these instructions.


4. In spite of the fact that during the third meeting with Cde. Argani Cde. Kiyanuri found out that Cde. Argani was continuing to meet with the terrorist, he not only did not reprimand him and did not dissuade him from this, but according to his own statement, treating this perfunctorily, and did not report about this to the executive committee.


Although Cde. Kiyanuri correctly explains his mistakes as some subjective causes, characterizing them as a manifestation of pride, immaturity, inexperience, and thoughtlessness, that he did not think about the disastrous consequences of these anarchistic actions and did not take Cde. Argani's statement seriously during their first meeting, he did not understand the importance of the issue and could not stop this, as he himself spoke of it during the investigation and in his explanation; however, this criticism nevertheless is insufficiently specific. Cde. Kiyanuri should realize this mistakes based on this resolution. Cde. Kiyanuri ignored Party policy, which asserts a rejection of any sort of terrorist acts, violated Party discipline, and should bear the Party punishment.


Having encountered these mistake, considering the personality of Cde. Kiyanuri and his services in our movement, and also that this occurred in a period when Cde. Kiyanuri did not have enough Party and life experience, the general development of the Party and the overall movement was at the first stage, giving great significance to the increase of Party unity and its leadership especially right now, in a period of general crisis in Party the NPI CC considers it necessary:


1) to agree with the 27th of November 1952 resolution adopted by majority vote at a meeting of several CC members in exile and with which Cde. Kiyanuri also agreed after familiarization [with it]. Cde. Kiyanuri is removed from the posts in the executive committee associated with organizational work and can be used in work associated with propaganda and training. Cde. Kiyanuri should try to win the necessary trust of the CC, displaying complete discipline and respect for the work of the collective in all his work.


2) to condemn the conduct of Cde. Kiyanuri during the events of the 4th of February 1949.


3) Cde. Kiyanuri should subject himself to criticism based on this resolution.


3. An assessment of the method of Party leadership on this issue


In the issue under discussion the Party leadership also deserves criticism. The mistakes of the Party leadership are as follows:


1) When Cde. Kiyanuri superficially and casually raised an important issue at a meeting of the executive committee the leadership was obligated to devote the necessary attention to it and comprehensively investigate it. The leadership displayed a lack of concern in performing this serious responsibility.


2) After it became known about the events via Cde. Kiyanuri, the leadership did not take steps at the necessary moment to organize a detailed investigation and a fair and objective study of this issue. It is true that it was difficult to conduct such an investigation in the special conditions of that time, but there were many suitable moments to do this after comrades had escaped from prison and especially when the Mossadegh government was in power. On the one hand the leadership created around Cde. Kiyanuri, a person who had participated in a dangerous provocation, an atmosphere of caution and began to restrict him, but on the other, it left him in responsible positions such as the person responsible for the Tehran organization, responsible for preparing weapons, responsible for sending people abroad, a member of the staff to prepare an uprising, etc. Such a contradictory behavior by the leadership could not have convinced Cde. Kiyanuri that the leadership was following correct methods with respect to his mistakes.


3) The Party leadership in exile, conducting a preliminary investigation of this event, adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority of votes, but still keeps it in its archives, without making a corresponding decision about deferring its implementation. By their action the leadership in exile has facilitated the prolongation of an unclear and unhealthy situation, although itself has demanded the elimination of the confusion in this resolution.


Based on all the above the NPI CC criticizes its own conduct in this issue.




1 March 1957


Translated: [signature] (V. Savel'yeva)



[the Persian-language original follows]






The resolutions of the CC of the People's Party of Iran "Concerning Some Mistaken and Blanquist Decisions of the NPI Leadership after the 19 August 1953 Coup" (dated 14 March 1957) and "Regarding the Events of 4 February 1949" (dated 1 March 1957).


The material was used in drawing up an article "Concerning the Situation in the People's Party of Iran" published in the second issue of the "Information Bulletin".


An. Anisimov

27 April 1957

Sector Chief [illegible signature]

27 April 1957

[to the] archives

V. Gorbunov

7 May 1957


Following Naser Fakhr Arai's attempt to kill the Shah in February 1949, the People's Party of Iran faced accusations that it had a direct role in the assassination attempt. The NPI denied any direct role, however contends that executive committee member Kyanuri and Party official Argani were connected in the capacity that they were aware of it. The resolution seeks to explain their character of connection and their degree of responsibility.


Document Information


RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 499. Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties (International Department of the Central Committee), 1953-1957, microfilm, reel 125. Obtained by Roham Alvandi and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.


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