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March 24, 1957

Resolution of the CC of the People's Party of Iran about Some Mistaken and Blanquist Decisions of the NPI Leadership

[CPSU CC stamp:


24 March 1957

Subject to return to the

CPSU CC General Department]

Translation from the Persian




of the CC of the People's Party of Iran of 14 March 1957 about some mistaken and Blanquist decisions of the NPI leadership after the 19 August 1953 coup


1. The leadership of the Party in Iran strived in their views and decisions to compensate for the damage done after the defeat of the national liberation movement in connection with the monarchist-fascist coup of the Shah and Zahedi and to liquidate the coup regime. These views and decisions were subordinate to the natural wishes of the Party masses, they overestimated Party strength, and had the nature of Blanquism and populism. They include the implementation of a plan of partisan raids and seizures when there were no longer the necessary conditions for this (the blow inflicted on the 30th of Mordad, the 22nd of August), sabotage at the [Gal'amorgi] Airfield, leaflets under the name of "Announcement of Danger", and others. The decision of the 30th of Mordad, 22nd of August, was not carried out.


As a result of an exchange of opinions between members of the executive committee in Tehran and CC members abroad and on the advice of the latter the plan of partisan raids was not implemented, and several other of these decisions were not put into effect. However, part of the measures, the sabotage at [Gal'amorgi] and the "Announcement of Danger" leaflets were carried out.


The CC considers it necessary to give its explanations about this.


2. The NPI is a revolutionary party, which thinks that violent acts (beginning with an uprising, revolutionary war, and partisan activity, and ending with various other acts associated with inflicting damage) can be useful and even obligatory only when they are carefully prepared at certain moments of a class struggle and national liberation movement. A revolutionary party does not reject this necessary means, but resorts to it only after considering all the circumstances. Criticism by the Party of some hasty decisions of the executive committee in Iran comes not from a complete renunciation of the need for violent acts, but considers it necessary to turn to them when these acts become a necessary duty. Such a renunciation would mean slipping into reformism.


The NPI thinks that the main responsibility of a proletarian party is the organization of the broad masses against imperialism and reaction, but violent acts when carrying out this main responsibility can be useful only at certain moments.


Violent acts are advisable and can lead to victory only when they rely on the broad masses which support these actions, and also when there are the necessary social conditions. Violent acts which do not enjoy the support of the broad masses but are supported only by the avant garde of the working class are turned into Blanquism and adventurism by a proletarian party.


Criticism by the Party of some of the decisions of the executive committee after the 19th of August arise namely from the fact that these decisions were adopted without sufficiently taking into account the main base, that is, the broad masses, relying only on the Party of the working class, but this meant an overestimation of their own strength.


These decisions and especially that part of them which were put into effect like, for example, the sabotage in Gal'amorgi and the "Declaration of Danger" leaflets exerted a negative effect on public opinion and caused the Party certain damage.


3. One cannot completely reject and consider Blanquism the use of various social forces, including the Qashqai tribe. This is possible in the interests of the national liberation movement in special conditions and at a certain moment.


However, after the 19th of August discussions with the chiefs of the Qashqai tribe ought to refer to the executive committee decision about an untimely uprising. The CC views these discussions as Blanquism.


4. The entire Party executive committee in Tehran bears responsibility for these adventurist decisions and acts regardless of which of the members of the Party leadership made these suggestions, since the available documents demonstrate that not a single act was undertaken by anyone personally without informing the appropriate bodies. Every suggestion was discussed at appropriate Party levels, where agreement was received. To make a suggestion or to display any initiative, even if not correct, does not violate organizational principles.


5. The position of the meeting of CC members abroad which at one time sent a document in response to a request of the Tehran comrades entitled, "The Strategic and Tactical Line of the Party" and obstructed the adoption of several wrong decisions was correct in this sense.


At the same time allowance ought to be made for the fact that the comrades on the Tehran executive committee were pressured by the Party masses and were operating in difficult conditions, especially after the defeat which prevented them from adopting decisions freely and cold-bloodedly as the comrades abroad could have done.


The CC of the People's Party of Iran


14 March 1957


Translated: [signature] (V. Savel'yeva)



[the Persian-language original follows]

This resolution addresses the People's Party of Iran's actions regarding the Party's mistakes after the August 1953 coup. Some members of the party went through with partisan raids and seizures when that was no longer the plan, as well as with the distribution of leaflets titled "Announcement of Danger." The explanation given by the NPI was that although the party supports violent measures when necessary and approved by the masses, the decisions made in this instance by the executive committee did not have the support of the masses, and therefore were flawed.


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Document Information


RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, d. 499. Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties (International Department of the Central Committee), 1953-1957, microfilm, reel 125. Contributed by Roham Alvandi and translated by Gary Goldberg.


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