Stenographic Protocol of the Meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Raul Castro Rus

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP CC)

Inter-party meetings and talks

Stenographic protocol of the meeting between Todor Zhivkov - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP and Chairman of the State Council of the NRB, and the Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and First Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba Raul Castro Rus - March 11, 1974.

44 pages

[page break]

MEETING

of Comrade TODOR ZHIVKOV - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP and Chairman of the State Council of the NRB, with Comrade RAUL CASTRO RUS - Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, First Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Government and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic Cuba

March 11, 1974

/Shorthand record/

The following are present at the meeting:

From the Bulgarian country - etc. Stanko Todorov - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BKP and chairman of the Council of Ministers, etc. Boris Velchev - member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP, etc. Konstantin Tellalov - secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP, etc. Mako Dakov - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, etc. Tinko Vodenicharov - assistant to the first secretary ­of the Central Committee of the BKP.

From the Cuban side - others. Faustino Perez Hernandez - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba to the Republic of Bulgaria, etc. Humberto Perez Gonzalez - advisor to Raul Castro on party and state affairs.

(p. 1)

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Comrade Raul Castro, allow me once again to welcome you on behalf of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the BKP, the government and on our behalf and to express our gratitude for responding to our invitation and now being our dear guest.

I must tell you that, apart from the question of friendship ­and companionship, we will not put any special questions before you now.

We usually give the floor to the guests, but if we agree, I can also start.

RAUL CASTRO: As you decide, we are now subordinate to the Bulgarian ­party.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We have a custom to give the floor to the guests first. Your impressions are richer than ours, since you come from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia: one side - the center of the revolutionary movement, the tallest bell tower in the world, the other - the center of the non-aligned countries. Besides, you are in the center of Latin America.

RAUL CASTRO: I was thinking of combining my trip to Europe with my vacation. I had decided to spend a month in Moscow to work a little on military matters, to take something of the Soviet experience in connection with the tasks we are now carrying out. However, I had to stay for a week because the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia had just left our country. At that time Comrade Stanko Todorov was in Cuba, and Fidel had to go to Yugoslavia.

(p. 2)

As early as the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers in September, he had accepted Tito's invitation after his return from Vietnam to pass through Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the Chilean events took place and Fidel had to cancel this visit to Yugoslavia, as well as the planned short visits to Syria and Iraq. They urged Fidel to come before May, before the Congress of the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. He said he could not come and asked me to use the opportunity to make a visit, which is the first party-government visit of our delegation to Yugoslavia. Dolanc came to Cuba last year. This was the first inter-party contact. We have never had relations with the Yugoslavs, they are just now starting to settle. We decided to respond to this invitation in order to strengthen our relations, bearing in mind the changes taking place there, and also the present relations of Yugoslavia with the countries of the socialist camp. This trip of mine is the first official party-government delegation to visit Yugoslavia. So far, other employees of ours have gone. The Yugoslav delegation that visited Cuba was led by Comrade Dolanc.

Due to the bad weather on my way back from Czechoslovakia, I had to spend a day in Kyiv, so I had to shorten my stay in Yugoslavia by one day. Already on the way from the airport to the residence, Dolanc told me that I would not be able to visit Slovenia - his homeland - as I had shortened my stay by one day and that he was thinking of spending a day with me there. Then we decided to stay one more day so we could talk in person. You know that at official meetings, when 15 Cuban comrades sit on one side of the table and 15 Yugoslav on the other, frank conversations cannot take place.

(p. 3)

During the conversations, I was told that I should speak first. Although I was assigned to speak first, Dolanc began with a few opening remarks that lasted half an hour. He talks about the relations with the capitalist camp, with the socialist and non-­aligned countries, on the issue of self-government in them. Mention of their relations with the Soviet Union during Stalin's time. He said that then the Soviet side stopped ­all supplies to Yugoslavia. He is talking about the current Soviet leadership. In general, he spoke respectfully of the Soviet Union. He mentioned that relations with the socialist camp had also improved. Only then did he give me the floor. We had decided to present before him a broad information of four hours about our history, which is very short. I spoke in more detail about the 15th anniversary of the victory of the revolution, about the mistakes we made, about the innovations we sought to discover and about their consequences.

I devoted an hour of my information to our relations with the Soviet Union, to the problems we had with it and the other countries of the socialist community, to the problems we had with almost all the parties in the world, especially the parties of Latin America, and in general lines about the difficulties we have all over the world. He said they know this because the same thing happened to them. I felt sad because after analyzing ­our behavior, we realized that all the mistakes were made by us. So the Soviet Union and the socialist ­camp have shown great patience with us.

(p. 4)

Frankly speaking, the only [small] problem and the only mistake of the Soviet Union, and more precisely not of the Soviet Union, but of Khrushchev, was the way in which he resolved the Caribbean crisis without warning us. It is true that the world was on the brink of war, but Khrushchev could have sent us a coded telegram of at least two lines telling us that there was nothing left for us but to learn from the telegraph agencies. We reacted to this work, but the Soviet people told us: "Cuba is there and will continue ­to be there!" At a meeting of the Politburo, Fidel said: "They were right then because Cuba still exists now."

I told Dolanc that today our relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp are better than ever. I have listed by name the countries with which we have good relations so that he does not make any mistake. This conversation was before noon. He gave us a dinner, during which he raised a toast and most vigorously defended self-government. I responded to his toast and noted that we are coming as ambassadors of our party, of our government, with the aim of strengthening ties with them, and we are convinced that we will fulfill this mission. I said that we have differences and that it is difficult to reach absolute unanimity ­. I emphasized that I have differences even with the people I love most in the world - Fidel and Vilma. I had to say this because in every toast and in every conversation their self-governance was emphasized.

(p. 5)

During the lunch break, we were offered to go to the Parliament and attend the ratification of the new constitution. There was a delegation from the Chilean Socialist and the Chilean Communist Party - Altamirano and Teitelboim. Sherif Belkasem was also a member of the Front for the National Liberation of Algeria.

In the afternoon, Dolanc spoke generally on international issues. I do not want to go into details, because I had instructed the head of the Propaganda Department of our Central Committee to go through Bulgaria and inform the BKP in detail.

We had to fight with them quite a bit until we made a communiqué. Comrade Peres and the other comrade who passed by participated in the elaboration of the communiqué. Obradovich - head of the International Department of the Union of Yugoslavian Communists - on the first day, he simply did not show respect to our comrades, they did not even shake hands with them when we reached the table. No one was waiting for us downstairs. There were two projects - theirs and ours. We proposed ­to exchange these projects and then get to work. They said that a project would be developed based on theirs. Our comrades agreed. I had instructed them. I told them not to be angry because we Cubans get angry very easily. It was characteristic of this communique that they did not want any mention of the role played by the Soviet Union in reducing tensions. Even Obradovich went so far as to say: " If we must mention the Soviet Union, we must also mention the Americans. " Our comrades argued quite calmly. In the entire Yugoslav project, the non-aligned countries were mentioned in three lines, and the socialist camp was not mentioned. When non-aligned and socialist countries were mentioned, 

(p. 6)

socialist countries came second. Finally we managed to turn them around. But Obradovic once said that there is no difference between industrialized countries, whether they are capitalist or socialist. Then the Cubans got angry. He tried to soften his words by saying that he had something else in mind, etc.

The negotiations were quite difficult. They wanted it to be written in the communique that the Cuban country welcomes self-government. They refused to use the expression "internationalism". There was no way not to use "international communist movement". Our comrades informed me of these things. Then we acted in the following way: what we did not have the opportunity to say in the communique, we did in an interview in c. "Politics". I asked them to give me the questions in writing. There were six questions. They tried to cut from the interview as many as five passages, and the most important ones, where the Soviet Union was mentioned. Then our comrades protested as I was on tour. It seems the matter got to Dolanc and they decided to publish the entire interview.

I had hoped that I would be able to speak personally with Dolanc in the capital of the Slovenian Republic. He was with me, we visited a factory, had lunch together, but we could not talk face to face. And in the evenings, when I was free, he would go because he was busy with work. We only talked in private when we were in the car. Finally, during a visit to a large shopping center, we were able to talk privately, with only an interpreter. I explained to him that I was worried about the way the communique was being discussed, that they did not want to

(p. 7) 

write about the Soviet Union and that the role of the non-aligned countries is emphasized. I told him that we had agreed on some things, and that there were different shades of things in their draft, that we were alarmed that they did not accept the word "co-ordination" when we proposed to co-ordinate their ­and our actions towards the non-aligned countries. We proposed to them four other synonyms, but they did not want to coordinate with us. I expressed some concerns to him. He said not to worry, he would return in the afternoon and give instructions to fix the passages for the Soviet Union. "Understand," he declared, "that our situation is special. Now there is a campaign going on in the world that we are moving away from the non-aligned countries and approaching the socialist camp." I told him the following: "Are we instructing our comrades who are working on the communique not to seek any concessions from you, some concessions. It's no secret that there are differences between us. II, however, we want you not to wait for discounts from us".

Both during this conversation and during the other brief moments when we were alone with him, he seemed to me to be well-behaved. I would say there was a different tone when we were talking privately and when we sat down with others. It makes an impression that he is an accessible person, that he has a greater desire to get closer to us. The peculiarity of the moment they are experiencing because of Tito's health condition leads me to the thought, shared by other comrades of the Cuban delegation, that no one expresses what they think. That's our impression.

(p. 8)

We know little about Yugoslavia, but we have the feeling that the situation is special. Tito is 83 years old. Everyone is careful not to say anything superfluous.

I analyzed all the conversations, all the details, everything our comrades told me. On the last day when the communique was to be approved, they had already changed some things in their draft after we had talked with Dolanc. They also changed their attitude towards our comrades. In the last brief meeting, he said to mention the Soviet Union as the only country that played a role in de-escalation, but it should be mentioned that many other countries to one degree or another also contributed to de-escalation. Finally, they agreed to mention the Soviet Union, specifically the treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany. It was not accepted to coordinate the actions. They did not intend to go into detail on the question of the role of non-aligned countries. Even before that, the Algerians and the Yugoslavs had taken some decision regarding participation in the Executive Committee of the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries without consulting us. In general, when it came to non-aligned countries, the expression "to coordinate actions" was dropped. At one time it was said that there were socialist countries that looked upon the non-aligned countries as a reserve. Their perception is that they are just an autonomous movement, just non-aligned countries, not a reserve of the socialist countries. They emphasized that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the socialists

(p. 9)

parties as to what non-aligned parties are. I also told him in this connection that it is indeed possible that there may be some misunderstanding on the part of the socialist countries and that for this reason, we propose to include in the communique the expression "to coordinate efforts". I also told them that if there is a certain misunderstanding of the non-aligned countries on the part of the socialist countries, on the contrary, the misunderstanding that these countries show towards the socialist countries, especially towards the role of the Soviet Union, is much greater. When Dolantz was in Cuba, we told him we were a non-aligned country only for tactical reasons. He then said that they were a non-aligned country for philosophical future reasons ­. I finished: "You say you are a non-aligned country, and we are a socialist country of the socialist camp, but we also belong to the non-aligned countries "

(p. 10)

On the second day, the Minister of Defense received me. I proposed to him that we exchange military attaches and invited him to come to Cuba. I told him that we would like a group of military personnel to come on vacation to Cuba. He said that as for the other issues, it could be done, but they did not have such a practice - to exchange servicemen for rest. If we have to exchange working groups - that is possible.

We talked about secondary issues, the state of our armed forces, and he was the first to talk about how many countries Yugoslavia borders without mentioning the Macedonian issue. "Three countries, he said, have territorial claims to us - Greece, Italy, and, unfortunately, one socialist country - Bulgaria. And it has territorial claims to us." We preferred not to talk about these issues. Then, in other circumstances, Dolanc told me: "We have improved our relations with the Bulgarians. The problem, however, is that they do not want to admit that there is a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria." There was one such difference: the Minister of Defense said that you have territorial claims, and Dolanc - that you do not recognize the Macedonian minority.

I was in Macedonia. Chemerski, chairman of the Union of Communists in Macedonia, was very kind to me and did not ask me such a question. However, comrades from our delegation told me that some other Yugoslav functionaries had mentioned this matter. One of our comrades asked a Yugoslav /I can't remember who it was, maybe the director of protocol/ how many Bulgarians there are in Yugoslavia. He answered: "None, because until a few years ago the Bulgarians recognized that there were approximately

(p. 11)

300 thousand Macedonians in Bulgaria. Now they say there is none. Then we will also say that there is not a single Bulgarian in our country."

That was more or less the talk on the matter.

The Yugoslavs generally showed a great desire to expand ties with us. They explained to me at least 20 times that Tito could not receive me because he was ill, he could not even go to the ratification of the Constitution. I was received by the acting vice president (prime minister), the secretaries, and assistant presidents of the Union of Communists in the republics I visited. During the contacts I had with the people, with the workers, I noticed that they have a good attitude and love Cuba. I was told that there is a very strong union of veterans of the partisan movement there. They treated us most warmly. Some of them were not very careful when they criticized the internal situation. We were silent and asked no questions. We behaved quite discreetly. However, we were left with the feeling that there is a new stratum, a new class, a layer of functionaries, of administrators, of people who benefit from self-government. It seems to me that this will be the most difficult problem that they will have to fix. For example, I was in an enterprise /enterprise, monopoly - I don't know what to call it/, a giant warehouse where they sold all kinds of things. It owns coffee and cocoa plantations in Africa, joint ventures in a number of other countries. I asked them, "Can you build a joint venture in Cuba as well?" They replied that they could. Then I told them there was

(p. 12)

a danger of Fidel calling them that he would nationalize it. This association/"Iskra", it seems to me /has 20 factories with 21 thousand workers. It also has its own branch in Italy. They said that 75% of the capital was Yugoslav and 25% Italian.

I was very impressed by the fact that there are very few workers who are members of the SUC. In a town near Ljubljana, I visited a large factory with many workers. When I was told how few workers were members of the Union of Yugoslavian Communists, I asked Dolanc if that was a few or a lot. He replied: "They are few". The same situation was in a bus factory in Macedonia.

They are now holding the Republican party conventions and will hold the general party convention in May. They expect the party to grow.

You know what huge differences there are between the republics. The Republic of Macedonia is very poor and Slovenia is a very rich country.

A general, deputy minister, head of the military industry, who invited me to an exhibition, said that unemployment was a big problem for them. I told him: "This problem will become greater if, as a result of the crisis, Yugoslav workers return from Western Europe. Besides, they produce surplus value for the capitalists." I could have answered him another way: "This is, that, your self-governance," but I only said it in my mind.

That's about it for our visit to Yugoslavia.

(p. 13)

Now it is difficult for us to assess everything because this is our first official visit to Yugoslavia. We had little contact before that. However, it is the unanimous opinion ­of all the members of our delegation that now there has come such a moment when everyone is on guard.

We signed an agreement on cooperation along party lines, on the exchange of delegations and vacationers.

When the Central Committee of the CPSU saw our draft communique, they said that it would turn out quite well, but that it would be very difficult to get such a communique out of them. That was the first step.

I told the Yugoslavs that this visit of ours to Yugoslavia is not a coming that can make us give up our views expressed in Havana. I told them we might even have some run-ins with them in Latin America.

After the current government of Peru came to power, the Yugoslavs began to promote their self-government. We told them that we will fight against this current of theirs in Latin America. Dolanc said, "It's not our fault that others want to emulate us."

So, we seek to strengthen our relations with Yugoslavia in general terms. We fear, however, that among the non-aligned countries, we will have clashes. They, for example, inspired the so-called " institutionalization", in the sense of creating an international women's or trade union movement of non-aligned countries. They backed down and so did Boumediene.

Fidel argued quite a bit with Boumediene about the two superpowers. After that, Boumediene behaved well for two or three months, and then spoke again in the same tone. I told

(p. 14) 

the Yugoslavs, when it came to the non-aligned countries, that it was clear to the imperialists that they could not win them over. To fight for individualization means to help imperialism. The policy of imperialism is to keep these countries equally distant from the socialist and the imperialist states. This would mean equating our views with those of imperialism.

As for the other details, I think that our comrades have already clarified them well in the Central Committee of the BKP. If you have any questions about our visit to Yugoslavia , we are ready to answer them.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We don't have any.

I don't know what the Soviet comrades think, but we must be ready in all directions, especially after the death of Tito. We must fight for Yugoslavia ­so that the imperialists do not settle. In our opinion, events like in Czechoslovakia can happen there.

RAUL CASTRO: That will be the final resolution.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I hope it does not happen, but we have to be ready.

RAUL CASTRO: In that case, one more thing has to be done - the troops should also pass through Romania.

(p. 15)

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Romania is surrounded by our countries, and we can act in a different way towards it.

RAUL CASTRO: Indeed, there are now three countries in which major changes should be expected after the death of their leaders - China, Yugoslavia and Argentina. It is not known what will happen in Argentina.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: The latest information about Argentina is worrying, about Peru - too. The president of Peru is ill.

RAUL CASTRO: Yes, the more time the better. I already a whole month and five days, since I've been out, but there once a week they keep us updated on what's going on in the world. In our view, the more radical forces there are now gaining ground. The worst person among the group of generals who carried out the coup is the Prime Minister, who is due to retire next year. A very vain, very ambitious man. I accompanied him to Cuba for 15 days. Finally, at the reception, a Peruvian brigadier general sat on his left and said that next month Mercado Harin would become army commander and prime minister. This was at the end of 1972. I told him: "Mr. General ­, now you will have a very big job as prime minister and as commander of the army." The general who was next to me approached me and said: "This is the man of the Peruvian future", Mercado Harin puffed up like a turkey.

(p. 16)

Fernandez Maldonado, who is the Minister of Mines, is now visiting Cuba. He is the central figure of this group, a man who proclaims himself a Christian, a revolutionary, and a Marxist, at the same time. But he is an honest man.

The Peruvian process is now the most serious trial in the Americas. Of course, very complex, and heterogeneous. We have a strong influence there. Velasco is a cunning man, but he is the best. He sends his worst ministers to visit Cuba. Even he thinks we should be magicians. Sending one of his bad ministers, he calls Fidel and tells him: "See if you can convert him". Velasco has great confidence in us.

All the members of the Council of Ministers are generals because they are all military. But since they all meet their respective colleagues, they come to see me too. They also meet with Fidel. We exert a positive influence on them. In the beginning, the Chinese and the Yugoslavs had influence there.

We have very detailed information about the state of the military command, even of the small military units. In the beginning, these were people with anti-Soviet sentiments ­. The first of them, when they arrived in Cuba, immediately began to criticize the Soviet Union. These are open people with whom contacts can be established immediately. We have the advantage of speaking the same language. We quickly cut them off when they started criticizing Russia. The Minister of Fisheries, Tantalean, began to criticize the Russians. I told him immediately: "Stop! If you want us to be friends, you won't criticize the Russians anymore. What have

(p. 17) 

they done to you? How many Russian enterprises are there in Peru and how many Peruvian workers work for Russian millionaires? What did the Russians do to you? Then what kind of imperialism is this?" Then he said: "Imperialism, but ideological". I answered him: "What profit and what benefit do the Russians have from this ideological imperialism, as you call it?"

That was in the beginning. This same Tantalean split the labor movement by creating a fractured trade union movement. He even once asked me why trade unions are necessary. I said, "Don't go down the road that we went down because we would have almost wiped out the unions, which we're paying for now."

A general who was the commander of an armored division and is now the chief of intelligence saw our maneuvers and our armament and said: "The Russians are helping you because they have an interest in holding the Caribbean." I answered him: "Don't you think that the Russians are not interested in having a base in the Pacific Ocean as well?"

The Peruvians already possess about 110 T-55 tanks. This is very important. Previously, the Soviets could not send Soviet weapons there because there was a mess between Chile and Peru. Allende was under pressure from the Chilean military. The Peruvian process is progressing with its characteristic features. The Americans did not hit him head-on, as they did with us, but with maneuvers. They seek to find a foothold in the internal reactionary forces, they conspire, as everywhere else. Velasco Alvarado has to make some declaration from time to time and then explain to Fidel: "Don't worry about it, I have to maneuver from time to time." The longer Velasco lives, the better.

(p. 18)

It is unknown what will happen in Argentina. Peron is a great demagogue. The General Secretary of the Argentine Communist Party told me that they pray to God that Peron will live another year or so, so that the myth of Peron can die. He stopped the revolutionary movement for now. He has a large number of workers behind him, so the longer he lives, the easier his myth will die.

What can I tell you about Cuba? We work hard. There is a very good political situation in Cuba. There is great unity among the people.

Comrade Zhivkov, You visited us in July 1970, just as we were making a big turn, and spoke on Revolution Square. You heard Fidel's famous self-critical speech on July 26. Since then, slowly at first and now faster, we have been moving forward. With this speech, what Fidel had earlier called "the stage of the idealism of the Cuban revolution" ended.

The party is strengthening and asserting its role as the leader of the mass organizations, of the entire ­revolution in general. Now we have a new structure of the Central Committee ­. The structure of the government is also changing. In many areas, the information that was provided to us by the Bulgarian Communist Party, both in connection with the reorganization of the Central Committee and the establishment of the Council of Ministers and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, turned out to be quite useful. All mass organizations were given life. Democratic elections are currently being held in all party units. The first party congress is being prepared for the middle of next year. Work is underway to create a constitution.

(p. 19)

In July, in one of our provinces, we started an experiment to create local government bodies. Elections were held to see how we should conduct them throughout the country in the second half of 1975.

The people are firmly united around the party, around Fidel. There is a great deal of democracy in the party which was not always there. Personally, we are proud of Fidel and I, who have known him since childhood, dare to say that he is currently at the peak of his political maturity. One simply cannot guess it. He is very calm now. Shows great understanding, listens. It exhibits a highly democratic spirit, not allowing decisions to be made before they have been discussed collectively. The Politburo and the Secretariat meet regularly under his leadership. This was not the case with the Central Committee, which was appointed, not broadcast.

The Central Committee of our Party began to play its role after the first congress when it was elected. We hope that our ambassador will be re-elected at the congress as a member of the Central Committee.

Sometimes I suggest to Fidel that we quickly solve some important issue in the Secretariat, but he says: "No, it must be considered in the Politburo. " There is a good situation.

On January 1, 15 years have passed since the victory of the revolution. At the end of the month, our country was visited by a delegation from the Soviet Union led by Comrade Brezhnev. These two events - the 15th anniversary and the visit of Comrade Brezhnev, I would say that they represent the end of a cycle

(p. 20)

of the revolution. We are starting a new phase. We still, roughly speaking, make a lot of mistakes.

We have made some progress in economic life since 1970 in all areas, but we still have difficult tasks. The most difficult thing is to organize business life. Now we are working with a new system of management of the national economy. We are preparing the first five-year plan. Personally, I fear that this plan will not be finalized by the time the convention begins. Other comrades think otherwise, but I am afraid.

Our inexperience - and it is a great inexperience in this direction, - the havoc we have wrought as a result of our new inventions in the field of economics, our tendency to ignore the objective economic laws, and the many mistakes we have made - it is not easy for all this now to receive new direction. To destroy a bridge is easy, but to build a new one is difficult. The same thing happens with friendship bridges. It is difficult to patiently strengthen a friendship, but it is easy to destroy it. That is why we are now working to strengthen the bridge of our friendship with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and other socialist countries.

The visit of Comrade Brezhnev and his accompanying comrades was a total success both domestically and internationally. As we say, Brezhnev, as soon as he came, put the whole nation in his pocket, in the sense that he became very endearing to everyone with his behavior.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Pie, we have complete information about the visit of Comrade Brezhnev to Cuba.

(p. 21)

RAUL CASTRO: The largest rally in the history of Cuba took place in our country. There were 3 million people who were characterized by the cheerfulness inherent in Cuban women, but at the same time, they were very disciplined. Fidel said: "The revolution has reached 15 years and has begun to mature, and we, although we are not old, are also maturing."

We have established contacts with all the Latin American communist parties, except the Bolivian Communist Party, but now when I return to Moscow, I will meet with the general secretary of the Bolivian Communist Party ­, who is there for treatment. After that, I will meet with representatives of the European Communist Parties.

We work with those with whom we have disagreements, as is the case with the Spanish Communist Party. Its Secretary General was recently in Cuba. There is a relationship of trust between us. During the visit of the delegation of the Spanish Communist Party, at first, I talked with them, then Fidel had to go on. He criticized Carrillo for their attitude towards the Soviet Union. We have a great right to criticize them, because some time ago we did not have a proper attitude towards the Soviet Union, when we had problems with the Soviet comrades, then the Spanish communists criticized us for this line. We told them: "In the past, you criticized and advised us, now we will criticize and advise you."

Dolores Ibaruri a birthday greeting every year, ­wishing: "Would you break this with your feet, what have you created with your heads?"

(p. 22)

I am not talking about the relations between Cuba and Bulgaria, because they are very good, excellent. Do you have any critical comments?

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Absolutely none.

BORIS VELCHEV: Maybe you have?

RAUL CASTRO: When Comrade Stanko Todorov is coming, I couldn't see him because I was in hospital. I received the Czechoslovak Minister of War with a plastered leg.

Fidel spoke a lot about Bulgaria and about his friend Zhivkov. As we talked about yesterday, Fidel should not come to Bulgaria anymore, because after that he constantly points out what happened here. Indeed, he values you very much, Comrade Zhivkov, and remembers all the days when you were together. Fidel's trip to Bulgaria, as well as to other socialist countries, was very useful. Unfortunately, due to the great distance we are in, it is difficult for us to meet often. But this journey is of great importance. Even the trip to Romania gave great results. At least for what Fidel told Ceausescu.

What can I tell you about our relations with the Chinese, except that they don't exist. We do not have the same warmth with the Romanians as with you.

I don't know how the trade between us goes - I don't get into that business. Maybe Comrade Mako Dakov knows better?

MAKO DAKOV: It's going well.

RAUL CASTRO: We recently had Comrade Honecker.

(p. 23)

As far as our relations with the US are concerned, we are not intransigent, among other things, because we do not want to be an obstacle to de-escalation. We have taken some other steps. For example, we signed an agreement against air piracy and we have said on various occasions that in order to negotiate with us, they must unconditionally end the blockade against Cuba. We further state that we are not in a hurry, as Comrade Fidel in one of his speeches at the meeting with Comrade Honecker. Our ambassador in Mexico gave a statement to the press on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the victory of the revolution. However, the news agencies twisted it, as they usually do. It seemed that we were in a desperate hurry to restore our relationship with the US. The other day, a head of the State Department took a hard line with us. Then we declared: “We can wait 10-15 years or more, we are in no hurry, but ­you will have to unconditionally end the blockade and then we will sit down and talk."

We make some small gestures towards them, some small ­displays of tolerance. For example, we captured two of their soldiers who had come out of Guantanamo Bay. and then we returned them. They were drunk, said they wanted to go for a walk and entered our territory. We sent them back through Mexico.

We protest from time to time against the violation of airspace by sheet music. Most importantly, we signed an agreement against air piracy. We have a feeling that Kissinger is willing to make progress in this area. But Nixon still hates us. He claims that we are attacking him personally. But we must not forget that Nixon proposed the aggression at Playa Giron when he was vice president.

(p. 24) 

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you for the information.

Let me first say a few words about our relationship.

Pie, we estimate that our relationship is developing excellently. After my visit to Cuba in 1970, we informed the Politburo and the entire party about its results, which marked the next stage in the development of Bulgarian-Cuban relations. A huge boost is undoubtedly the visit of Comrade Fidel Castro to Bulgaria, when we further deepened our relations, contacts and personal friendship with him. I feel him perfectly close to my heart, and I cannot but express my regret that we could not meet in Moscow, as I was in a serious state of health, and made great efforts not to let my comrades know that I was ill. I hope that we will meet informally either in Bulgaria or in Cuba. So, the first thing is to ask you to congratulate him on behalf of our leadership and myself.

As for our relations in the future, they will develop successfully on all lines. There are no obstacles for them not to develop, it just depends on our respective competent ­authorities. There are no particular issues either from your side or from our side that deserve special discussion.

In the near future, we will deal with the economic cooperation between the two countries in the Politburo with a view to giving it a new impetus, minimizing the trade aspect. Of course, there will always be a commercial aspect, but we have to create such conditions and such a perspective

(p. 25)

for our economic cooperation in some areas, so that it becomes a model of cooperation between two brotherly countries. We will deal with this issue in the Politburo and in connection with the visit of others. Stanko Todorov in Cuba, and in connection with your visit to our country. We are not ready to offer anything concrete now. We plan to change our ambassador. We settled on a very good comrade, a member of the Party Central Committee.

Nothing else I can add about our relationship as it is developing well. I repeat again - it depends on our competent authorities.

You know that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is generally developing well. We have success in the field of economy. The Bulgarian Communist Party is an old, strong party united around the Central Committee. Now we have directed the efforts of the entire party, of the people, towards implementing the decisions of the Tenth Congress, which was held three years ago, and the Program of the Party, which the congress approved, for building a developed socialist society in Bulgaria. We believe that the domestic and international prerequisites, economic cooperation, and integration with the fraternal socialist countries and above all with the Soviet Union allow us to pose the question of a sharp increase in the social productivity of labor in material production. On the 20th of this month, we will hold a National Party Conference. There is an article in the Constitution of our party that provides for party conferences to be held between congresses when the Central Committee considers that important questions of our development should be raised. Such an important question now,

(p. 26)

in which all economic, political, social, state and international problems intersect as a focus, is the sharp increase in social labor productivity based on the achievements of the modern scientific and technical revolution. This is the main question we will ask at the upcoming conference. The goal is to give a new qualitative boost in solving this problem in all branches of material production - in ­industry, transport, agriculture, services, etc. Of course, we will solve this issue to the best of our ­ability. Obviously, we will give up a number of productions that are not profitable, and we will carry out such concentration, specialization and cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries, which will allow us to go to optimal production both from the point of view of profitability and from the point of view of the implementation of modern technologies.

In this regard, we will examine the work of all sectors, the work of our party, state and economic bodies with a view to subordinating our development to the main task - the sharp increase in social labor productivity.­

At the conference, we will touch on some issues of the international situation, but they will be by the way.

Last year, we held a special plenum of the Central Committee of the party, which went down in the history of our party as the July Plenum. At it we discussed the issue of the further qualitative rapprochement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union.

(p. 27)

What is meant? Of all the socialist ­countries, Bulgaria is historically the closest connected to the Russian people, to Russia, to the Soviet Union. For several decades, the party, the workers' party, was brought up in friendship and loyalty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Soviet Union. In this spirit, we are now educating the party and the people. All the necessary prerequisites have been created that allow us to move to a qualitative new rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This does not mean that Bulgaria will become the 16th republic of the Soviet Union or join the Soviet Union in some other form - confederation, etc. It is explicitly stated in the decision of the July Plenum that this is based on the preservation of the sovereignty of our country. We are developing our economy as a subsystem to a certain extent of the corresponding branches of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria is a small country so that we can maintain the pace of development we have now and implement modern technologies. We can do this only when we participate most actively in the socialist division of labor and in the international division of labor, especially with the Soviet Union. And that's understandable. For example, 70 percent of our national income comes from imports and exports, and it is likely to increase because we are a small country. Besides, we don't have raw materials either. All this forces us to move towards active integration with the fraternal socialist countries and above all with the Soviet Union. But this is the economic aspect, and we are looking at convergence in ideological, military, etc. aspect. We can't imagine going to war alone on this front.

(p. 28)

Here is the southern wing of NATO. We don't know what the Yugoslavs and Romanians will do if the situation gets complicated. That is why we are preparing to take both the Romanian share and the Yugoslav share and hold the front alone for at least hours. So, from a military point of view, we have colossal tasks ahead of us. God forbid we go together with Romania and Yugoslavia, but we don't know what will happen.

This is a new moment in the development of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in implementing the decisions and the Program of the party for building a developed socialist society in our country. Of course, we activate our relations and cooperation with all socialist countries - members of the SIV. And we can say that lately these contacts, connections, camaraderie and friendship strengthened. Our party-government delegation was in Poland, GDR, and Hungary. A party-government delegation was supposed to go to Romania. Since 1968 we have been postponing this visit. Recently, their ambassador came to the Central Committee and again asked about my visit. I don't know what we will apologize for.

Our relations with the fraternal socialist countries are good and developing positively. Our bilateral cooperation with the Romanians in the field of economy is expanding, and our ties along state and party lines are also expanding, of course, up to the level of ministers and vice presidents. departments of the Central Committee. They follow our experience. They imagine that everything what we do in Bulgaria is very nice, they take it and apply it. We have reorganized the state apparatus.

(p. 29)

And they did. We created agro-industrial ­complexes in agriculture. And they create something similar.

We are the only ones so far who talk to them frankly. Me. I think the conditions are ripe for others to talk frankly with them. At the last Crimean meeting, I waited for Ceausescu to speak before me, and he spoke one of the last, and then I caught him ­. He stood up and said: "I will leave the council because they are interfering in our internal affairs". They calmed him down and he sat down, and I continued in the same vein. After the meeting, he invited me to his villa. We sat in a car. I invited him to go to the residence where I was staying, but he insisted that we go to his place because his wife Elena was there. We went and Ceausescu cheerfully said to Elena: "Comrade Zhivkov criticizes me." She replied, "Perhaps he was right in criticizing you." Elena holds the situation in Romania. Between us, my impression is that in addition to being a nationalist, etc., he is also a schizophrenic. I am not starting from this case alone. We have argued for 3-4 hours. A month ago he invited me hunting. He invited me because my daughter goes there and they had a falling out with their secretary over ideological issues. There they are destroying our cultural monuments, which are very dear to us, as they are from the war of national liberation. We maintain their memorials here. To erase this trouble, Ceausescu is now inviting me to go hunting.

But Ceausescu went too far. Therefore, we believe that a conversation with him with the participation of the other first secretaries is necessary. It will happen, it cannot happen. We

(p. 30)

clash everywhere - in the UN, in Vienna, in the Balkans, etc.

RAUL CASTRO: If such a meeting takes place, do you have any idea when it will be?

TODOR ZHIVKOV: No, because it does not depend only on us. This is our opinion. Having talked now with Comrade Gerek, he also thinks that everyone should do what I did at the Crimea meeting. We talk to them in principle, without any diplomacy. We have no doubt that Comrade Fidel Castro talked like that as well.

RAUL CASTRO: I asked Fidel in the Politburo if he would say anything to him. He told me that we were the hosts and he wouldn't tell him if Ceausescu did not call first.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Now, at our meetings, he avoids talking about the issues on which we have disagreements. This is not nice. So the situation changes a bit. We have been arguing with him for years. Every year we meet once on a hunting trip in Bulgaria or Romania. We hunt for 2-3 hours and the rest of the time we talk.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, I think that you have very well orientated yourself about the situation there. We are all interested, and very interested, in keeping Yugoslavia at least in the positions it is in now, because it will be very unpleasant if he goes to the imperialists. And they are fighting very actively for this. Still, for now Tito is the best, but he is already out of order. It is not known what

(p. 31)

forces will take over. true that the apparatus is corrupt. There are honest people, but anyway, there is an atmosphere of political decay and corruption in every respect. They are connected to the capitalists, they receive dollars, gifts, executives make their personal deposits in foreign banks. The situation there is difficult. We must support what is now taking place in Yugoslavia - raising the role of the party and the working class. But these, in our opinion, are palliatives that do not affect the main problems. They have concentrated their attention on their self-governance, as a result of which many negative problems arise for the development of Yugoslav society. We must realize the created situation and do everything possible to strengthen the situation in Yugoslavia, to keep Yugoslavia at least partially in our community.

Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations have recently expanded significantly in the field of economics, as have party ties. But between us there is the so-called Macedonian question. They occupy everyone who goes to them, regardless of whether they are communists, socialists or imperialists.

STANKO TODOROV: Even Indira Gandhi enlightened on this issue.

TODOR DINKOV: They treat us as nationalists with territorial claims, for not recognizing the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, etc.

(p. 32)

How does this question stand? This is purely nationalist politics. Pure-blooded Bulgarians who speak the Bulgarian language live in Macedonia. However, things are developing historically in such a way, that it is located within Yugoslavia. Our opinion is the following: the population of Vardar Macedonia is fighting with the Yugoslav people against fascism, together with the Yugoslav people is building a new society, its present and future are connected with the development of Yugoslavia. On this basis, a new nationality can be formed, as they call it Macedonian nationality. We are ready to assist Macedonia to be a strong, healthy pillar of Yugoslavia in the struggle to build a new society. We have said thousands of times that we are ready to sign, that we have absolutely no territorial claims, that we are in favor of turning the Republic of Macedonia into a unit for strengthening Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, etc.

What do they want? They want us to recognize that there is a Macedonian nationality, and not in Bulgaria at all, but in the Blagoevgrad district, which is on the border with Yugoslavia. We tell them that there are no such people, they are pure-blooded Bulgarians, they are related to Bulgaria. We have people from their embassy go to whatever town and village they want in the county, whatever home they want, and if they find them, take them. They took all our deceased prominent figures of Macedonian origin. They do not claim only Georgi Dimitrov and Dimitar Blagoev, the founder of Marxism-Leninism, who are also Macedonians. They do not claim to be Georgi Traykov - the president of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (­BZNS), who is also Macedonian. Half of the members of the Central Committee are either Macedonians or

(p. 33)

married to Macedonian women. The Yugoslavs want us to give them the Blagoevgrad region. We can't give it to them. We are also ready for an international survey to be carried out. During the time of Georgi Dimitrov, we committed atrocities. But we must say that Georgi Dimitrov was doing this because of the known compromises that were made regarding Yugoslavia at that stage. We forced the population in Blagoevgrad District to write Macedonians.

BORIS VELCHEV: They are now using these mistakes.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: During the year, we changed the party and state leadership in Blagoevgrad district twice, because it did not follow this line. Now the Yugoslavs refer to it and use this error. A few years ago, on purely democratic principles, we held a referendum for the manifestation of national consciousness in this region. I have several times called the party leadership in the district and warned the comrades to be careful, as we are interested in at least 10 thousand people to determine themselves Macedonians at the current stage. We are interested in not speculating. However, about 1,000 people showed Macedonian national consciousness out of a population of 300,000. Now they are gone too. And these are mainly people who are against our government, connected with nationalist organizations in the past, etc. This is the reality. We want to find a political solution to the matter. They want everything to be solved in a package: historical, national, etc. We won't do that. If we do that, we will be removed as a leader because it is in

(p. 35) 

a gross contradiction with history. I and Comrade Brezhnev said that if we have to do something from the point of view of the international revolution, I can do the following: I will go to five of our factories and say: "Brother workers, in the name of the revolution, in the name of our cause, in the name of the internal ­nationalism is spelled Macedonians". But in Blagoevgrad District, I cannot do that because they will beat me.

As I said, we are in favor of strengthening the Republic of Macedonia within the SFRY. If we take Macedonia now, we will aggravate the situation in Bulgaria, because there is misery there, we will lower the standard of living in our country. Why do we need her? I said to Dolanc: "Listen, Comrade Dolanc, why are you speculating, the question is, we have territorial claims. This is pure nationalism on your part. Let's suppose that we are in favor of the accession of Macedonia to Bulgaria. We can take Macedonia only through war, and who will support us. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will not support us. How will we fight with you without allies?"

BORIS VELCHEV: And Cuba will not support us.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Here the conversation with Dolanc was one, and then when we went to a hunting farm, we talked for a few hours just the two of us. We agreed on all issues. He said that there should be a meeting between Tito and me to understand these matters. He returned to Yugoslavia and they started the old song again. A meeting was arranged between me and Tito for January. We received an official letter inviting me to go at the end of March. Now it is being postponed again due to his illness. We don't know if the disease alone is the cause or if there is something else.

(p. 35)

We follow our general line of supporting Yugoslavia. In our print and in our business we adhere to this. In their press, however, they write constantly, they treat ­us on the Macedonian issue on an international scale. The population in Macedonia has good, positive feelings towards Bulgaria, except for some layers who are poisoned by their propaganda.

Our relations with Albania are developing in a limited ­way. We want to send an ambassador there, but they refuse under pressure from the Chinese.

RAUL CASTRO: What is happening in Albania? The Chinese talked a lot, but then they did the exact opposite of what they said.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: The economic situation is not good. Perhaps the more naked part of the Albanian people does not support this line, but there the terror is great. For example, the circles with which we have contacts advise us not to succumb to this adventure of theirs, to hold our nerves and do everything possible to expand connections. That's what we do. We have been closest to Albania, we were personal friends with Enver Hoxha. He was a bit sentimental and always broke up crying. We are the only ones who have signed a treaty of friendship and mutual aid, and that of military aid. The term of this contract has expired, but neither they denounce it, nor do we. If someone attacks Albania, we are obliged to come to the rescue, if we are attacked, Albania is obliged to come to the rescue. So we have a big job opportunity now in Albania. But the situation there is not good.

(p. 36)

RAUL CASTRO: Are there any trends of change in their line?

TODOR ZHIVKOV: So far, none. Albania's foreign ministry is occupied by the Chinese and they are very vigilant. However, in the contacts with their personnel, we find a common language. Same with Romania. In Romania, the grassroots do not approve of this policy ­. We have contacts in the border towns. There, the secretaries of the relevant committees and the chairmen of the councils choose to be loyal to Ceausescu, but other people in private conversation with our people do not approve of this line.

Our relations with Turkey are developing better than with Yugoslavia and Romania. We are pursuing ­the line agreed with the socialist countries on the Balkan Peninsula, but in the nuances it is a little different from what the Soviet Union and other countries are pursuing because we are neighbors and there is a struggle by the Chinese, the Americans, the Yugoslavs, the Romanians to they isolate us. So far, they have not been able to do this.

We maintain good relations with Turkey and when Süleyman Demirel was prime minister, and now at Ejevit. Yesterday, etc. Stanko Todorov met with him and he expressed his desire to cooperate, to meet the Bulgarian-Turkish commission. But whoever is there - Suleiman Demirel, Ecevit or another - the attitude towards Bulgaria will be the same, except for a purely military dictatorship.

(p. 37)

We have relations with Turkey on different lines - on the line of the National Council of the Fatherland Front, on the line of the BZNS, etc. We have created conditions for normal relations with Turkey and we cannot imagine that a government will come there that will lead an anti-Bulgarian policy. Of course, we mean that Turkey is a capitalist country, a member of NATO, and we are a socialist country, a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Our relations with Greece are more or less similar to those with Turkey, except that there is an open military-fascist regime there. Regardless, they do not go against Bulgaria, on the contrary, they declare that they are in favor of expanding cooperation with us. So our relations with Greece are generally developing normally. By normal, I mean within our common conflicts and interests. We insist on not going to extremes. We maintain a line of good neighborly relations. Of course, our press explains to the people what the regime is like in Greece, but the press is free, it does not engage the government.

Our relations with Cyprus are developing well.

For China, we can repeat what you said. The Chinese have a special relationship with us. They have placed us with the Soviet Union in a place of honor. I believe that they did not lie. They tried to create pro-China groups in our country. We helped them with State Security officials to set them up. And they were very pleased, and we were pleased. We then told them that these were State Security officers. The bands were

(p. 38) 

liquidated. We also created groups for the Albanians. As an ideology, etc., China cannot succeed in Bulgaria. We held a plenum on ideological issues not from the point of view of domestic considerations, but from the point of view of international considerations. The situation everywhere, as well as here, is complicated, but we are fighting, we are working.

Inside the country we also have difficulties. We are saying that now the capitalist world is being shaken by an energy crisis. If a person listens to our radio and television, he will say that in Bulgaria things are running smoothly. But that's not quite the case. We are to receive 9 million tons of oil from the Soviet Union under contract and 3 million tons to buy from the Arab East and other countries. We can only buy one million. tons at new prices. Our plan is not tied to 2 million tons, and this is reflected in all areas of our economy.

Also, we don't have raw materials, we don't have metals, chemicals, etc.

RAUL CASTRO: Perhaps Bulgaria and Cuba are the two socialist countries that have the most problems in common.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I've been thinking about what to do lately. Bulgaria's natural resources are few - we have no oil, gas, or metals. Our plant in Kremikovtsi processes ore that contains less than 30% metal. In addition, there are components that degrade the quality of the metal. We even import ores from India. Now I will submit a memo to the Politburo in which I will justify the necessity of creating an industry for the processing of rock materials. We have a lot of volcanic rocks, we will turn to them. There is no other way out.

(p. 39)

RAUL CASTRO: II we have the same fracture. We hope that we will be able to use the sun.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: There are some stones called "bulgarites." 

They occupy 60 sq. km. - a whole mountain. A few years ago, the Federal Republic of Germany offered to buy a ton of these stones for $10. Our people have not paid attention. They wanted them to get potash fertilizers, as they contain potassium. But they actually wanted them because of the rare metals. We will start with stone casting and gradually move on to other processes.

In the Soviet Union, they received 100 items from such a casting. We have an enterprise that is primitive, but it also pours.

In addition, I will submit a report to the Politburo to begin the exploitation of oil shale. According to the forecast ­, there are about 4 billion tons in our country, and most of them are on the surface.

As you can see, we're taking what have been paid attention to up to now not. In general, the situation in our country is good. We are developing well. Questions and problems - a lot.

We believe that an international conference of the communist movement should be called. My opinion is that at this conference the question must be put in an appropriate form, culturally, but fundamentally, that a revolutionary power cannot be maintained without a dictatorship of the proletariat ­. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a peaceful and non-peaceful path of offensive against the exploiters and imperialists. Otherwise, we will suffer defeat after defeat.

(p. 40)

The Japanese Communist Party amended its constitution and liquidated the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Italian, and the English as well. There was no doubt in our country that there would be a coup in Chile. Corvalan here convinced us at length that they work with the military, that their military has not staged a coup for 60 years, and that it is the only army in Latin America that does not stage coups. These are naive things. Could you have stayed in Cuba without revolutionary power? No, they would sweep you away. It cannot be without an offensive. We ­talked with the Italian comrades, Berlinguer was here. I asked him how he envisions the job when the communists take a majority in parliament, will they give them power. He doubts it. I told him I doubted it too. If their army does not defeat them, the NATO armies will enter Italy and defeat them. He imagines that their army cannot do as the Chilean did. Jorge del Prado also assured us that if there was a military coup, it would not be as cruel as in Chile. I don't know what his reasons are. There is a peaceful and non-peaceful path - this is Lenin's position, it has various forms, but it cannot be done without the dictatorship of the proletariat! Our form was people's democracy. There were Soviet troops here, and yet we had to fight opposition, and quell riots. We do not think that every party should put the dictatorship of the proletariat first, but what kind of leadership are we if we miss this main issue? It means disarming ourselves.

These are our thoughts. How it should be placed - must be thought. We are in favor of this conference because many contradictions have now appeared at the Brussels conference of the communist parties of the European capitalist countries. We talk about the positive aspects of this meeting, but some parties there developed various theories.

(p. 41)

RAUL CASTRO: Some parties are already opposing the idea of convening an international conference.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: And they set a condition not to talk about China. How can we not talk!

RAUL CASTRO: Communists should gather and not talk about the Chinese! Better to arrange a reception instead of a meeting.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Regarding Cuba, we highly value your role both in Latin America, and in the world, and among non-aligned countries. We know that Fidel Castro has a lot of influence. It is good that you are working with the non-aligned countries. Cuba is a guarantee that these countries will pursue an anti-imperialist line. The Yugoslavs cannot hold such a line. When meeting with Yugoslavs, we say to them: "We congratulate you on the good results of the conference of non-aligned countries".

STANKO TODOROV: When I was in India now, I was told that Tito, when he was returning from Bangladesh, told Indira Gandhi that India should normalize its relations with China and the United States in order to balance between them in order not to get a Soviet influence in India.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: In general, our forces are advancing. Otherwise, Americans ­will not accept this coexistence.

(p. 42)

This is a great success and will enable us to strengthen ourselves domestically and internationally. If we can guarantee 20 years of peace, we will decide the future of the world, we will speed up the international revolutionary process. We need time.

RAUL CASTRO: We agree that an international conference of communist parties should be held. And when necessary, we will talk about the Chinese. We will do this! And so far we have done so, but not openly because we have not yet secured the independence of Cuba in terms of the supply of rice and various other consumer goods. We have no other commercial interests with them. But the day we have to, we will. Now we are developing our textile industry and we have to import cotton. We were very poor with rice and had to import. Our land still produces very little.

We agree to participate in the conference of the Communist parties and to raise the Chinese ­question publicly. I completely agree with what you said about the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must learn from the Chilean experience.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Lenin says that such a member of the Social ­Democratic Party who does not recognize the dictatorship of the proletariat in deed cannot be a member of the party.

In our country, too, one who is against the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be a member of our party.

(p. 43)

RAUL CASTRO: They banned this basic principle that history of humanity is a history of class struggle. They wanted the Soviet Union to give weapons to the Chilean army. Allende wanted it, the communists wanted it too. The Soviet comrades asked us what to do. We told them that they can give weapons, but they can be used against the people. Therefore, our advice was to wait for the situation to be clarified. And Peru wanted arms. Allende hesitated and made concessions to the military.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: If you are interested in anything more, the other secretaries and the head of the departments of the Central Committee.

RAUL CASTRO: Thank you very much for your wonderful information.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We have very good conditions for rest.

We invite you to come with your wife.

Created the protocol:

/M. Dalekova/

/S.Draeva/

(p. 44)