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July 27, 1954

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek after the Geneva Conference

 Ambassador Zhang [Wentian], convey to Premier Zhou (top secret) 

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: 

The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the agreements in Korea and Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policy of creating international tension for the purpose of further taking over more spheres of influence from Britain and France, of expanding military bases for preparing for war, and remaining hostile to our Organization of Defense, and of rearming Japan. The United States will surely continue to use Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of ships from various countries coming to our country, and it is likely to expand the sphere of blockade of our country to the areas off the Guangdong coast and to the Gulf of Tonkin area. Recently the United States and Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] have been discussing signing a US-Chiang treaty of defense, and the United States has repeatedly increased military aid to the Chiang bandits in Taiwan. All of this is worthy of our main attention. According to public information, it seems as if the United States still has some concerns about signing a US-Chiang treaty of defense, and it seems as if they have not made a final decision. But if the United States and Chiang sign such a treaty, the relationship between us and the United States will be tense for a long period, and it becomes more difficult [for the relationship] to turn around. Therefore, the central task of our struggle against the United States at present is to break up the US-Chiang treaty of defense and the Southeast Asian treaty of defense. 

We believe that after the victorious conclusion of the war of liberation on our mainland and the victorious armistice of the Korean War, now we are still facing another war, that is, the war against the Chiang Kai-shek bandit bloc in Taiwan. Now we are still facing a task, that is, the task of liberating Taiwan. After the end of the Korean War, we failed to highlight the task [the liberation of Taiwan] to the people throughout the entire country in a timely manner (we were late by about six months). We failed to take necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we are committing a serious political mistake. The introduction of the task is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-Chiang plot to sign a military treaty; rather, and more importantly, by highlighting the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the people of the whole country; we mean to stir up our people's revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation's socialist reconstruction. In addition, we can use this struggle to enhance our fulfilling of the task of national defense, and learn how to carry out maritime struggle. 

Toward this issue the Central Committee has adopted the following measures: 

(1) In the political field, a propaganda campaign emphasizing that we must liberate Taiwan and exposing the Americans and Chiang has already begun at home. We are also prepared to issue a open statement about the Taiwan issue in the name of the foreign minister after your return to Beijing, which will be followed by a joint statement by the representatives of various parties. Then, in accordance with the two statements, broad, profound, and prolonged propaganda and education will be carried out among the people of the whole country. In addition, we are organizing broadcast specifically aimed at Taiwan. 

(2) In the military field, the Military Commission has already issued a special instruction for enhancing naval and air operations against the Chiang bandits in coastal areas. In the meantime, it is strictly regulated that the operation targets of our navy and air force should be restricted to Chiang Kai-shek's military planes and vessels, and, toward American planes and warships, unless under the circumstance that they attack our troops, they are not permitted to take the initiative for attacks. The shooting down of a British transporter close to Yulin on 23 July was a mistake that is completely possible to be avoided. Apart from taking diplomatic measures to manage this, we also should use this accident to carry out serious education among our troops. 

(3) Considering that our struggles against the Americans and Chiang in the coastal area will be a matter of a very long period, and that our troops lack the capacity and experience for maritime struggles, it should become a long-range task to enhance the construction of our navy and air force. Our navy should follow a policy of first constructing boats and then constructing ships, and our air force should learn to carry out operations over the sea. In order to meet the needs of the struggle at the present time with urgency, we plan to increase orders for naval and air force equipment from the Soviet Union in the next three years. The Military Commission has put forward an order of 500 million rubles. There is no financial or budgetary difficulty for putting forward such an order. However, we should find more ways to get foreign aid. About this we will discuss and make decisions after you have come back home. 

Please report the above policies and measures to the comrades of the Soviet Party central leadership, and ask for their opinions.

Apart from the above, the various aspects of domestic situation are good, except that the flooding disaster of this year is quite serious.

The Central Committee
27 July 1954


In this telegram, the CCP discusses policies and measures taken to break up the US-Chiang treaty, and to liberate Taiwan. The CCP describes its propaganda efforts and efforts to enhance naval and air forces.

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PRC FMA. Translated by Chen Zhihong


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