December 19, 1946
Telegram, Gromyko to Cde. Dekanozov
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Received in the clear on 16 December 1946
from New York, 16 December
MOSCOW, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS – to Cde. DEKANOZOV
I am sending the text proposed by Baruch which he submitted on 5 December at a meeting of the first commission.
In accordance with the resolution of this commission adopted at its meeting held on 13 November 1946 the report about the work, conclusions, and recommendations of this commission to be submitted to the Security Council on 31 December 1946 will consist of three parts.
Part one. A brief report about the work together with the minutes of this commission and its committees and subcommittees.
Part two. Some conclusions of this commission based on the discussion which took place in the commission up to the present time.
Part three. Some recommendations of this commission based on its conclusions drawn up to the present time.
It was decided that the second part of the above report should, inter alia, contain the following conclusion of the commission.
Based on the proposals and information submitted to the commission, not heard by the commission, its work, and the consideration which has taken place up to the present time, and from the work, discussions, and reports of its several committees and subcommittees which have all been presented in part one of this report, the commission has drawn the following conclusions.
1. What can be accomplished from the scientific, technological, and practical point of view:
a) the dissemination “between all countries of an exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes;*
b) the monitoring “of atomic energy in the amount necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;”*
c) the accomplishment “of an elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other basic kinds of arms suitable for mass destruction;*
d) the provision “of effective safeguards of precaution by the survey and employment of other means to protect states complying with the agreement from possible violations and evasions”.*
2. That effective control of atomic energy depends on effective monitoring of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their derivatives which can decay. A proper monitoring apparatus for warning of their illicit leakage, secret production, and use, including inspection, accountability, observation, the issue of licenses, and management [upravlenie], should find application at various stages of their mining, beginning from the moment when these minerals are extracted from the Earth, and until they become materials capable of decaying, and how they are used.
3. That independent of what is intended or is not a final product of production capable of decaying, for peaceful use or for destructive ends, the production processes are the same and unavoidably are those up to a quite high stage of production. Thus control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, the exclusion of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective guarantees for the protection of countries observing the agreements from possible violations and evasions should be done by the only unified international system of monitoring designed to perform all these interconnected goals.
4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially and exclusively questions of the domestic interest of individual countries, but rather have predominantly international importance.
5. That an effective system of control of atomic energy should be accomplished on an international scale and should be created through and subject to a multilateral agreement (hereinafter called a “treaty”) which must be undertaken and which should be performed by an international body within the framework of the United Nations, having proper authority, and accordingly organized, staffed, and supplied with everything needed for this purpose.
Only through the medium of such a system of international control can the development and use of atomic energy be placed outside the bounds of nationalistic competition, a consequence of which puts the security of all peoples at risk. Only through the medium of such a system can the benefits of a broad exchange of scientific information and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes be assured. Only such a system of control would deserve and enjoy the support of the peoples of all countries.
6. That an international agreement which puts the production and use of atomic weapons and their possession outside the law is an essential part of any such system of international control of atomic energy. An international convention in this direction, if it turns out to be the only instrument, will not be able to a) “ensure” the use of atomic energy “only for peaceful purposes”, and b) to ensure “effective guarantees through inquiry and with the employment of other methods to protect the countries observing the agreements against possible violations and evasions*, and thereby will not be in a position to satisfy the requirements of the provisions about the competency of the commission. In order to be effective such an agreement should be an integral part of a treaty which provides for the creation of an all-embracing system of international control and backed by proper guarantees in the form of international observation, inspection, and control adequate to ensure the observance of the terms of the convention and “protect the countries observing the agreements against possible violations and evasions.”* Then the decision that part three of the above report should, along with other things, contain the following recommendations:
Based on the conclusions of the commission presented in part two of this report the commission makes the following recommendations to the Security Council with respect to the questions covering the provisions about the competency of the commission which are interconnected with the recommendations and are inseparable from those provisions which together and as a whole form the fundamental principles and foundations of the organizational mechanism needed to achieve the goals presented in the provisions about the commission’s competency.
1. A strong and all-embracing international system of control of atomic energy should be created which strives to achieve the goals presented in the provisions about the commission’s competency.
2. Such a system of international control of atomic energy should be created and its scope of operation and functions determined by a treaty through which all member countries of the United Nations will have the right of participation with equal rights and responsibilities. An international system of control should be announced as in force only when the members of the United Nations whose participation is necessary to ensure its success obligate themselves to accept it and give it support by signing and ratifying the treaty.
3. Among other things the treaty should include provisions:
a) about the institution of an international authority (hereafter the “authority”) within the framework of the United Nations having the power and appropriate responsibility necessary and proper for the effective implementation of the terms of the treaty and to immediately fulfill its everyday responsibilities. Its rights, powers, and responsibilities, as well as its relations with some bodies of the United Nations, should clearly established and defined by treaty. Such powers should be sufficiently broad and flexible in order to allow the authority to handle a situation which might be created in the sphere of atomic energy in connection with new discoveries. In particular, the authority should bear the responsibility for the dissemination between all countries of an exchange of primary scientific information about the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, for the prevention of such use for destructive purposes, and for stimulating its use for the good of the peoples of all countries.
the authority should have definite responsibility in the sphere of research and development in order to henceforth remain in the forefront of atomic science for the purpose of greater effectiveness in the development of the use of atomic energy for the good of humanity and the prevention of its use for destructive purposes. The authority should be furnished with the exclusive right to conduct research in the sphere of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.
the decisions of the authority adopted in accordance with the powers entrusted to it by treaty should guide the actions of national bodies concerning the control of atomic energy.
However, when implementing the functions prescribed to it the authority should interfere as little as possible in the actions of national bodies concerning the control of atomic energy or the economic plans and the private, corporate, and governmental relations in individual countries;
b) about appropriately providing the accredited representatives of the authority with the right to unhindered entry into or exit from sites, or access within its boundaries during which the national or local authorities should not place obstacles when they are performing inspections or other responsibilities;
c) about a prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons and its possession for all countries who are parties to the treaty, and as well as for all their citizens;
d) about the disposal of any existing reserves of atomic bombs whatsoever;
e) about the precise determination of the means and methods of establishing violations of its terms, condemning such violations as international crimes, and establishing the nature of the measures with respect to the mandatory implementation and imposition of appropriate punishment on individuals and states found to have violated these provisions.
The legal or other processes to determine violations of the treaty and punishments for violations should have an immediate and specific nature. The authority should immediately report to the countries who are parties to the treaty and the Security Council about serious violations of the treaty. When dealing with such violations the permanent members of the Security Council should agree not to use their right of veto to protect a violator of the terms of the treaty from the consequences produced by its incorrect actions.
The provisions of the treaty would be utterly ineffective if in any such case the mandatory provisions of the treaty were ineffective by virtue of the employment of a veto by countries which voluntarily signed the treaty.
The treaty should encompass an entire program of putting into effect a system of international control of atomic energy and provide a plan for the conclusion of some transitional period and a gradual step-by-step methodical and conditional sequence, leading to the complete and effective establishment of a system of international control of atomic energy.
In order for the transition to be completed as fast as possible and in conditions of security [and] complete equality for all, this commission should observe the transitional stage as it is prescribed by the treaty, and should have the power to determine how a certain stage or stages can be considered complete and when the last stage begins”.
*the quotes are taken from the provisions about the competency of the commission as they were presented in article 5 of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946.
received via VCh
at 0030 19 December 1946
A copy of a report to be submitted to the Security Council, detailing a commission's conclusions and recommendations for future control of atomic energy.
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