December 16, 1966
United Nations Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry, 'Our Lobbying on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Draft)'
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Our Lobbying on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Draft)
United Nations Bureau
The United States and the Soviet Union are making progress on drafting a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is thought that both countries would enact a joint draft of the treaty soon. Before the draft is finalized, we will convey our views as soon as possible to the countries concerned, particularly the United States, to ensure that these ideas are reflected in the draft. (Our basic stance on nuclear non-proliferation is described in the instructions for the 21st UN General Assembly, of which related sections are attached.)
1. The U.S. is the first country to which we will propose our views, and the proposal will be made through the Ambassador to the United States Takeuchi. Then it will be considered whether it is necessary to make approaches to other countries.
2. The following are the proposals to the United States (if we approach countries other than the United States, each version shall be prepared in accordance with the proposal made to the U.S.)
(1) (Our views on international politics relating to nuclear issues would be expressed as an introduction – created separately by regional bureaus [within the Foreign Ministry])
(2) Our country believes that it is desirable to conclude the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, regarding Japan's accession to the Treaty, in view of our requests, Japan would like to decide its stance after reviewing the complete version of the text of the Treaty.
(a) To achieve the objective of nuclear non-proliferation, all nuclear countries, including communist China and France, should join the treaty.
(b) At the same time, it is important to involve as many non-nuclear countries as possible, especially those having capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, and to fully respect the stances and views of these countries.
(c) From this perspective, our country believes that it is necessary to meet the following requirements in concluding the treaty:
(i) In this treaty or in a separate declaration, the nuclear countries clearly express their intent that they will continue to make every effort towards disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.
(ii) Appropriate measures are to be taken to ensure the security of the non-nuclear countries. At least the treaty should not harm the security of each country.
(iii) Our country believes that any functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should not be undermined in any way. Considering this viewpoint, it is absolutely necessary to secure the following two points:
(a) This Treaty does not prejudice the right of non-nuclear states to allow foreign countries to deploy (so-called “introduction”) nuclear weapons in their own countries.
(b) This Treaty does not prejudice the right of non-nuclear countries to consult with nuclear states regarding issues such as planning of nuclear strategy plans and deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
(iv) The duration of this Treaty should be limited to about five years at the outset to allow all countries to review their stance at the end of the term.
(v) Regular and timely meetings of the parties can be held to review any issues relating to the Treaty (including disarmament efforts by the nuclear countries).
(d) In addition, the international safeguards system should be developed and strengthened to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
(e) Peaceful nuclear explosions are prohibited under the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, except for the case of an underground test. The issue of regulations on the peaceful use of underground nuclear explosions is a matter that should be considered in relation to the issue of banning underground tests. Therefore, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to regulate peaceful nuclear explosions by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In any case, from the viewpoint of balancing obligations and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear countries, it is not appropriate to prohibit peaceful nuclear explosions only for non-nuclear states.
3. The following are points that should be kept in mind when making the proposal:
(a) Of the matters listed in 2., the section on national security (c)(iii) shall be explained to the effect that the conditions are indispensable for Japan’s entry to the Treaty. With regard to other points, we will explain that these are our strong requests, and will avoid presenting them as Japan’s conditions for joining the Treaty. In addition, if the other party asks whether these points are conditions, the response should be along with the following lines: “Though it is not a condition, to what extent these points are reflected in the completed text will naturally be considered when Japan decides whether it signs the Treaty or not.”
(b) Regarding the relationship between the non-proliferation issue and the disarmament obligation of nuclear countries (Section 2(2)(c)(1)), if the other party asks specifically what disarmament measures we are seeking, the response should be along with the following lines: “As a non-nuclear country, Japan strongly opposes the exploitation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a tool for nuclear monopoly. Therefore, it is important to clarify the intention of nuclear countries to make efforts toward disarmament. On the other hand, in light of the current situation that Japan is effectively ensuring its security through U.S. nuclear deterrence, Japan has no intention of demanding disarmament in the form of unilateral reduction of the U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our country believes that disarmament measures should be determined while respecting the principle of military balance, and we fully understand the difficulties of directly linking the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with that of other disarmament measures.”
The Japanese Foreign Ministry plans to convey its views on the proposed nuclear non-prolfieration treaty to the United States, particularly its concerns about how it might affect the US-Japan security alliance and the balance between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.
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