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May 27, 1946

Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

In the Kremlin


27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.



[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]


[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]


[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,[20] Kocha,[21] Vlado,[22] Kidrich, Neshkovich.


Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."


[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."


Molotov: agreed.[23]


Stalin: Asks how was our trip.


Tito [says] it went well...


Stalin (chuckling, ironically): "How is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Shubashich?"


Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop.[24] And also Grol.[25]


Stalin (similarly): "And how is my `friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?"


Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...


[Tito:] "We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."[26]


Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.


Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"


Tito: "An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions[27] it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA[28] will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."


Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"


Tito: "Everything has been sown."


Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"


Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.


Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!"


* [Stalin] "How are Kardelj and Djilas?"[29][* Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by *__*.]


T[ito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."


S[talin]: "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).


T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].


Molotov: "But you still do not have Trieste...".


T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] importance...[30]


* During the time that Tito [...]*.




23:00 h.


[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]


...1) S[talin]: "On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for eco[nomic] questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for ex[ample], declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."


T[ito]: "No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary."


2) S[talin]: "...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...". (M[olotov]: "In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")


S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. "You have very good bauxite." T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha[31] - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.


3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.


4) The army.


S[talin]: "This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country."


S[talin]: "For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."


T[ito]: "... In Boka Kotorska[32] ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed."


S[talin]: "These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze [Academy]).


Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy] will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.


It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding nav[al] cadres.


We will assist you with the extraction of oil.


Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories."


5) Albania*.


[Further, two lines are crossed out:"S[talin]: "What do you think of [doing] with Albania?"


T[ito]: "Sign...".]T[ito] [with regard to the naval fleet]: "We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast."


S[talin]: "What exactly are you proposing?"


T[ito]: "To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat."


S[talin]: "This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies.[33] But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.


Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time" (at this he chuckled).


T[ito]: "Three times we put off Enver Hoxha's visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its-trans.] "sovereignty." ***.


[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by ******__******.]S[talin]: "Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?**** [**** Further text is crossed out: "They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him." This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?"


T[ito]: "I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic-trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular...


****** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness."


S[talin] agreed.******


T[ito]: "...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren't any kind of special problems."[34]


S[talin]: "They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?"


T[ito]: "We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements."


S[talin]: "We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need."


T[ito]: "Yes, we can take care of everything with them."


S[talin]: "Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you."[35]


S[talin]: after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.


Marko: "Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov[36] from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent."


T[ito]: "We can resolve this question with them."


S[talin]: "Good."


6) Bulgaria.


S[talin]: "Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?"


T[ito]: "No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the bourg[eois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian] position on signing a peace treaty."


S[talin]: "Correct, but they must be offered help."


7) Hungary.


T[ito]: "We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] polit[ical] situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with your advice."[37]


S[talin]: "Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?"


T[ito]: "There were provocations against us, but not in recent times."


S[talin]: "The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well."


T[ito]: (laughs): "We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki."


M[olotov]: "Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea."


S[talin]: "Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.] Many comrades have gone to Bulg[aria], but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov.[38] Currently we have there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign] Affairs."** [**Russian word used in document.]


T[ito]: "I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui[39] because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads."


S[talin]: "And did they really believe you?.."[40]


S[talin]: "And what further plans have you for tonight?"


T[ito]: "We don't have [a plan]."


S[talin] (laughing): "Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.] plan!" (laughing).


Vlado: "We accommodated ourselves to meet with you."


S[talin]: "Then we can have a snack."** [**Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: "to eat something".]


M[olotov]: "If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure."


At the villa***



[*** Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.]


S[talin]. Regarding Togliatti[41]: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather people and "guide" them - this he cannot do; he has difficult circumstances there.


Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.[42]


Jose (Diaz)[43] was good, intelligent. Passionaria[44] is not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.


In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the father"**** [****Russian word used in document.], is gathering people and resolving various questions...[45] Germans are nothing without orders.


The International - there's nothing to say.[46]


Referenda - "but it's nonsense"*****[47]


[***** Russian words used in quotes in the document.]


Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks.[48]


"Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sov[iet] Union."


The idea of revenge in Italy.


Realism and idealism of Benes:[49] realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).


"Firlinger[50] will go with the communists."


Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps.[51]


Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: "new"] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.


"We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."** [**Phrase composed of Russian words.]


"Slovenian*** [***Russian word used in text.] mercenary intelligentsia."[52]




"Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe..."[54]


Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is "a good man." - St[alin]: "I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."[55]


Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... "I will cure my migraine under his care."[56]


"Bevin - an English Noske"[57]


Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...


"Beriia - Marko - who will subvert whom?"[58]




[20] Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

[21] Koca Popovic.

[22] Vladimir Popovic.

[23] According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

[24] Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime-minister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs.

[25] Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall 1945. Following the first elections to the skupscina (parliament) in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted himself to the theater.

[26] Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly fictitious and deceptive character.

[27] Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and are even unable to support themselves.

[28] The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

[29] Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, minister without portfolio.

[30] Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).

[31] Known deposits of non-ferrous metals.

[32] The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

[33] Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the signing parties would render each other military and other assistance using all available means, if one of them "is brought into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action."

[34] Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of government Hoxha.

[35] The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer 1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel to Albania "via the government of Yugoslavia," that is, within the context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See "New documents on the Great Fatherland War," Kommunist [The Communist] 7 (1975), p. 52.) On the eve of Tito's visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj expressed to Lavrent'ev the opinion that USSR trade operations in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 108.

[36] Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.

[37] See note 19.

[38] Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister 1944-1946, activist in the union "Zveno"-a party belonging to the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov (see note 15), Stalin announced that "you must show your teeth to the rightist Zvenists" and that another prominent member of "Zveno," Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv - Sofiia (Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv [hereafter TsDA-TsPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 134.) Stalin's orders were carried out in both cases.

[39] See note 19. Pechui-Serbian name for the city of Pecs in Hungary.

[40] Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, ll. 51-52.)

[41] Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the Italian Communist party.

[42] Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at the time. Dedijer's description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 May 1946 states that "the leader" had mentioned a "great deficiency" in Thorez. "Even a dog that doesn't bite, said Stalin, shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can't do even that..." Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

[43] Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, died in the US.

[44] Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. Diaz's death.

[45] Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German communist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear who the writers referred to by "F."

Dedijer's account of the evening dinner mentions that Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already mentioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist party Klement Gottwald and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain Harry Pollit. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

[46] The phrase obviously referred to the impossibility of reestablishing the Comintern. Apparently Stalin told the Yugoslav delegation the same thing he had said ten days earlier in his meeting with Dedijer, Kolarov and Kostov, of which an unidentified record has been preserved, written most likely by Kostov. According to this account, Stalin told the Bulgarian delegation: "We will never reestablish the old style of the [Communist] International. It was created with the example provided by Marx, who expected that revolution would take place concurrently in all countries. However, this does not correspond to our current ideology." In additional remarks, Stalin criticized the Comintern, stating that its directives had tied the hands of the Communist party, which "we untied" "when we dissolved the Comintern." (See TsDA-TsPA under CC on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 138.) In reality, Comintern directives were issued by Stalin himself. And even following the announced dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, Stalin by no means had given up on administering via directives to the leadership of Communist parties-only the organizational forms and the concrete mechanism of such administration were changed. Thus, in speaking of the impossibility of reestablishing the "old style of [the Communist] International," he spoke only within that context. At the same time he discussed with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian guests his plan to set up a new organizational structure for the international communist movement: an informational bureau which would unite a number of communist parties. According to the Yugoslav delegation members' accounts reported by Dedijer, the question of establishing the information bureau was raised by Stalin during a conversation with Tito, and later during the joint meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, when he emphasized that the new organ must maintain an informational character and its decisions would not be binding on a communist party which disagreed with the decision. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 453, 471.) That the question was put forth in this manner is supported by the handwritten notes Tito made a few days after returning from Moscow. (See AJBT-KMJ, I-3-s/11, ll. 1-2.) Most likely these remarks, including the statement that there "can be no talk" of reestablishing the Comintern, were a tactical move intended to help his interlocutors "swallow" his idea to create the Informbiuro (Cominform) as some kind of entirely different "democratic" organ of which they had no reason to be wary.

[47] Possibly the reference is to the Greek referendum to be held on 1 September 1946 to decide whether to continue the monarchy, which was a focus of intense political struggle.

[48] Greece was at the time the arena of a sharp and intensifying confrontation which in the second half of 1946 began to erupt into an armed struggle between the partisan forces and the Greek government, with the former having been created under the leadership of the Greek Communist party and receiving assistance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and the latter relying on military support from Great Britain and, later, the USA.

[49] Eduard Benes (1884-1948) - president of Czechoslovakia. Attempted in the years immediately following the war to navigate between the USSR and the West, but was forced into resignation following the de facto coup carried out in February 1948 by communists relying on Soviet political support.

[50] Zdenek Firlinger (1891-1976) - one of the officials in the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic party, head of the Czechoslovak government in 1945-1946, actively supported the communist party, including during the coup in February 1948.

[51] Reference is made to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement delivered on 24 April 1946 to the ambassadors of USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, which officially put forth territorial claims on Poland for the so-called border region of Teshinskaya Silesia. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute regarding Teshin continued for some time following the end of World War II and reached its peak around late April-May 1946, on the eve of the first post-war parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia, held on May 26, a day before Stalin's meeting with Tito. From the record of conversation published herein, it follows that Stalin regarded the Czechoslovak announcement entirely as a pre-election maneuver. The question of Teshin was obviously raised by the Yugoslav guests, for even on May 7, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev, Tito inquired as to Moscow's opinion of the Czechoslovak demarche and informed him that the Polish ambassador to Belgrade had addressed him, Tito, with a request to influence the Czechoslovak government to renounce these claims. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 77.

[52] According to Dedijer's account, Stalin had spoken about the Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a play on words-"podlaya [sycophantic] intelligentsia" and "podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia." See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.

[53] Dedijer's book mentions that Stalin advised the Yugoslavs to plant eucalyptus, as this is the best tree for ship-building, and related how many years ago he had read in a book that this tree grows well in South America. So having received the seeds, he undertook to plant them in the Crimea where it took root very successfully and grew very quickly. Stalin promised to send eucalyptus seedlings to Yugoslavia. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 452-453.

[54] In Dedijer's account of the 27 May 1946 meeting these words are tied to an episode where, following a lengthy period during which the guests had sat at the dinner table, Stalin stood, walked over to the record player in the corner, and began to play record after record-all Russian folk songs. While listening to one of the records, he started to sing along and dance. Molotov and others present met this with exclamations of how robust Stalin was, from which followed Stalin's response about the laws of physiology, which dictated that he would not live long. Stalin added that Tito must take care of himself in order to be there for Europe. And further, according to this account, Stalin looked at Molotov and noted: "Viacheslav Mikhailovich will remain here...." He then proposed to Tito to drink to "bruderschaft" [brotherhood] (and then to all the other Yugoslav guests); they clinked glasses, embraced, and then "the leader" with the exclamation "I still have strength left!" grabbed the Yugoslav leader by the armpits and lifted him three times. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.) However, the Yugoslav political and cultural activist Josip Vidmar later maintained that, upon returning from accompanying Tito to Moscow, Kidric told of a different scene at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo: it was he, Kidric, who grabbed and lifted Stalin, and that the latter laughed and spoke compliments. See J. Vidmar, Obrazi (Ljubljana, 1980), p. 396.

[55] Prime-minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill (1874-1965), having met Tito in August 1944 in Italy, said this to Stalin during his visit to Moscow in October 1944. In actuality, Stalin by this point had already met Tito in person, when the latter secretly visited Moscow in late September.

[56] Djido-Djilas' pseudonym. Stalin knew from Tito that Djilas suffered from headaches.

[57] Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) - one of the leaders of the Labor party and a trade-unionist in Great Britain, foreign minister during the early years following World War Two. Gustav Noske (1868-1946) - German Social-Democratic activist, member of government following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, became famous as one of the organizers of the suppression of revolutionary action taken by the radical wing of the German labor movement.

[58] L.P. Beria (1899-1953) - member of CC VKP(b) Politburo, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dedijer's account states that Stalin joked about Beria and Rankovic, both in charge of security organs in their respective countries-who will subvert whom? According to this account, also present among the Soviet participants at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo, aside from Stalin and Molotov, were A. A. Zhdanov, Beria and N.A. Bulganin. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.


Stalin and Tito discuss economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Stalin advises Tito about improving the Yugoslav army and defense program and discusses the Soviet Union providing assistance in this development.

Document Information


Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated into English by Daniel Rozas

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