Report to the Political Committee on the Consultation Meeting With Comrade J. Andropov and Comrade A. Gromyko

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Report

to the Political Committee on the consultation meeting with Comrade J. Andropov and Comrade A. Gromyko.

A delegation of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee [KB], led by Comrade Zoltán Komócsin, visited Moscow between December 19 and 24 ­for the purpose of continuing consultation meetings and coordinating the 1967 party and mass organizational cooperation plans. The delegation had a conversation with Comrade Y. Andropov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Comrades Ruszakov ­and Kudryashov, Deputy Heads of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee, ­and other employees of the Foreign Affairs Department and Comrade D. Sevlyagin, the head of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) Information Department. The delegation met with Comrade A. Shelepin, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CC. Comrade Zoltán Komócsin was received for a short visit by Comrade L. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU.

The following questions were discussed during a total of approximately 9 hours of discussion with Comrade Y. Andropov:

1. Meeting of the European Communist Parties.

Despite the difficulties, the conference will probably be held in the first half of 1967. According to French and Polish information, the West European sister parties, with the exception of the Swedish, Norwegian and Dutch parties, are ready to participate in the meeting.

Among the parties of the socialist countries, the participation of the Yugoslav and Romanian parties is questionable. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) [Jugoszlávia Kommunistáinak Szövetsége, JKSZ] is of the opinion that 

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the consultation should be organized on a wider scale with the involvement of democratic organizations, but it is not clearly opposed to participation. The Romanian position is more negative. They oppose holding the meeting. Experience shows that despite all their opposition, they do not want to be alone, so it is expected that they will eventually decide to participate.

The parties taking a stand in addition to the Convening of the meeting must show a firm attitude. Our basic principle should be that the more parties take part in the meeting, the better, but the meeting must be held even if the above parties do not take part.

We must show a calm comradely attitude towards the parties absent from the meeting and their position must not be understood as eternally valid. At the meeting and in the time that follows, such a situation must be created so that the absent parties can later adopt what was accepted at the meeting. We must learn from previous mistakes, because, for example, if we had taken a more flexible position at the 1960 meeting and our wording had not been so categorical, the LCY would have joined the documents.

On the location of the meeting. There are capitals that cannot be taken into account, such as Berlin or Bucharest, but any other socialist capital is conceivable. According to the Soviet comrades, it would not be a good idea to convene the meeting in a capitalist country, because for Western countries it is only a political and tactical issue, and for us it is also a military issue ­. The CPSU is not categorically against the meeting being held in a capitalist country , but if the question ­comes up during the preliminary discussions, they will express their opinion.

The French Communist Party and the LEMP [Communist Workers' Party of Poland] are preparing to convene the editorial ­committee. Their proposal is that 4-5 parties from socialist countries and 4-5 western fraternal parties should be included in the editorial ­committee. According to the CPSU's opinion, even such a staff limit would create many difficulties in the way of convening the meeting.

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We have to take into account that parties such as the Romanian ask the question at which forum the number and composition of the editorial board was determined. There may be such opinions on the part of the absent or vacillating western brotherly parties. It would be advisable for all parties, if they wish, to be able to participate in the work of the editorial board.

Comrade Andropov emphasized that the Political Committee does not have a developed position on issues related to the convening of the meeting, which is expressed by his own opinion and that of the Foreign Affairs Department, which Comrade Brez3hnev knows and supports. Their opinion is that the representatives of each party should come together for a preliminary meeting, where the purpose and schedule of the meeting could be discussed, as well as what kind of documents should be prepared, and at the same time, the editorial committee could be formed, which could start its work immediately. Convening such a preliminary meeting two or three months before the meeting would greatly facilitate the work of the editorial committee and would also be useful from the point of view that controversial issues could be discussed here. The preliminary consultation is particularly justified if the first secretaries represent their party at the meeting.

It has not yet been decided whether the documents to be prepared by the editorial committee will be sent to the meeting participants in advance. If these are sent in advance, it is expected to make big waves, if they are not sent out and the Politburo of each party does not have the opportunity to study the documents, the comrades participating in the meeting will be in a difficult situation, even if they are the first secretaries, because on the spot have to take a position on various issues, it seems that this difficulty could be avoided by convening a preliminary meeting.

The purpose and nature of the meeting. It must be ensured that it is not a copy of the meeting in Bucharest. Of course, there will be questions that have already been discussed there and should be given a place here as well. However, the nature of this meeting is dictated by the fact that it is a party consultation.

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The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the following questions:

1. Coordination of the struggle for peace and European security by the communist parties of the socialist countries, as well as the communist parties, and social and mass organizations of Western Europe.

2. The exchange of the specific combat experiences of the communist parties. This would help those parties that have been looking for a way to improve their activities for a long time, e.g. The Communist Party of Great Britain, the Danish Communist Party, etc. It would help them to listen to the experiences of parties such as the Italian, French, and Spanish parties.

3. The unification of the European communist parties, the strengthening of proletarian internationalism, the preparation of the great conference, etc.

The specific tasks of the meeting may be:

1. Development of specific proposals for mobilizing the European masses on issues such as e.g. the dissolution of NATO, the fight against the revanchism of the FRG, pan-European cooperation and the creation of European security. /These are the opinions of several fraternal parties, collected by the CPSU Foreign Affairs Department/.

2. As an internal task and for internal use /this would not be published/, some plan must be drawn up for the conduct of the struggle of the communist parties, for the coordination of the methods of struggle, for the organization of various campaigns, their direction, timing, etc., in such matters as e.g. the fight against the revanchist aspirations of the FRG, the attitude towards the new government of the FRG.

In addition to the internal ones, some parties also proposed to discuss certain sub-issues. The Italian Communist Party e.g. proposes a meeting of the European left-wing forces, as well as the convening of a European workers' congress by the social democrats and trade unions­

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and the Belgian comrades mobilized the masses in order to withdraw from NATO. It is conceivable that the consultation will also deal with these sub-issues.

The deliberations, the appeal of the European communist parties could be issued, which could address all progressive left-wing forces, primarily workers, social democratic parties, and trade unions. In addition to the invitation, it is also possible to prepare another document, possibly several documents. This would make the situation easier because the individual sub-questions could be recorded in separate documents. In this way, separate internal resolutions and documents could be developed for the communist parties and trade unions.

The preparatory meeting should be convened at the level of Politburo members and CC secretaries. The editorial committee should be composed at a similar level, and its working groups should be formed from the apparatus of the foreign affairs departments and the apparatus of the Peace and Socialism editorial office.

The secretariat of the meeting could continue its work for two or three months after the conclusion of the meeting, to collect the opinions and resolutions related to the meeting. It is also possible that we ask the French and Polish parties for this task.

It is possible to issue only a statement of facts about the meeting. This would facilitate the participation of individual parties, so e.g. of the Yugoslavs. This method would also make it possible to discuss the communist parties more often.

2.         The big meeting of the fraternal parties. No new moments have arisen since the last conversation . It turns out to be correct, we moved the issue of deliberation out of the deadlock. A long study preceded the raising of the question and there are many advantages in favor of deliberation.

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So far, 64 parties have taken a positive stance. The Chinese, the Albanians, the Romanians, the New Zealanders, the Dutch and a few other parties are openly against the consultation.

The Workers' Party of Korea - as Comrade Kim Il Sung ­said during his last visit to Moscow - is in favor of the consultation, but one must understand their difficult situation, which arises from the Chinese neighborhood. He also said that the Chinese Communist Party had already ­raised the convening of a special meeting on two occasions, citing that the so-called together with Marxist-Leninist parties, 34 parties want to participate in this conference. The Workers' Party of Korea and the Workers' Party of Vietnam did not accept the Chinese proposal.

KimIl Sung did not categorically reject participation in our meeting and stated that they would study the issue.

The Workers’ Party of Vietnam expresses its well-known position, according to which the meeting is necessary, but they cannot imagine their participation without the Chinese Communist Party. On the other hand, they announced that they would not take any action against it if the meeting were to be convened.

The Japanese Communist Party was initially categorically opposed to the deliberations. Lately, they have not taken a stand either against or for him.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia binds participation to conditions, above all, they make it dependent on what kind of documents are accepted. Despite all this, their participation seems likely.

The Romanian Communist Party, the Dutch, Swedish and Norwegian parties openly oppose the creation of the conference.

Apart from pints, approx. There are 15 parties that ­you have to fight for. These include e.g. also the Danish Communist Party, which has not taken part until now due to its internal difficulties.

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The position of the CPSU on the nature of the deliberations is the same as that of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) [MSZMP]. The CPSU also holds the view that none of the absent parties should be cursed, but while the problems related to the Chinese Communist Party ­may be avoided at the European conference, this will not be possible at the grand conference. There is no need to deal with ­China's internal affairs, but ­it is absolutely necessary to talk about their separatist activities. We have to take into account the changes that are taking place in China and we will have to act according to the given situation.

Regarding the document to be proposed for adoption, there are different ideas even within the CPSU CC. There is a point of view that a large document is needed that covers and discusses all the important problems of our time. According to another view, it is sufficient to record the current situation and define the tasks. There will be a need for further discussions on the question of space.

It is possible that the LCY ties its participation to the amendment of the declarations of 1957 and 1960. Revoking the decisions, or finding that they were incorrect, would not be correct. It is possible to record in the document that Yugoslavia is a ­socialist country, etc., but self-criticism would not be good, because the Chinese Communist Party would cling to it and claim that our position was incorrect on other issues as well,

There would be no report at the meeting, but speeches on the international situation, the national liberation movement, the fight against imperialism, etc. It is precise that all zones of the world are adequately represented at the meeting.

The date of the meeting has not been set. The conditions ­are right, you have to work on the proper preparation, but it takes time to be able to convene. There is no need to hurry with the convening, the date and agenda cannot be discussed yet.

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3.         About the Chinese Communist Party, China's internal situation.

Comrade Brezhnev gave a detailed report at the last plenum of the CPSU, in which he stated that the "cultural revolution" was the result of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party in the last 6-7 years. After the communes, the folk smelters, and the implementation of the Great Leap failed and they lost seven years in the industry and nine years in agriculture, they began to correct the mistakes. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others tried to correct the failures of the Mao Zedong policy with the help of about 3.5 million party workers. This adjustment took place without Mao Zedong, even against his will, and Liu Shaoqi and the others practically fought against Mao Zedong whether they wanted to or not. While the army stood behind Mao, Liu Saoji was supported by the party in this fight. The "cultural revolution" therefore means not only the struggle for power but also the clash of the two schools of thought. In this fight, it was not Liu Shaoqi who attacks, but Mao Zedong, who strives to destroy the party because he understood that after the failure of his great goals, the XX. Congress in China may result in nothing remaining of his principles.

The Chinese party and their cadres are not fundamentally anti-Mao, they only act against extremism. The fight that has been carried on until now, with specific Chinese methods, took place on the path of silent resistance. The struggle between the two lines eventually led to conflict. Sensing resistance to his line, Mao resorted to administrative means. The balance of power / 18 million party members against an army of 8 million forced him to create the Red Guard, primarily from school youth who, based on their education and origin (60% of them are not of proletarian origin) are suitable for action against the party. Red guards are not organized in factories and agriculture. There are various data on the number of members of the Red Guard, they talk about 3.5 and even 10 million members. It is also disputed whether Mao Zedong created this organization for a long or short time. It seems likely that when he created it, he had in mind a short period of time, but its operation did not produce the desired results. The cultural revolution did not resonate with the people. They failed to oust Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping from the leadership. It is possible that Liu 

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Shaoqi had already had a separate political program before, you can also imagine that he has only just developed it. The important thing is that he opposes the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and also opposes the extreme forms of anti-Soviet Union and anti-CPSU.

An important part of the "cultural revolution" is Mao Zedong's foreign policy. It has already been said openly by Chinese leaders, e.g. Chen Yi [Csen Ji], that the "Cultural Revolution" should be turned against the Soviet Union. He also expressed his hope that the Red Guards will also appear on the streets of Moscow. The question of the contrast between poor and rich peoples, which had already succeeded in creating confusion among some peoples, was given more prominence. ­This theory of theirs is now also applied to the internal area and they talk about the contradictions between the poor people and the rich leaders. In our countries, these views do not have a significant impact, but their efforts should not be underestimated either. We also have immature young people, poorly paid people, there are those who find it attractive to be able to hit the ministers, who like this "real" democracy.

/Comrade Andropov quoted from letters secretly received from Chinese citizens, which were signed in the name of ordinary party members, but presumably came from persons in senior positions. In these letters, a thorough Marxist analysis of the internal situation in China is given, and it is basically the same as explained above./

The leadership of the Communist Party of China strives to be cautious ­in issues related to China and clearly states that it ­does not identify the Chinese party and people with Mao Zedong and his group.

In its propaganda and agitation activities related to China, the CPSU strives to ensure that the press does not unjustifiably publish anti- Chinese articles. At the meetings, we emphasize the importance of good relations with ­the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also that the interests of socialism must be protected against the Chinese leaders.

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Soviet-Chinese economic relations, cultural cooperation, and delegation exchanges are maintained. The CPSU still considers it important to maintain the Soviet- Chinese friendship treaty, because it obliges the Chinese.

4. The situation of the Korean Workers' Party and Kim Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union.

The CPSU is generally satisfied with the development of Soviet-Korean relations. During the meeting in May, Kim Il Sung explained that he would not go to China or the Soviet Union. Now he came to the Soviet Union on his own initiative. Communique did not appear about the visit, but he did not hide his presence, he often appeared in public. Kim Il Sung also visited Romania for two days from Moscow.

Kim Il Sung condemns the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party towards the action unit. He considers the cultural revolution dangerous for the forces of socialism, including Korea. While the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party used to only call them centrists, now they classify them as revisionists.

Economic problems were not discussed in detail, but from what the Korean comrades raised in this regard, it can be inferred that they want to prepare in case the Chinese break off relations with them. Kim Il Sung asked the opinion of the Soviet comrades on the Vietnam and China issues, as well as on the issue of the Great Council.

The CPSU leadership has no illusions about Korean behavior. Koreans openly say that they also have differences with the CPSU, although they do not specify them. At the World Congress of Trade Unions [Szakszervezeti Világkongresszust, SZVSZ] general council meeting in Sofia, as is known, they voted against the exclusion of the Chinese. However, it should not be overlooked that they did not march out with the Chinese.

The appropriate tactic is not to squeeze them, not to attack them from the door in order to improve relations. It is advisable to develop

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economic and cultural relations and, within the limits of possibilities, also party affiliations, but for the time being these do not need to be forced at a very high level. The CPSU is changing its party workers' delegation and there will also be a change of parliamentary delegation. Their expressions must be treated with understanding and it must also be correctly assessed that Kim Il Sung has nurtured the party in an anti-Soviet spirit for the last 5 years.

Kim Il Sung invited Comrade Brezhnev to Korea. It is possible that the visit will take place at the end of 1967.

5.         The Vietnamese comrades - On the occasion of Le Duc Tho's last visit - they said that either in the 1966-1967 season or in the 1967-1968 season they would deal a big blow to the Americans. In addition to the aid of 2 billion rubles provided so far, an additional 400 million rubles are requested, mainly in the form of weapons, missiles, and aircraft. A new moment, which the Soviet comrades evaluate positively, is that they requested the sending of Soviet training personnel.

6.         Since Comrade Brezhnev's visit, the behavior of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has been characterized by a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, they behave as if they have accepted the opinion of the Soviet delegation, concrete signs of which are that they did not call the extraordinary congress and emphasize the leading role of the party more strongly. On the other hand, they continue their particular line in their propaganda work, especially in the press. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is cast in the wrong light. In their textbooks, they describe the Soviet-German agreement in a distorted way. The Soviet leadership addresses these undesirable phenomena in an appropriate way. During Comrade Tito's visit to Moscow in January or February 1967, they will try to have an honest conversation.

According to the information of the Soviet comrades, both sides are satisfied with the Tito-Ceausescu meeting. During the conversation, the issue of the FRG came up, and the Yugoslav side took a more correct and principled position. The Yugoslavs are more determined against the revanchist aspirations of the FRG.

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Ceausescu expressed his opinion on the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet Union in relation to the Chinese question. Tito inquired about the living conditions of the approximately 250,000 Serbian minority living in Romania. Ceausescu responded sharply to this and stated that there was no question of that many Serbs, there were at most 25,000, but he did not say anything about the essence.

7. Romania will predictably continue to follow the same line as before. The situation within the country has improved to the extent that the previous harsh anti-Soviet propaganda has been toned down. Although there is some progress in Soviet-Romanian relations, the atmosphere is not honest now.

Their behavior within the CMEA ­can be partly explained by the fact that the interests of individual socialist countries are opposite. The contrast in the assessment of the Chinese Communist Party is neither uniform nor can it be explained by such reasons. It is also completely incomprehensible why they oppose the meeting of the European communist parties.

The main characteristic of the Romanian position is that it places its own national interests above the common cause. The communist parties do not have to fall into the boat of the Romanians, but they must make sure that the relationship with them is not strained to the point of rupture. You have to patiently look for ­the possibility of overcoming the opposites. No high-level Soviet-Romanian meeting has taken place recently. Comrade Brezhnev has a valid invitation to Romania, if he finds time he will visit.

8.         The reason for the characteristics of Cuban leaders is primarily to be found in their social origin. On the occasion of his visit to Moscow, Raul Castro said that the July 26 movement was the work of bourgeois elements, and within that they, as the children of landowners - who were brought up in a Jesuit school - represented the left. You can imagine what the right wing of this movement looked like. The Cuban leaders, due to their social origin and upbringing, find it difficult to cope with Marxism and are only now trying to master it.

The relations of the Cuban comrades with the Latin American communist parties are bad. With the exception of the Uruguayan and Bolivian parties, all 

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Latin American parties criticize them. These criticisms have some rational substance when they raise, e.g. that the leadership of each party ­has become old, does not fight actively enough, etc., but it is in no way correct to continue this criticism publicly. The Cuban comrades are trying to find the necessary forces to implement their avant-garde line. However, there are no such forces on which they can rely, unless they are the Trotskyists in Latin America, whose strength is also not significant. They failed in Africa, e.g. Congo. That is why the Castros are now active in Latin America, but it ­can be predicted that their efforts will not bring results, but even more damage.

When the question of Cuba's security came up, the Soviet leaders said that the best way to protect security was to manage to spend 10-15 years in peace. During this time, a lot is happening in the world, and it is quite certain that we will be able to talk to the USA in a different way. In order to preserve their security, you must primarily pursue a smarter policy in Latin America. To the Soviet opinion, Dorticós responded that their policy was not formed just now, it was a well-thought-out line they had long ago.

The situation and condition of the Cuban party is undeveloped. They have basic organizations and local management, but no elected higher body . There is some kind of political committee and secretariat, but their personnel composition and operation are not clear. The party will hold its first congress in June. Different forces are fighting each other within the party. Paul Castro fights for the mastery and validation of Marxism, there are also "leftist" forces within the party.

The situation within the country is difficult. The Soviet Union ­goes a long way in helping them, but that doesn't solve the problem. Due to their previous situation, the demands in Havana are very high, they cannot satisfy them and many problems arise from this.

There are still many unclear questions about Cuba. They have steps at times that are completely incomprehensible. It is very difficult to understand the frequent turns and changes in their behavior and positions.

/Comrade Andropov will visit Cuba in February/.

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The following questions were discussed during the discussion with A. Gromyko:

The internal policy of East Germany. In Comrade Gromyko's opinion, it will not change significantly compared to the times of Adenauer and Erhard. So far, there are no signs that such a change will take place.

On Kissinger's foreign policy:

1.         On the border issue, he takes the revanchist position of previous governments.

2.         On the issue of the two Germanys, his position is the same as that of previous governments. Kissinger puts it more delicately than Adenauer and Erhard, but essentially says the same thing. He does not recognize the GDR, he seeks to discredit and weaken the GDR in the political, economic, and cultural fields. This explains the sharp reaction of the leaders of the GDR.

3.         Kissinger also continues to fight for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In his statements, he says that they do not seek to have their own nuclear weapons, but they still aim to obtain such weapons within the framework of NATO. Brandt made a statement according to which there is no hope for a group acquisition of nuclear weapons either, but this was not stated in the government statement. In essence, therefore, they take the position of the previous governments on this issue as well.

Many statements were made by the new government that they want to improve their relations with the socialist countries. If the government's position on the above issues does not change, it does not seem possible to improve these relations.

So far, there has been no official response from the Soviet side to the statement of the government of the FRG, the issue is kept on the agenda and they are working on the development of an appropriate response.

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The issue of European security.

The activities of state and social bodies are based on the program adopted at the Bucharest conference.

Western European countries are dealing with the program and it is being discussed in governments and within NATO.

The British government developed some kind of proposal, which it handed over to NATO. According to their information, they consider our statement more acceptable with certain amendments, and they agree with several of its statements.­

The Italians are also studying the declaration and consider a series of questions worthy of consideration. [Amintore] Fanfani said that they agree with the position adopted on the border issue /due to Tyrol/.

In France, they agree with the goals of the program. Our position on the border issue is completely the same, but on the issue of the GDR, we differ. The NDK remains unrecognized, despite the fact that the creation of a unified Germany is not in their interest. Their position is therefore dictated by obvious class interests. De Gaulle showed a very flexible attitude full of illusions towards the Kiesinger government, and the future will show what this relationship will be like in the end.

The Federal Republic of Germany took a stand against the program. They also issued a statement on the issue of the GDR . They represent the former position on the border issue.

Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, etc. they consider the program to contain a series of questions of interest to them and worth studying. They sympathize with our position on the issue of the border and the possession of nuclear weapons ­, even if they have not voiced this openly so far. Compared to FRG, these countries also harbor certain illusions.

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Our position regarding the all-European meeting to be convened on the issue of European security can be summarized as follows.

1.         Mainly European countries should participate.

2.         All European countries must participate.

3.         It must be kept as soon as possible.

The majority of European countries are NATO countries as well as neutrals, I agree with you about the goal. On the other hand, the position is different in the sub-questions.

As regards the participation of some countries, England favors US participation. Others raise the same question more cautiously, e.g. the Italians. The NATO countries have therefore already raised, or will continue to raise, the question of US participation.

Regarding the proposal that all European countries participate in the meeting, the participation of the GDR is disputed. At the same time, they are not openly opposed, but this does not mean that they will not be if the question arises more specifically. We can have no illusions in this regard.

The date of the meeting is unclear. Preparations have to be started and this is equal to studying and discussing the issues. The date of the meeting cannot be postponed indefinitely. European capitalist countries are generally of the opinion that it should be prepared, but they do not talk about a date. Only the English talk about the fact that it will take 4-5 years until the meeting is held. They do not justify their position either, and it seems that there is no basis for this deadline. The French are also making preparations, but they are not talking about a date.

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The date of the meeting seems distant and a lot of work has to be done in order to create it. The crucial question is how the situation will develop in Europe. If different countries deal with the proposal and they embrace an issue such as the recognition of borders, this is an achievement in itself. It is also a result from the point of view of isolating the Federal Republic of Germany. We can count the discussion of the program itself as a result.

[signatures]

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