Debré, Michel Jean-Pierre 1912- 1996

The French decision to join EURATOM was conditioned on the regional agency not impinging on national nuclear programs. As early as 1955, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet had instructed French negotiators that “Euratom will not be an obstacle toward the possible decision of France … to build nuclear weapons.”  While EURATOM’s jurisdiction would be limited to negotiating purchases of fissile materials, promoting trade with the United States and the United Kingdom, and exchanging reactors designs and civilian technology among members of the Atlantic community, Couve de Murville credited EURATOM with a fringe benefit: monitoring West Germany. In this spring 1960 letter to Prime Minister Michel Debré about revising the treaty, he warned against the removal of EURATOM controls over raw uranium and thorium or enriched uranium. Their removal, he cautioned, would create a dilemma: “either abandon the idea that German’s renunciation of atomic armaments could be enforced or support the enforcement of equivalent controls under the West European Union, which … would interfere in the direction of our programs and the development of our nuclear weapons.”

On May 15, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev met with French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris to discuss the fallout from recent incidents involving US reconnaissance aircraft violating Soviet airspace. Khrushchev emphasized the Soviet Union’s outrage over these acts, labeling them as aggression and a threat to sovereignty. He called for the US to acknowledge its violations, condemn the actions, hold those responsible accountable, and commit to ceasing such provocations. De Gaulle expressed regret over the incidents but maintained that espionage was an inevitable reality of modern geopolitics. He assured Khrushchev that he would convey the Soviet statement to US President Dwight Eisenhower but noted that France had not participated in planning the reconnaissance missions. The discussion also touched on broader themes of disarmament and international cooperation, with Khrushchev reiterating the USSR’s readiness to engage in the summit only if the US changed its course. De Gaulle stressed the necessity of dialogue to prevent future incidents and achieve détente. Both leaders reaffirmed their nations' desire for peace but left the resolution of the immediate crisis contingent on US actions.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.