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Foster, William C. 1897- 1984

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Popular Documents

October 28, 1966

The Issue of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Conversations of Comrade Gromyko with US Government Officials During the 21st Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA)

This document includes accounts of several conversations between Soviet officials and US diplomats, including Andrei Gromyko for the Soviets, and Dean Rusk and Arthur Goldberg for the Americans. The most pressing topic discussed during these meetings was figuring out mutually acceptable language to mollify Soviet demands that the NPT contain explicit prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries not just directly but through a military alliance, namely, NATO, remembering previous US attempts to nuclearize NATO through the Multilateral Force (MLF). Some attention is paid to fears not just of the Soviet Union but the US and other NATO allies as well about the FRG acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition to the focus on the semantic differences in the Soviet and American drafts of the NPT, the document emphasizes that one key area of common ground between the Soviets and Americans is the importance that an agreement be reached sooner rather than later before more countries acquire nuclear capabilities.

November 22, 1966

Concerning Roshchin's Conversation with Foster on November 17, 1966

This note summarizes a conversation between Alexei Roshchin and William Foster concerning Foster's views on individual provisions of the Soviet draft of the NPT, with Foster's primary concerns pertaining to Article I. The main issue of contention between the Soviet and American drafts is whether to explicitly prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons on a group basis or within an alliance, as the Soviets desire, but to which the Americans do not want explicitly stated in the Treaty. Roshchin conveyed the readiness of the Soviets to continue discussions on Article I, to which Foster's response that he would need to coordinate with the White House on the official posture of the US government toward the new Soviet language on the issue.

July 1, 1966

Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Karl Carstens, State Secretary at the West German Foreign Office, 'Disarmament and Related Problems'

In this conversation, West German State Secretary Karl Carstens told ACDA director William C. Foster that Bonn was still committed to a “hardware” solution, “if not in the form of an MLF than in some form.” Refraining from making any commitment, Foster wanted to leave the question “open.”

March 27, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster’s Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT'

During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”

March 10, 1967

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger'

To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”