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Indira Gandhi, 1982

Gandhi, Indira 1917- 1984

Indira Gandhi, 1982

Popular Documents

November 9, 1968

Speech by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

Transcript of a speech delivered by Prime Minister Indra Gandhi at the dedication of the Homi Bhabha Auditorium detailing her person experiences with Homi Bhabha and expressing her belief in the need for continued scientific investment for India.

August 1, 1953

Memorandum from Conversations with the Daughter of the Prime Minister of India, INDIRA GANDHI

L.D. Kislova recounts, in a diary entry, a conversation with Indira Gandhi, daughter of Prime Minister Nehru, on the night before her departure from Leningrad. Gandhi discusses the difficulties Nehru faces in his rule of India, arguing that nobody could replace Nehru and continue the democratic reforms he has put in place.

February 26, 1989

Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 4:00 p.m. - 5:40 p.m.

George H.W. Bush and Zhao Ziyang discuss Sino-American relations and China's reform and opening, in addition to the situations in Korea, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union.

July 1974

Intelligence Community Staff, Post Mortem Report, 'An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974'

This partial release of the July 1974 post-mortem investigation analyzes why the CIA and its sister agencies failed to predict the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Two problems were especially important: 1) the lack of priority given to the Indian nuclear program for intelligence collection (further confirmed by the January 1972 INR report), and 2) the lack of communication between intelligence producers (analysts and estimators) and intelligence collectors (spies, NRO, etc.). The low priority meant that intelligence production “fell off” during the 20 months before the test (from October 1972 to May 1974). Moreover, there may have been a lack of communication between producers, with the “other guy” assuming that someone else was “primarily responsible for producing hard evidence of Indian intentions.” Trying to explain the lack of follow-up on relevant “raw intelligence,” e.g. Pinjanians’s surmises about the Indian nuclear program, the post-mortem saw no “sense of urgency” in the intelligence community, which may have “reflected the attitudes of the policymakers.” Another problem was that the intelligence community focused more on “capabilities” than on “intentions,” which implicitly raised the difficult issue of breaching the nuclear establishment or Indira Gandhi’s small circle of decision-making. The substantive discussion of satellite photography has been excised, but the recommendations were left intact, including the point that “The failure of production elements to ask NPIC [National Photographic Intelligence Center] to exploit photography that had been specifically requested from the National Reconnaissance Office suggests a weakness in the imagery requirements system.” The implication was that NRO satellites had imagery of the Thar Desert that could have been scrutinized for suspect activity, but no one asked NPIC to look into it.

January 12, 1972

Note about a Meeting of Foreign Minister Otto Winzer with the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi

Minutes of a meeting between East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The two begin by discussing the national liberation of Bangladesh, which both countries express mutual support for. They then discuss India-Pakistan hostility, and blame Western countries for trying to keep the two states separate, and express hope for peace between India and Pakistan. Winzer then pushes for Indira Gandhi to normalize relations with East Germany. Gandhi gives a non-committal response, and the report concludes by speculating that Indira Gandhi has not yet decided to normalize relations, noting that some of her advisors will wait on the opinions of the FRG before moving on GDR.