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Indira Gandhi, 1982

Gandhi, Indira 1917- 1984

Indira Gandhi, 1982

Popular Documents

November 9, 1968

Speech by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

Transcript of a speech delivered by Prime Minister Indra Gandhi at the dedication of the Homi Bhabha Auditorium detailing her person experiences with Homi Bhabha and expressing her belief in the need for continued scientific investment for India.

February 26, 1989

Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 4:00 p.m. - 5:40 p.m.

George H.W. Bush and Zhao Ziyang discuss Sino-American relations and China's reform and opening, in addition to the situations in Korea, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union.

August 1, 1953

Memorandum from Conversations with the Daughter of the Prime Minister of India, INDIRA GANDHI

L.D. Kislova recounts, in a diary entry, a conversation with Indira Gandhi, daughter of Prime Minister Nehru, on the night before her departure from Leningrad. Gandhi discusses the difficulties Nehru faces in his rule of India, arguing that nobody could replace Nehru and continue the democratic reforms he has put in place.

December 22, 1980

Information about Results of the Visit by L. I. Brezhnev in India (8 to 11 December 1980)

Description of Brezhnev visit to India (1980 December), and summary of his discussions with Indira Gandhi and the Communist Party of India (ICP). With Gandhi, Brezhnev discusses a wide range of international issues, including increased US military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Gandhi both expresses sympathy for Soviet situation in Afghanistan but also calls for withdrawal of troops. Both sides criticize Pakistan for taking action to destabilize region, and both sides criticize China for policy on sub-continent; Soviets accuse china of "direct support for imperialist policy."

July 1974

Intelligence Community Staff, Post Mortem Report, 'An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974'

This partial release of the July 1974 post-mortem investigation analyzes why the CIA and its sister agencies failed to predict the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Two problems were especially important: 1) the lack of priority given to the Indian nuclear program for intelligence collection (further confirmed by the January 1972 INR report), and 2) the lack of communication between intelligence producers (analysts and estimators) and intelligence collectors (spies, NRO, etc.). The low priority meant that intelligence production “fell off” during the 20 months before the test (from October 1972 to May 1974). Moreover, there may have been a lack of communication between producers, with the “other guy” assuming that someone else was “primarily responsible for producing hard evidence of Indian intentions.” Trying to explain the lack of follow-up on relevant “raw intelligence,” e.g. Pinjanians’s surmises about the Indian nuclear program, the post-mortem saw no “sense of urgency” in the intelligence community, which may have “reflected the attitudes of the policymakers.” Another problem was that the intelligence community focused more on “capabilities” than on “intentions,” which implicitly raised the difficult issue of breaching the nuclear establishment or Indira Gandhi’s small circle of decision-making. The substantive discussion of satellite photography has been excised, but the recommendations were left intact, including the point that “The failure of production elements to ask NPIC [National Photographic Intelligence Center] to exploit photography that had been specifically requested from the National Reconnaissance Office suggests a weakness in the imagery requirements system.” The implication was that NRO satellites had imagery of the Thar Desert that could have been scrutinized for suspect activity, but no one asked NPIC to look into it.