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Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport) 1901- 1987

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Popular Documents

January 10, 1963

Memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the Secretary of Defense [Robert McNamara], 'Withdrawal of Italian and Turkish JUPITERs'

Taylor forwarded to McNamara the views of USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, and the DSTP on targeting and submarine deployment issues. According to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, it was feasible to deploy up to three Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. They could regain the same “operating efficiency” that they had achieved in their previous Norwegian Sea deployment. In Lemnitzer’s absence, General Lauris Norstad, who was departing as CINCEUR, opposed the withdrawal of the Jupiters as “weakening our nuclear capability” by reducing target coverage and by “destroying” the Jupiter’s “psychological” impact. DSTP General Power was also concerned about target coverage but did not foresee “basic problems as long as Free World missiles are targeted as an integrated package.”

December 24, 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision'

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

February 21, 1963

Memorandum from JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor to the Secretary of Defense, 'Deployment of POLARIS Submarines to the Mediterranean'

Consistent with the concerns about target coverage, the plan for Polaris patrols required the presence of at least one submarine in the Mediterranean. The overlapping patrols would begin when the U.S.S. Sam Houston entered the Mediterranean on March 28, followed by the U.S.S. John Marshall on April 10, and the U.S.S. Ethan Allen on 1 June. The Sam Houston could make a port call in Turkey, but the stopover had to occur when another submarine was in the Mediterranean. Taylor recommended the port of Glock as the site of a two-day visit, one day for a visit by officials and the second for a “daylight indoctrination cruise by designated observers.” The latter would be barred from sensitive “spaces” used for communications and nuclear propulsion.

December 1954

Message, President Syngman Rhee to General Taylor and his forces

In this Christmas Message, President Rhee addresses General Taylor and the US Forces. He praises the US troops for their victory against the communist aggression during the Korean War. Rhee recognizes America for continuing to “defend human liberty” not only in Korea but in all of Asia. Rhee ends the message with the goal of creating a “free, united, and democratic” Korea.

February 10, 1955

Letter, General Taylor to President Syngman Rhee

General Taylor emphasizes the important contributions the Korean National Railway has made toward the military effort and rehabilitation of the Korean civil economy. He informs Rhee that the US will soon reduce its rail supervisory personnel and the Korean government will now have to support and secure the future of the railway-including the new repair and replace program- to help maintain operation after the war.