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February 3, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Lunch Meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 31 January 1994

Kohl and Clinton review the state of NATO enlargement after the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. They view NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the best solution to engage Russia and to reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Both view the situation in Ukraine as a key factor in the search for Europe's post-Cold War order. "If anything happened in Ukraine, this would increase the pressure for the NATO accession of the Central and Eastern European countries," Clinton says.

August 24, 1991

National Intelligence Daily for Saturday, 24 August 1991

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 August 1991 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Lebanon, France, El Salvador, South Africa, China and Iran.

February 15, 1995

Memorandum for Kenneth C. Brill from Andrew D. Sens, 'Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany'

Kohl and Clinton have a wide ranging discussion on NATO expansion, crises in the Balkans, Chechnya and Northern Africa, relations with Europe, and other subjects.

September 9, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993

Kohl and Clinton discuss plans for NATO enlargement and the need to find a modus vivendi for an intermediate period as a way to balance Russia's engagement and the security interests of the Central and East European countries. Kohl has doubts over the feasibility of NATO enlargement but is willing to search for an intermediary solution.

November 27, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic on Thursday, 26 November 1992

Kohl and Panic review the situation in Yugoslavia and Panic's standing in the domestic struggle with Milosevic. Panic emphasizes his readiness to recognize Slovenia and Croatia reiterating that a democratic Yugoslavia could be a catalyst for peace in the entire region. Kohl remains doubtful arguing that Milosevic would not support such a policy.