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March 11, 1964	National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-64, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China' The CIA assesses Taiwan's future in the wake of France's normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The report covers US-Republic of China relations and likely developments in Taiwan's internal security, politics, and international recognition.
June 20, 1961	National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-61, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China' This National Intelligence Estimate about the future of the Republic of China assesses the status of the China debate at the United Nations, KMT efforts to retake the mainland, the political status of local Taiwanese in the ROC, and other political and diplomatic issues.
February 4, 1957	Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier' Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.
August 27, 1957	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China' Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."
April 9, 1957	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China' Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."
October 9, 1956	National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China' This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."
September 10, 1954	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4/1-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.
July 7, 1977	Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China' Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.
December 13, 1982	Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m. Bush and Zia discuss the Soviet war in Afghanistan, China's relations with Pakistan and the US, the status of Taiwan, and the Pakistani nuclear program.
January 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment' The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle." This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.

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