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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 27, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973

    Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.

  • August 31, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, August 31, 1973

    Discussion between Galley and Blancard with Kissinger, Foster and Sonnenfeldt held in secret. Kissigner wishes to give the strategic assessment of France followed by Foster’s specific observances. Kissinger notes that the Soviets are expanding rapidly, and there is a need for a warning system. They discuss the importance of building up a deterrent, and the U.S. thinks it is feasible to assist the French in this regard. The French are asking for clarifications and information on MIRV and MRV. Kissinger discusses how these exchanges are not going through the normal channels, stressing the need for secrecy, though Congressional approval may be needed for some points, and they conclude by setting up a time for Foster to come to France.

  • July 05, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10239 to State Department, 'My First Meeting with President Zia'

    A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”

  • July 06, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10276 to State Department, 'My Final Meeting with President Zia'

    After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.

  • October 17, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

    The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.

  • October 25, 1982

    State Department Cable 299499 to US Embassy Islamabad, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

    In a follow-up message after his trip to Islamabad, Ambassador General Vernon Walters noted that at the end of the conversation with Zia the Pakistani President had given his “word of honor” that Pakistan “will not develop a nuclear device or a weapon.”