Panel commissioned by the White House and comprised of Zbigniew Brzezinski, William E. Griffith, John S. Hays, and Richard S. Salant recommends continuation of RFE and RL as covertly funded objective news services, along with VOA and RIAS, discontinuation of public solicitation of private financial donations to RFE, and (Hays dissenting) establishing a Radio Free China

Zbigniew Brezinski rejects North Korea's proposals for talks with representatives from South Korea as of limited significance.

Botha describes that neither South Africa nor Rhodesia can count on much support from the United States.

Zbiginew Brzezinski offers instructions on how best to coordinate tripartite talks between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, including how the U.S. should work with China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations on this issue.

Zbigniew Brzezinski reports that Park Chung Hee is interested in reviving talks between North Korea and South Korea and that the United States should also support an inter-Korean dialogue.

Zbigniew Brzezinski reported that President Park has directed that Panmunjom again be sounded out on reviving the stalled North/South dialogue and added Park's saying that the United States should push this as well.

The U.S. Department of State reports on discussions with China and efforts made to encourage the resumption of a dialogue between North Korea and South Korea.

Brzezinski briefed President Park on two exchanges with the Chinese leaders. They mainly talked about whether the Chinese leaders behave as spokesmen for Kim Il Sung or not.

Participants in the meeting included President Carter, Minister Vance, MP van Agt and also Min. Van der Klaauw, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, David Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach. Conversation revolves around TNF modernization and arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. Both parties discuss domestic difficulties shaping how these issues are presented and pursued.

Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt, and Minister Van der Klaauw. The conversation focuses on Dutch domestic sentiment toward TNF modernization and SALT II.

Officials from the US Department of State, the White House, the CIA, NSC, OSD, and JCS determine US policy toward South Korea in light of the events in Gwangju.

The memorandum contains Cristopher's analysis of advantages and risks to Ambassador Smith's proceeding with post-INFCE explorations.

In this lengthy transcript of discussions between Stephen Solarz and Kim Il Sung, Solarz poses questions about prospects for Korea's unification, exchanges between North and South Korea, and exchanges between North Korea and the U.S. In his response, Kim emphasizes the DPRK's views regarding the necessary preconditions for unification and increased cooperation between the two Koreas. Later, Kim Yong Nam continues to elaborate to Solarz on the North Korean perspective of unification and the role of the international community in perpetrating division.

In his National Security Council memorandum to Brzezinski, Donald Gregg notes that Kim Il Sung appears conciliatory toward the South during his conversation with Solarz. Gregg then makes recommendations on how the US and South Korea should respond.

Donald Gregg informs Brzezinski that Congressman Solarz had not forwarded the transcript of his conversations with Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Nam to South Korea.