Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • May 29, 1953

    Cable from Ambassador Charles Bohlen to John Foster Dulles regarding Transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany to Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Semyonov

    Bohlen informs Dulles of the transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany, which does not yet provide much indication of future Soviet policy in East Germany except the solidification of East Germany's continued existence under the control of the USSR.

  • June 17, 1953

    Cable from SECSTATE Dulles to HICOG Bonn, 7:02 p.m. EST

    Secretary of State John F. Dulles requests full report of implementation of Infoguide Bulletins concerning East Berlin demonstrations. Dulles states that USG believes the demostration present an excellent propaganda value.

  • June 18, 1953

    Telegram from Cecil Lyon to John Foster Dulles, Reporting on Developments in Berlin

    In a telegram following the recent uprising in East Germany, Lyon reports from Berlin that there is currently no reported action in East Berlin, and the inner city is now completely controlled by Soviet troops and police with orders that no one may enter or leave the Soviet sector.

  • June 25, 1953

    Summary of Discussion at the 151st Meeting of the National Security Council

    American response to East German protests, plans of action toward the Soviet Union, question of defectors from socialist countries, implementation of passive and active resistance in socialist countries.

  • July 10, 1953

    Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Allen W. Dulles

    In a telephone conversation, the Dulles brothers discuss their opposing views in regards to the future direction of Soviet policy following the uprising.

  • July 28, 1953

    Letter from James B. Conant to John Foster Dulles

    Conant reports the apparent success of a food distribution plan from West Berlin to the occupants of East Berlin. However, he informs Dulles of received complaints by British and French Allied High Commandants about unilateral action in Berlin, and the American lack of consultation of the Allied High Commission on these matters.

  • August 03, 1953

    Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

    When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

  • August 05, 1953

    Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (First Session)

    In early August of 1950, delegates from the United States and the Republic of Korea met to discuss the logistics for the forthcoming conferences centered on the creation of a strong US-ROK mutual defense treaty. The delegates also propose who can and should be present. While both sides agree that North Korea and China should be included, President Rhee advocates that due to India’s Prime Minister’s “pro-communist views,” India should not be invited.

  • August 06, 1953

    Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Second Session)

    During the second Dulles-Rhee conference, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles led the discussion with the subject of Korean rehabilitation. Rhee makes a few suggestions that both sides should consider if Korean reconstruction should take place. These suggestions include: 1) rehabilitating Korean productive industry, 2) directly allocating money for Korea’s rehabilitation instead of doing so through the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and, 3) prevent the importation of Japanese technicians to Korea. Dulles answers he will consider Rhee suggestions, however, the US will continue to aid Japan to prevent losing her to communism.

  • August 06, 1953

    Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

    In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

  • August 06, 1953

    Proposed Joint Statement by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles

    In this proposed joint statement, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles discuss the terms for the joint security pact between the ROK and the US.

  • August 07, 1953

    Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

    President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

  • August 08, 1953

    Cable from James B. Conant to John Foster Dulles

    Conant suggests that while US policy towards East Germany should, on principle, encourage the “spirit of resistance” brought about by the East German Uprising, it is believed that Communist authorities will continue to use brutal tactics to restrain such resistance, and therefore US initiatives towards the situation should be restrained as to not provide East German authorities an opportunity for more brutal repressions of the population.

  • May 10, 1955

    Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Comments on the Asian-African Conference from Capitalist Ruled Countries After the Asian-African Conference'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry summarizes (predominantly) Western leaders' statements about the Bandung Conference. Secretary Dulles expressed great satisfaction with the "useful and good conference," especially its role in "checking China," while Great Britain expressed strong disapproval of China's behavior at the conference and France was "shocked" that Algeria was discussed. Israel and Australia expressed regret that they were excluded from the conference.

  • November 14, 1956

    US Government Appraisal of Radio Free Europe Broadcasts

    Cord Meyer forwards to Allen Dulles a State Department assessment dated November 13, 1956, of Radio Free Europe Hungarian and Polish broadcasts. The assessment was requested by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and was prepared by State Department official L. Randolph Higgs, responsible for coordinating RFE issues with CIA, and Meyer, who objected to an initial State Department draft.

  • March 23, 1957

    Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd, 'Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request (2) Test Limitation'

    US-UK discussion of French nuclear weapons potential and efforts that could be undertaken to hinder or advance the their program. The French request for technical assistance from these two governments was also covered.

  • December 14, 1957

    John Foster Dulles, Memorandum of Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer

    Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer at a NATO meeting. Dulles learned from Adenauer that the French-West German project on nuclear weapons research would soon come to include Italy, to which Dulles expressed reservations and suggested a broader arrangement including the U.S. and the U.K.