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  • October 18, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

    Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.

  • October 18, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

    Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

  • October 20, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak)

    Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.

  • October 23, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962

    In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

    Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 27 October 1962

    Drozniak reports on his conversation with American journalist and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop about the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 30, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 October 1962

    Drozniak reports on information about the Cuban Missile Crisis - the US administration's opinion on Soviet missiles in Cuba, liquidating Guantanamo Base and missiles in Turkey.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

    Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

  • November 16, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 16 November 1962

    There is a belief within the US administration that Mikoyan was not successful in convincing Fidel Castro to adopt a Soviet point of view.