August 01, 1949
Letter, Frank Wisner to DeWitte Pool [Approved for Release May 6, 2019]
Frank Wisner counsels FEC executive secretary DeWitte Poole that the FEC, private but largely government funded, should consult closely with OPC and the State Department on issues of policy, budget, and personnel vetting.
September 13, 1949
Memorandum from Frank G. Wisner to [withheld], 'Policy Directive Governing Organization of Russian Refugees in Germany and Austria' [Approved for Release, March 2009]
George Kennan authorizes Frank Wisner to proceed with a central Russian émigré organization initially focused on émigré welfare and subject to US government policy guidance. Wisner directs Office of Policy Coordination staff in a cover memorandum to proceed with the project.
January 07, 1957
Memorandum from Frank G. Wisner for the International Organizations Division Chief, 'Reflections on Radio Free Europe's Present Position and Potentials; Lines for Poland, etc.' [Declassified September 19, 2016]
Frank Wisner, reflecting on the Hungarian Revolution, suggests that Soviet Communism is on the defensive and RFE broadcasts to Poland should discourage violence while supporting Party leader Gomulka’s efforts to gain more autonomy from the Soviet Union. IOD Chief Cord Meyer annotates the memorandum.
August 12, 1996
US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'
Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.