February 17, 1969
Telephone Conversation Transcript, Henry Kissinger and William P. Rogers
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for ratification and its chairman, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark), wanted to know where Israel stood on the Treaty. Believing that the issue should be handled at the White House level, Rogers proposed a meeting with Kissinger, Laird, and CIA director Richard Helms. Agreeing to schedule a meeting, Kissinger acknowledged that the issue was also “political.”
February 20, 1969
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Excluded from Katzenbach Committee Restrictions
Henry Kissinger informs President Nixon of the 303 Committee’s determination that RFE and RL are not “private voluntary organizations” and not subject to the policy recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee ban on covert federal funding
April 11, 1969
National Security Study Memorandum [NSSM] No. 40, Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence, 'Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program'
Kissinger initiated a formal bureaucratic process to address how the U.S. government should respond to the emergence of a nuclear Israel, a review process managed by Kissinger’s NSC staff, known as NSSM 40. Through the NSSM Henry Kissinger tasked the DCI, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report for the President that included the latest intelligence findings on the Israeli nuclear program and policy options with recommendations that the President could use in making decisions.
April 15, 1969
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Guidance to State and Defense Department on Our Attitude Toward Military Cooperation with the French'
Kissinger informs Nixon of a discussion he had with British Defense Minister Denis Healey about French/U.S. military cooperation. Kissinger has told Healey that the French have not approached the U.S., and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. Kissinger and Healey have agreed to inform one another should he be approached for such assistance by France in the future.
April 22, 1969
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations
This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.
June 27, 1969
Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Shriver and the National Security Council, 'Conversation with Schriver on Pompidou Visit, Military Cooperation with France, and Middle East'
Ambassador Shriver and Kissinger discuss wanting President Pompidou to visit the U.S. soon, and the former states that he will ask President Nixon to give his opinion on this and to approve it soon. Kissinger further states that he does not know if the President wants to aid France, either militarily or by nuclear means, though he does not think it is out of the question that the President may want to do so. Finally, Kissinger notes that the U.S. does not need French aid in negotiations with the Soviets but would not be opposed to their help in talks with the Israelis.
July 12, 1969
Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger
In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.
July 19, 1969
Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Israeli Nuclear Program'
The memorandum lays out substantive and significant line of thinking about the complex problem raised by the Israeli nuclear program. Kissinger thought it might be possible to persuade the Israelis that with all of the NPT’s loopholes signing it would not prevent them from continuing their weapons research and development. Kissinger also recognized the real possibility that the Israeli development momentum could not be stopped.
February 16, 1970
Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "Brandt's Eastern Policy"
A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger summarizing West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.
February 18, 1970
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'French-US Military Relations'
Kissinger briefs the president before his visit with Pompidou stating why the French may want a military alliance, as well as the problems associated with such an alliance due to the French attitude regarding NATO and nuclear forces. He then states the reasons why the U.S. should encourage French entry into the NPG and issues concerning joint targeting with the French. He further discusses issues of French/U.S. and French/British alliances that would be of possible interest of discussion when Pompidou visits the U.S. soon.
February 23, 1970
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Summary of My Conversation with President Pompidou'
Kissinger briefs President Nixon on his initial meeting with President Pompidou during his visit to the U.S. Pompidou told Kissinger that he wanted to discuss issues relating to the Soviets, Germany, and other defense matters. Financial issues and the establishment of a private channel of communication were other topics of interest.
March 10, 1970
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French'
Kissinger seeks Nixon’s approval on certain points regarding military cooperation with France. He seeks and receives approval to convey a message to Goodpaster to increase theatrical and naval cooperation with France; to rescind the U.S.-French R&D Steering Committee dealing with military technology; to deal with specific French requests for military assistance via Laird; and to convey a message to Prime Minister Wilson about U.S.-French military cooperation. The end of the document is the memorandum itself to Goodpaster from Kissinger on the points approved by Nixon to be sent to him.
March 10, 1970
Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "The Current Status of Brandt's Ostpolitik"
A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the current status of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.
March 16, 1970
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, 'French Requests for Assistance in Connection with their Missile Program'
Memorandum from Kissinger to Laird instructing the latter to draft a memorandum for the President outlining French requests for aid, keeping in mind the President’s desire to improve relations with France.
March 25, 1971
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Military Cooperation with France'
Kissinger summarizes the issues and options involved in three areas of potential aid to the French: 1) advanced computers, 2) technical assistance for their ballistic missile program, and 3) nuclear safety. He makes recommendations for each of the three areas, suggesting limited assistance for the first two.
March 29, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 103, 'Military Cooperation with France'
Outlines President Nixon's decisions regarding France's request for military aid with their nuclear program. The restrictions on exporting advanced computers will be loosened, allowing France to import more powerful models. Limited technical assistance for their ballistic missile program will be offered, but only in areas that won't jeopardize US security or "provide France with a distinct new capability."