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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 24, 1956

    Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary

    The CPSU CC Politburo meets to discuss the burgeoning crises in Poland and Hungary. Also participating was the leader of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny. Khrushchev described for the Soviet leadership his discussions with Gomulka on the Polish situation. Khrushchev urges patience in dealing with Poland. On the situation in Hungary, Khrushchev tells the Soviet leaders that actions were taken at the request of the Hungarian leadership.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable no. 319 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Vladimir Pavlíček)

    This cable sent to Prague confirms the decision by President John F. Kennedy to blockade Cuba, based on talks between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev. Despite no orders for the American warships to stop Soviet ships, Alekseev was preparing in anticipation for "dangerous provocations." Cuba canceled all PanAm flights, while at the same time allowing Czech and Soviet flights to proceed.

  • October 28, 1962

    Report to Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) General Secretary Antonin Novotný on European Military Situation

    This report to Antonin Novotny details the European military situation at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most NATO troops were on combat alert, but no increased activity or suspicious movements were reported. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces were at combat ready status to repel any attack by NATO.

  • October 30, 1962

    Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

    In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

  • November 29, 1962

    Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (Dr. Miloslav Ruzek), Report on Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations in Washington

    The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.

  • October 11, 1964

    Plan of Action of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period

    A detailed strategic miltiary plan the Czechoslovak People’s Army for war period.

  • 1965

    Lê Thanh Nghị, 'Report on Meetings with Party Leaders of Eight Socialist Countries'

    North Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi recounts his discussions with socialist leaders in the summer of 1965, just as the war in the south was heating up.

  • January 20, 1965

    Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Warsaw

    (Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.

  • January 20, 1965

    Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Warsaw

    Romanian meeting minutes of Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting concerning non-proliferation.