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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 27, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973

    Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.

  • August 17, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Programs'

    Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”

  • August 30, 1973

    Scowcroft to Kissinger on the Meeting with Galley

    Scowcroft briefs Kissinger for his meeting with Galley. This lengthy document includes information on what the French are specifically asking for, the outline for the meeting (as proposed by Kissinger, himself), Foster’s notes for the meeting expanded, and a reminder to discuss underground testing.

  • August 31, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, August 31, 1973

    Discussion between Galley and Blancard with Kissinger, Foster and Sonnenfeldt held in secret. Kissigner wishes to give the strategic assessment of France followed by Foster’s specific observances. Kissinger notes that the Soviets are expanding rapidly, and there is a need for a warning system. They discuss the importance of building up a deterrent, and the U.S. thinks it is feasible to assist the French in this regard. The French are asking for clarifications and information on MIRV and MRV. Kissinger discusses how these exchanges are not going through the normal channels, stressing the need for secrecy, though Congressional approval may be needed for some points, and they conclude by setting up a time for Foster to come to France.

  • September 05, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation—Kissinger and Schlesinger

    Kissinger and Schlesinger discuss possible concessions to France in light of potential changes in their government. Other topics of discussion include foreign relations with the Middle East, MIRV, and security in Europe.

  • December 03, 1973

    Memorandum for General Scowcroft, through W.R. Smyser, from John A. Froebe Jr., “Proposed WSAG Meeting on Korean Situation"

    National Security Council staff member John A. Froebe, Jr., suggests that the United States must respond to North Korea's claims over the Northern Limit Line.

  • December 21, 1974

    George H. Springsteen, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, 'Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation'

    In the course of a background paper on the nuclear proliferation problem and policy options, the State Department updated the White House on the state of play of the nuclear suppliers’ initiative: the British, the Canadians, and the Soviets had agreed to attend a meeting; the Germans would agree “if all key suppliers” (France) accepted; and the Japanese, who had also been asked, had not responded. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would take place to go over the issues.

  • March 03, 1975

    US National Security Council Memorandum, ROK Weapons Plans

    American officials in Washington, D.C., conclude that South Korea is in the initial stages of developing a nuclear weapons program.

  • June 24, 1975

    Memorandum for General Scowcroft from W.R. Smyser, “Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled Islands in Korea"

    Richard Smyser writes to General Brent Scowcroft about the defense of the five islands off the northwest coast of Korea and whether or not the defense of these islands is bound to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

  • August 01, 1975

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Economic Policy/Cyprus; French Nuclear Programs; Energy'

    Transcript of a conversation between President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The conversation opens with a discussion of economic policy and the embargo on northern Cyprus following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Giscard then asks about the slow progress of US technical assistance to the French nuclear program. Lastly they discuss energy and oil prices.

  • September 15, 1975

    Note for Ltg. Brent Scowscroft from John A. Wickham, Jr., “Defense of UNC Controlled Islands"

    John A Wickham, Jr., writes to General Brent Scowscroft about the U.S. defense commitment to the five northwest island groups and U.S.-South Korean defense coordination.

  • December 31, 1975

    Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines'

    This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.