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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • January 21, 1953

    VGU Information on Activities of the Swiss, Belgian, Dutch and Swedish Intelligences Services

    Report on the intelligence activities of some Western governments in Sofia. The report identifies the main areas of interest of the foreign intelligence services, names of some agents and names of collaborators.

  • October 12, 1955

    Letter, Kim Yong-shik of the Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee

    Report on Lagerfelt's plan of visit to ROK

  • December 12, 1955

    Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 12 December 1955

    Ivanov meets with Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili. Pan reports that Sweden and Switzerland are working to reorganize the Neutral Nations Korean Armistice Supervisory Commission.

  • December 15, 1955

    Letter, Kim Yong-shik of the Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee

    Call from Swedish Ministers in Japan on the agreement for the establishment of Korean National Medical Center

  • December 15, 1955

    Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 15 December 1955

    Ivanov tells Nam Il that the Polish government is in favor of Sweden’s and Switzerland’s proposal to reorganize the Neutral Nations Korean Armistice Supervisory Commission. Nam Il says he is still unsure about the motives of the Swedish and Swiss governments.

  • March 18, 1957

    Letter, Young Kee Kim to Chung Hwan Cho

    Minister Kim briefs Minister Cho on the textile trade between Japan and Philippines and the Artists' goodwill mission to Manila.

  • May 25, 1957

    Collection of Reports from Polish Military Attaches Around the World

    Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.

  • May 31, 1957

    Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

    This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

  • May 17, 1961

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Sweeden, 'Swedish News Publications’ Comments on the South Korean Coup'

    The Chinese Embassy in Sweden summarizes the reaction in the local press to the coup in South Korea.

  • October 29, 1962

    Cable from Swiss observer at the United Nations (Thalmann) to the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    A cable from Swiss observer at the United Nations (Thalmann) to the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the composition of a UN inspection team being sent to Cuba and to say that a definitive decision will possibly not be made until after U Thant’s return to New York.

  • October 29, 1962

    Cable from Swiss observer at the United Nations (Thalmann) to the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    The UN inspection team for the supervision of the dismantling of the Soviet bases was to be made up of representatives from Sweden, Mexico and Switzerland. Switzerland feels uncomfortable with being included in the mandate, due to their representation of American interests in Cuba.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the UN General Assembly, New York, 2:30 p.m., Friday

    In the XVII session of the General Assembly of the UN, the Delegates from Canada, Sweden, and Ghana referred exhaustively to the Brazilian draft about denuclearization of Latin America and expressed support to the ideas it contains.

  • June 23, 1963

    National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-63, 'Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems'

    This NIE comes to the general conclusions that “there will not be a widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the next 10 years” and discusses programs in various countries (Israel, China, Sweden, India, West Germany, Japan, etc.) This copy includes newly declassified references to the Israeli nuclear weapons program, including the conclusion that “the Israelis, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a nuclear weapon some time in the next several years.”

  • August 28, 1963

    Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'

    Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force

  • April 23, 1964

    Letter from Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone

    Noting new intelligence information on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, as well as the possibility of developments concerning Sweden, Hughes requested McCone to initiate a new estimate of nuclear proliferation trends, which would eventually become part of a October 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Hughes enclosed draft “terms of reference,” that included questions about the possibility of “clandestine” weapons programs and new technological developments that could make weapons development “easier” (perhaps a reference to gas centrifuge technology that the 1964 NIE would discuss).

  • October 21, 1964

    National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade'

    This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

  • December 10, 1964

    From the Diary of V. Kh. Man'ko, Record of a Conversation with the Correspondent of the Swedish Communist Party Newspaper, 'Ny Dag,' Karl Shtaf, 28 November 1964

    Shtaf mentions that he had a conversation with an Argentinian Communist Party leader in Prague, who reported about his trip to Cuba and meeting with Guevara. He also discusses the current situation of the Communist Party in Sweden.

  • July 15, 1965

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

    With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

  • January 20, 1966

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

    This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

  • July 28, 1966

    Research Memorandum REU-52 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Weapons Question Continues to Plague Swedish Government'

    In 1966, Sweden's Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Torsten Rapp, sought funds to support planning to produce nuclear weapons.