Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • May 31, 1944

    Letter No. 180 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

    Fu Bingchang (Foo Ping-sheung) relays his views on relations among the Great Powers, Soviet involvement in Xinjiang, and the rifts between the Nationalists and Communists within China.

  • June 05, 1944

    Letter to J. Edgar Hoover on Mikhail Kalatozov

    A heavily redacted letter from Ottawa reporting on foreign contacts made by Soviet film director Mikhail Kalatozov in Canada and Mexico.

  • September 30, 1944

    Letter No. 340 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

  • November 25, 1944

    Letter No. 425 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

  • May 25, 1957

    Collection of Reports from Polish Military Attaches Around the World

    Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.

  • May 29, 1961

    Memorandum from Deputy Chair, South African Atomic Energy Board, T. E. W. Schumann Regarding 2 June 1961 Paris Meeting on Bilateral Safeguards

    Memorandum discussing the impact on South Africa of new safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the sale and transfer of nuclear materials.

  • October 25, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry Official and Canadian Ambassador, Mexico City

    A meeting between the Mexican Foreign Ministry official and the Ambassador to Canada. The Canadian Ambassador says that planes from Cuba landing in Canada will be inspected for weapons, no planes from the Soviet Union will be allowed to flyover or land in Canada, and questions why the Mexican government voted the way it did on the US Resolution. To which the Mexican official replied that there were concerns over the use of military force against Cuba.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the UN General Assembly, New York, 2:30 p.m., Friday

    In the XVII session of the General Assembly of the UN, the Delegates from Canada, Sweden, and Ghana referred exhaustively to the Brazilian draft about denuclearization of Latin America and expressed support to the ideas it contains.

  • December 27, 1962

    Bulgarian UN Representative Milko Tarabanov, Report to Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo on Disarmament Negotiations

    UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session. The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO). Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

  • October 21, 1964

    National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade'

    This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

  • June 19, 1965

    Record of Conversation between Premier Zhou and Premier Sabry

    Zhou and Enlai and Ali Sabry discuss developments in Algeria, prospects for the Second Asian-African Conference, Egypt's tenuous food situation and trade relations with countries such as Argentina, Canada, and the US, and the latest news from Vietnam.

  • July 15, 1965

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

    With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

  • 1966

    Note on Certain Characteristics of Western Trade Developments for 1966 (undated)

    Report on the main aspects of international trade for the year 1966. The report covers issues such as developing countries’ growth in exports, the trade balances of various Western countries, East-West trade, and trends for 1967.

  • March 03, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

    Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

  • February 02, 1968

    Record of a Conversation with Canadian Ambassador to the USSR R. Ford

    S.P. Kozyrev and the Canadian Ambassador review Soviet policy toward the resolution of the Pueblo Incident and the connections between developments in Vietnam and the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.

  • April 25, 1969

    Telegram Number 1797/1800, 'Chinese Foreign Policy'

    The French Ambassador to London reports that China is eager to open up diplomatic relations with Italy and Canada and to enter into negotiations with the United States.

  • September 30, 1969

    Letter no. 429 from Franco Maria Malfatti to Aldo Moro

    Malfatti reports on his impression of the prospects of negotiations with the Chinese in regards to establishing diplomatic relations.

  • December 05, 1969

    Note on the Conversation between the Honourable Minister and the Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sharp, at NATO in Brussels

    Mitchell Sharp and Aldo Moro coordinate Canadian and Italian policies towards China and Taiwan.

  • February 23, 1972

    Memorandum from Ray Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, enclosing 'Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test'

    At the request of Undersecretary of State John Irwin, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared an assessment which included a detailed review of Indian’s nuclear facilities and their capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium as well as capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to a target. While India had signed agreements with Canada and the United States that nuclear reactors were to be used for peaceful purposes, the Indians were likely to claim that an explosive device for “peaceful” purposes was consistent with the agreements. Whether the Indians were going to test in the near future was in doubt. INR could not “rule out” one in the near future. Further, the “strongest incentive [to test] may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power.” All the same, “it our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years.” Weighing against a test were the financial and diplomatic costs, for example, “India's full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including the USSR) would be jeopardized.”

  • March 07, 1972

    US Embassy Canada cable 391 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

    U.S. embassy officials report on an interview with Lauren Gray, the chairman of Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), who had recently visited India. Having spoken with Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other officials, Gray believed that Sethna opposed a test and that as long as Sethna and Indira Gandhi were in office “there was no chance” that India would test a nuclear device, which would take three to four years to prepare. Other officials with the AECB disagreed with Gray's estimates - based on their assessment of Indian’s ability to produce weapons grade plutonium, they argued that it would take no more than a year to produce a device. They also pointed out that about 18 months earlier there had been a “blackout” of statistical information on plutonium production in India.