A copy of appointment of John W. Staggers as General Counsel by President Syngman Rhee in 1922

Soviet officers provide a sketch of the existing communist movement in northern and southern Korea in 1945 and suggest that Kim Il Sung should be a leading candidate to head the Korean government.

This document discusses the creation of an independent Korea. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) first presented the idea at the Cairo Conference in 1943. The United States supports the creation of a single Korean state while the USSR opposes it. The document discusses the importance of the answer to the unification question for the Soviet Union's political and economic future as well as its interest in the Far East.

In this telegram Shtykov reviews the activities of the Socialist-Workers' Party of South Korea, stating that it is comprised of reactionary elements and should not be allowed to join with the Workers' Party of South Korea. Lacking a broad base among the working masses, the Socialist-Workers Party would undermine the work done thus far in South Korea. Furthermore, Shtykov advises Ho Hong to be nominated leader of the Workers' Party of South Korea and and Pak Heon-yeong first chairman.

Shtykov informs Ignatev of South Korea's current inability to pay its debt for electricity to North Korea.

An intelligence report about both North and South Korea. The report explains what the situation currently is and what is projected to happen with Soviet and American interaction with their respective Koreas.

Molotov blames the Americans for the failure of the US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea and rejects the latest proposals put forth by Robert A. Lovett.

Stalin agrees to Malik's proposal regarding the situation in Korea, which calls for the creation of an All-Korean Temporary Assembly to resolve the peninsula's issues. The Soviet representative is to insist to the Americans that such a consultative body be established.

Responding to Molotov's letter about Korea dated September 4, Lovett writes that the US will refer the Korean issue to the United Nations and forego further bilateral discussions with the USSR.

Marshall speaks about Greece, Palestine, and Korea, as well as the international control of atomic energy and the role and structure of the United Nations.

Molotov reports his answers to several questions from Vyshinsky: he advises not to be so contentious with Marshall on private questions. On the Korean issues, Vyshinsky should remind the Americans about the terms of the December agreements calling for a united, democratic Korea and that Marshall's new proposals at the UN constitute a violation of these agreements. He approves Vyshinsky's position on the veto and the peace and security committee.

The Soviet Union's response to George Marshall's September 17, 1947, speech at the UNGA. Vyshinsky offers the Soviet Union's position on arms control, nuclear weapons, the UN, Korea, Greece, and other issues raised by Marshall

Molotov relates how the Americans have rejected the Soviet position toward establishing a temporary all Korean assembly. While there is some overlap between both positions, this issue has now been exacerbated by Marshall's move to decide it in the UNGA. The Soviets should respond to this move by reiterating their commitment to a self-determined form of government for Korea, which requires the Soviets and Americans to withdraw their troops.

Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.

Molotov writes that Vyshinsky must insist on the Koreans being invited to any discussion on removing foreign troops from Korea. If opposition to such participation holds, the Soviets should abstain from voting on the matter out of principle.

Vyshinsky outlines the amendment that the US has introduced regarding the Korean question. Moreover, Vyshinsky asserts the plan to object to the amendment and express why the amendment is not compatible with the proposal of the Soviets.

Vyshinsky clarifies that in case there is a decision to form a commission in Korea, it is not advisable for the US and the Soviets to take part. Vyshinsky requests for an answer on this issue.

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case of opposing proposals from the US, the Soviets should oppose and abstain rather than voting against them.

Vyshinsky outlines the proceedings at the UN, where discussion of the Korean question and the withdrawal of Foreign troops from Korea has led the Soviets to insist that the Koreans be invited to the discussions. He details counter proposals from the Americans, and Soviet responses to these resolutions.

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee.