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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • January 24, 1973

    Memorandum from Ronald I Spiers to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 'US – French Military Cooperation: Status Report'

    Description of weapons safety talks between US and French nuclear weapons technicians. The US team is impressed that the French employ safety tactics that are on par with US practices. A third talk would help cover any remaining issues related to safety, and would also be a time to discuss underground nuclear testing by the French. The French continue to press for more technical assistance for their missile program.

  • January 24, 1973

    General Staff of Defense (SMD) Summary Report of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee (Bruxelles, 6th December 1972), sent by Minister of Defense Tanassi to Prime Minister Andreotti

    Summary of the Defense Planning Committee discussions about the Action plan 1973-78, the problem of standardization, and the common infrastructures program of NATO. It is concluded that there is no realistic alternative to US forces in Europe, and that signs of positive change in Soviet intentions should not be trusted.

  • February 03, 1973

    Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Missile Assistance to France -- New NSSM'

    Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.

  • March 09, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Reports that the Belgian Embassy Counsel received the North Korean Counsel in his home, where the latter noted the establishment of a North Korean information bureau in France and a trade bureau in Finland, and proposed a formal or informal visit to Brussels. The Belgian reply was noncommittal; the North Korean also announced his intention to visit the Dutch Embassy.

  • March 13, 1973

    Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Contacts with North Korea'

    A memorandum from the Dutch Government which argues the benefits of opening informal contacts with North Korea.

  • March 14, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Schmelzer states he would like to be informed of the Belgian government's reaction to the report of the Belgian Embassy Counsel in Warsaw's report on his informal meeting with the North Korean Counsel.

  • March 15, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea

  • March 21, 1973

    East German Ambassador in Mogadishu Herklotz, 'Note About a Conversation with the USSR Ambassador to the SDR [Somali Democratic Republic], Comrade A. Pasiutin, on March 15, 1973'

    The two ambassadors discuss relations between East and West Germany, as well as Somalia President Siad Barre's trip to visit Arab states.

  • March 28, 1973

    Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan, "Growing Ties with Pyongyang"

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on growing ties with Pyongyang, UNCURK session, document concerning last week's confidential letter, and North-South dialogue.

  • April 19, 1973

    Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'US Assistance to the French Missile Program'

    Sonnenfeldt worries about documents concerning French nuclear aid passing through so many hands that their security is at risk; Kissinger is to tell Richardson to be as discrete as possible. Richardson has recently sent Galley information on the new areas of U.S. aid to France and of the talks that will be used to implement such aid. He informs Galley that we are willing to go ahead on the four areas recommended by his predecessor Laird: information on nuclear effects simulators; sales of small simulators; hardening technology; and ABM intelligence.

  • May 01, 1973

    Report by Diplomatic Advisor of the Prime Minister Andrea Cagiati, 'Atlantic Declaration'

    Cagiati analyzes Kissinger's speech from April 23 in light of conversations between Nixon and Andreotti. The US efforts to emphasize the importance of transatlantic relations and Europe's role in advancing democratic ideas could create an opportunity to relaunch the process of European integration.

  • May 10, 1973

    Agenda, Brazilian Delegation to West Germany, 'Program of the Meeting on Nuclear Cooperation'

    Schedule of the Brazilian delegation during a visit to various cities in West Germany (Bonn, Erlangen, Frankfurt) in February 1973. This mission is regarded as a critical step towards the establishment of the nuclear agreement with West Germany in 1975. The hand-written notes indicate the appointments and the sites to be visited by technical officials, engineers Carlos Syllus, who later became Director for Technology at Nuclebras, David Neiva Simon, who had been involved in the negotiations of the first Angra power plant with Westinghouse, and Ambassador Nogueira Batista, who would later become president of Nuclebras.

  • May 21, 1973

    Sixth Interkit Meeting, Record of Meeting with Boris Ponomarev and Konstantin Katushev

    This record of a meeting with the secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Boris Ponomarev, and with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev, addresses the anti-Soviet course adopted by Beijing. The discussion specifically refers to relations between China and the Communist parties of Albania, Romania, Australia, France, Italy, and New Zealand. The document also assesses the situation in Anwar el-Sadat's Egypt, in Hafez al-Assad's Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the main idea being that the Socialist countries should support the development of progressive Arabic states.

  • June 27, 1973

    Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland, 'Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation'

    Kennedy sends Hyland a review of the current status and future prospects of French aid as drafted by Denis Clift, as well as a summary of Dr. Foster’s most recent meeting with the French where they discussed new areas of cooperation. It also discusses the advantages if the French were to implement a missile warning system, and how French assistance might be a useful bargaining tool for the U.S. especially when it comes to improving French-European relations.

  • June 27, 1973

    Telegram by Ambassador Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'US-USSR Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war'

    The document describes initial reactions to the signing of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in Washington. The new agreement raises concerns over the bipolar focus of US-USSR relations, NATO's traditional strategy, and poses questions related to autonomous European defense.

  • June 27, 1973

    Telegram by Ambassador in Brussels Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Soviet-American agreement on preventing nuclear war'

    Summarizes the first comments from Min. Foreign Affairs on the agreement Soviet-American for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It is said that the philosophy of this agreement appears to have contradictions with regard to the classic strategy of NATO and diminish the credibility of the latter. Conceptions NATO military will have to be updated in light of recent agreements and ongoing trends around the Russian-American bipolarity. Just because you are at a "secondary" compared to the two supergrandi, Europeans should take the opportunity arising from this new trend to seriously address the issue of their defense. The prospect more desirable at this stage is an acceleration of proesso European unification, including the appearance of its "independent" defense.

  • July, 1973

    Possible Ideas for the Introduction of a Submission in the Politburo

    A report on Stage I of the CSCE prepared for the SED Politburo.

  • July 03, 1973

    Notes on a conversation between the GDR and FRG Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Otto Winzer and Walter Scheel, on 3 July 1973

    Notes on a conversation between the GDR and FRG foreign ministers on inter-German relations and the CSCE negotiations.

  • July 04, 1973

    Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The UN and North Korea'

    The memorandum notes the Minister's intent to recognize North Korea no later than year's end, if possible. It agrees with the suggestion made in a departmental study that confidential consultations with those countries most involved would be good to get rid of UNCURK and the attached UN Command. It does note that (1) recognition should be postponed until some kind of basic agreement between the Koreas has come about; (2) getting rid of UN Command would create a difficult situation for those American troops still present, which should be addressed.

  • July 06, 1973

    General Staff of Defense (SMD) Summary Report of the 13th NPG Meeting held in Ankara, 15th-16th May, 1973

    Summary of the 13th NPG meeting in Ankara in May 1973. Italian Minister of Defense, Tanassi, raises the issue of reviewing the process of launching nuclear weapons in order to secure the potential military and political advantages.