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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • January 07, 1958

    Code Message No. 337 from Deputy Minister Nazkowski to Szymanowski (Stockholm)

    Deputy Minister Marian Naszkowski offers guidance for swaying public opinion in Sweden in favor of the Rapacki plan.

  • November, 1963

    Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 'The Unshakeable Foundation of the Unity of the International Communist Movement' (excerpts)

    Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer describes Romania's new policies and approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union at a time when Romania was increasingly attempting to distance itself from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's military control. Toward this end, Mauer proclaims a policy of military disengagement and disarmament, declaring that mediation and negotiation are the only legitimate way of resolving international tensions.

  • November 20, 1963

    Minutes of the HSWP Political Committee Session - Views of Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka on the Cuban Proposal to Join the Warsaw Pact

    Władysław Gomułka views of Cuba’s proposal to the Warsaw Pact are recorded in the minutes of a HSWP Political Committee session. He explains why Poland opposes Cuba’s entry into the Warsaw Pact. The statements include concerns over the Federal Republic of Germany, nuclear and conventional weapons, and counter-revolution.

  • December 07, 1963

    Telegram number 7125/28 from Maurice Dejean

    Maurice Dejean summarizes recent reporting done on China by Soviet news agencies.

  • April 09, 1968

    Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party

    Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  • March 19, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 2 for Reconnaissance of the Maritime Front

    This document describes the present military situation in Europe as part of the "Soyuz-75" military exercise. Having inflicting damage on NATO with nuclear strikes, the Polish Maritime Front must now gauge the current condition and location of Western military forces in Europe.

  • March 19, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Operational Directive No. 2 of the Maritime Front

    This document chronicles continuing developments in the hypothetical "Soyuz-75" military exercise. After two days of battle, Eastern forces have overpowered the West. However, due to the deployment of nuclear weapons, the zone between the rivers Elbe and Oder has become radioactive. In light of the possibility that the West may soon deploy reserve forces, the document directs the Polish Maritime Front to plan an offensive towards Berlin, Hannover, and Brussels with the goal of defeating Western forces in northern West Germany. By the end of March, the Maritime Front is to occupy the Jutland peninsula and reach the North Sea coast at the border of France. Finally, the document directs the Maritime Front to a defense of its position on the North Sea and prescribes the use of nuclear weapons against enemy forces.

  • March 19, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Order No. 1 of the 4th Army

    This document describes the locations, movements, and goals of Warsaw Pact forces in their theoretical confrontation with NATO under the "Soyuz-75" military exercise.

  • March 22, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 1 of the Maritime Front

    This document describes the developing military situation in the hypothetical "Soyuz-75" military exercise. The Polish Maritime Front has successfully defeated NATO after five days of battle and reached the Weser River in Germany, which empties into the North Sea. However, Western forces retain the capacity to remobilize. Therefore, the document directs the Maritime Front to establish a defense of its position on the North Sea.

  • March 24, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 17 for Radioelectronic Warfare of the Maritime Front

    Part of the Soyuz-75 military exercise, this document updates the Warsaw Pact Maritime Front on the status of enemy communications capabilities. Due to their use of a nuclear weapon and conventional warfare, the Warsaw Pact forces have successfully disrupted enemy communication. The Maritime Front is now ordered to "suppress enemy radio relay communications" during impending military confrontations.

  • March 24, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Instructions

    In this hypothetical scenario, enemy forces have attacked Maritime Front troops with nuclear and chemical weapons. This document directs the troop leadership to modify their route to avoid contaminated areas, decontaminate all contaminated units, and repair and/or replenish their chemical equipment.

  • March 24, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Combat Instruction No. 04 of the Maritime Front

    Part of the Soyuz-75 military exercise, this document provides the Warsaw Pact Maritime Front with information on enemy losses and opportunities to mount an offensive strike. In this hypothetical scenario, the Maritime Front is charged with destroying enemy airfields, advancing westward, and occupying the North Sea coast, where their troops and allied navies will establish a defense of their position.

  • September 06, 1976

    Military Exercise Tarcza-76 Instruction No. 1 of the Northern Front for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

    This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise. The document describes the enemy's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons.

  • June, 1977

    Military Exercise VAL-77 Explanatory note to the concept of the operational-tactical exercise of allied fleets in the Baltic Sea, codenamed VAL-77

    This document provides an overview of the VAL-77 Warsaw Pact military exercise. Conducted in June and July 1977, the exercise simulated a joint seizure of the Baltic Straits region in order to provide practical operational experience and to improve coordination between ground, naval, and air forces. The exercise is predicated on a hypothetical scenario in which the "Westerners" initiate hostilities toward the "Easterners," prompting the Warsaw Pact allies to respond with force.

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • May 28, 1983

    CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (2)

    The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

  • October 14, 1983

    Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983

    Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

  • April 14, 1988

    Lecture by Sergei Akhromeyev, 'The Current State of Soviet Military Doctrine'

    This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”