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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 20, 1954

    Transcript, Zhou Enlai's presentation at the meeting of members of the Chinese delegation attending the Geneva Conference (excerpt), 5:00 a.m.

    In his presentation Zhou Enlai is encourages fellow communist countries who are to participate in the Geneva Conference to work together and perform well on the international stage.

  • May 30, 1954

    Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, (excerpt)

    Zhou Enlai highlights the main problems with the Communist negotiation strategy, which lies in lack of proper understanding of the complexity of the Indochina question. He also stresses that both sides need to discuss "three key issues, namely, dividing zones, ceasefire supervision and international guarantee."

  • June 08, 1954

    Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

    Zhou Enlai writes to to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee to inform them that the "big adjustment" plan of dividing Vietnam and drawing borders is most favorable to them. He cautions that the other plans are not favorable and that some small concessions might have to be made in order to avoid other less favorable plans.

  • July 03, 1954

    Main points, Zhou Enlai's presentations at the Liuzhou Conference (excerpt)

    A summary of the main points of Zhou Enlai's presentations given at the Liuzhou Conference July 3-5. Zhou touches on the topic of crucial questions the communist parties are facing, Korea and US intervention, and conditions for armistice.

  • July 22, 1954

    Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding the final plenary session of the conference (excerpt)

    In this telegram Zhou Enlai writes to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, regarding the final plenary session of the conference. "The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia" was signed on July 21 and Zhou met with the participating delegations, and celebrated with the delegations from Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China.

  • June 30, 1955

    Conversation of Mao Zedong and the Yugoslav Ambassador V. Popovic

    Conversation between Mao Zedong and Yugoslav Ambassador Popovic. Mao explains that the delay in China's recognition of Yugoslavia was because China was waiting for Yugoslavia and the USSR to mend their relations. Emphasizes the need for Communist unity and cooperation.

  • April 15, 1957

    Memorandum of Conversation with East German Ambassador Fr. Everhartze

    Meeting with East German Ambassador Everhartze concerning the recently concluded Chinese-Polish negotiations and the recent 1956 uprisings in Poland. The main purpose of the visit was to find out about the future visit ofZhou Enlai to Czechoslovakia, because the GDR has also invited Zhou Enlai to a state visit.

  • December 24, 1959

    Draft, Report to the CC CPSU Plenum, 'About the Visit of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the PRC'

    Soviet record of conversation between delegations from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China. They argue over China's policy toward India and toward Taiwan, and assert that China is pursuing a path that will hurt its Communist allies and risk war. Also notes the extent of Mao's personality cult in China.

  • May 12, 1961

    Notes on Soviet Political Work with China

    Covers a meeting that took place on May 12, 1961 involving the military attaches of various socialist countries, where Mao spoke about the China's political and ideological direction, perseverance through work and scarcity, and flexible military strategies, and lays out plan for fulfilling these goals

  • June 27, 1961

    Polish Notes on Results of Chinese Military Inspection

    Results of the inspection included the need for the Chinese to have more practice in tasks like grenade-throwing, establish better relationships between soldiers and officers, promote uniform ideology within the army, as well as to fulfill more of the soldiers basic needs. Motto is "small but good."

  • October 09, 1967

    CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. No. 026.235/67-3, 'Information about Most Recent Measures against the Activities of the Representative Office of the Chinese People’s Republic'

    Account of measures taken in response to provocative activities of the CPR (threats, propaganda, restrictions on freedom of movement, etc) and objectives in pursuing these responses.

  • April 28, 1969

    Embassy of the GDR in the PRC, 'Note about a “Club Talk” of the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of the fraternal countries on 25 April 1969 in the Embassy of the GDR'

    Ambassadors to China from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Mongolia discuss Chinese border provocations, the ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and other aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

  • January, 1972

    The International Activities of the Chinese Leadership and Conclusions for the Practice of the GDR's Relations with the PR China

    The GDR Foreign Ministry outlines the current shifts in the PRC's foreign policy within the international community under the Mao group.

  • July 03, 1972

    East German Report on the Fifth Interkit Meeting in Prague, July 1972

    This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Prague, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China. It makes reference to internal conflicts destabilizing the Chinese leadership. China is said to be enhancing its military potential, especially in the area of missiles and nuclear weapons. Its aims in foreign policy are to acquire a leadership position in the so-called "Third World", to expand its relations with capitalist countries, to damage the unity of the Socialist bloc, and to obstruct the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of influence of China on North Korea, Romania, and Vietnam, as well as on the Communist parties in Spain and Italy, the Socialist countries must improve their anti-Maoist propaganda efforts.

  • May 21, 1973

    Sixth Interkit Meeting, Record of Meeting with Boris Ponomarev and Konstantin Katushev

    This record of a meeting with the secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Boris Ponomarev, and with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev, addresses the anti-Soviet course adopted by Beijing. The discussion specifically refers to relations between China and the Communist parties of Albania, Romania, Australia, France, Italy, and New Zealand. The document also assesses the situation in Anwar el-Sadat's Egypt, in Hafez al-Assad's Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the main idea being that the Socialist countries should support the development of progressive Arabic states.

  • May 21, 1973

    Sixth Interkit Meeting, Record of Meetings with Oleg Rakhmanin and Konstantin Katushev

    These are the records of two meetings on the occasion of the Sixth Interkit Meeting. The first of these involves a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Oleg Rakhmanin, while the second is a meeting with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev. Both address relations between China and the Soviet Union. The documents discuss the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the Soviet security policy in the Far East and Siberia, and the position of countries such as Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania, as well as the critical situation in Vietnam and Cambodia.

  • July 09, 1973

    Report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on China's Policy toward Western Europe and Opposition against the CSCE

    This document contains information prepared by the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on China's European policy and Chinese opposition to the convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It states that China's overall goals are diametrically opposed to those of the European Socialist countries and their Communist parties, with Beijing identifying the Soviet Union as its primary enemy. In this light, the Soviet leadership maintains that actively confronting China in ideological and political terms remains one of the most important tasks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

  • March, 1974

    East German Report on Seventh Interkit Meeting in Budapest, March 1974

    This report, issued after the seventh Interkit meeting in Budapest, addresses unsolved socio-economic problems and internal party disputes in China. The new military strategy of the People's Republic as well as its economic development are examined. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries, especially with the US, are considered to be detrimental to international détente. The attendees condemn China for stockpiling nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, for extending its influence in developing countries, for strengthening the position of NATO, for interfering with the domestic policies of Vietnam, and for supporting the military junta in Chile.

  • January, 1975

    Informational Note from the Talks in the CC CPSU

    A note on the development of Chinese Anti-Sovietism and militarization.

  • June, 1975

    East German Report on the Eight Interkit Meeting in Ulaanbaatar, June 1975

    This report, issued after the eighth Interkit meeting in Ulaanbaatar, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China and the anti-Maoist propaganda measures to be undertaken by Socialist countries. There are no great expectations for a collapse of Maoism, even though the Chinese economy is developing slowly. China is acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for an armed conflict. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries are considered to be detrimental to international détente and directed against the interests of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries.