October 20, 1954
Talking Points from Premier Zhou Enlai’s Second Meeting with Nehru
Zhou and Nehru cover a large range of topics relating to China and India's international relations. The conversation begins by discussing the issue of Taiwan, in relation to China, then moves to the "adverse effects" of American involvement in the Afro-Asian region. The two then discuss the upcoming Afro-Asian conference.
April 28, 1955
Chinese Foreign Ministry Reference Document No.1
Chinese Reference Document No. 1 which includes the following articles: Ike says to correspondents that the USA is willing to hold direct negotiations with New China Britain wishes to be a loyal mediator between New China and the USA Burmese newspapers’ comments on Taiwan issue Nehru, Nasir and others speak to correspondents in Calcutta Menzies’s comments on Zhou Enlai’s proposal Kotalawela’s comment on the Asian-African Conference USA and Red China Bright prospect Bright prospect The Five States of the Colombo Conference and the USA Comments of the prime ministers of India, Pakistan and Egypt on the Asian-African Conference The Bandung Conference The Five States of the Colombo Conference and the USA. Allen’s comments on the Asian-African Conference Pakistan and Egypt on the Asian-African Conference
May 17, 1956
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Pakistani President’s Exclusive Conversation with American Reporters'
The Pakistani President stated that Islamabad's warming relationship with the PRC did not mean a move away from the US. He reaffirmed Pakistani commitment to the Southeast Asian defense treaty and the Baghdad Pact while urging the US to recognize the PRC and advocating an increase in Sino-Japanese trade.
June 30, 1956
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'The Main Themes of Pakistan’s Diplomatic Activities'
The report claimed that the two main themes of Pakistani diplomatic activities are 1/Winning the support of foreign leaders for its position on the Kashmir issue and 2/Breaking away from its isolated position and resolving its financial difficulties. Pakistani diplomatic stance toward China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France and the Arab League was examined.
March 03, 1977
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Seoul, 'Approach to Pakistanis on US-North Korean Contacts'
Stern reported that acting Foreign Minister Yoon was aware of NK-Pakistani-US communications. He reassured Yoon that the president policy of not holding discussions with North Koreans without participation of ROK had not changed.
September 05, 1978
'Ambassador’s Talk with General Zia,' Embassy Islamabad cable to State Department
Ambassador Hummel describes a conversation with General Zia. They discussed the cancellation of the French reprocessing project, disputes over the Pakistani-Afghan border, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTRO).
September 15, 1978
'Congressional Consultations on Pakistan,' State Department cable 235372 to US Embassy Vienna
Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.
November 14, 1978
'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' US Embassy Pakistan Cable 1119 to State Department
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan advises against informing the Indian government about U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. It would have an "adverse impact" for the U.S. government to be seen colluding with India by Pakistan.
June 06, 1979
US Department of State Cable 145139 to US Embassy India [Repeating Cable Sent to Embassy Pakistan], 'Non-Proliferation in South [Asia]'
U.S. State Department cable states that the Carter administration has “reached a dead end” in its efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology in South Asia. The State Department is wary of taking too strong an approach to Pakistan’s nuclear endeavors, given the security ties between the two countries and concerns about Pakistan’s stability.
September 08, 1979
Anthony Lake, director, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State Vance, 'The Pakistan strategy and Future Choices'
Anthony Lake, director of the Policy Planning Staff, writes to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about available options to deter Pakistan’s further proliferation while still maintaining “good relations.” Lake suggests exploring the idea of pressuring groups and countries providing aid to Pakistan, and wonders whether the sale of F-16 fighter-jets could sway Pakistan’s military to scale back their nuclear effort.
January 31, 1980
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”
March 23, 1981
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan and the US: Seeking Ways to Improve Relations'
A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on the desire of the Pakistani leadership to improve relations with the U.S. and negotiate a more substantial aid package. The report warns against becoming too close to General Zia, as close relations with him “might harm future relations” should he be swept from power.
June 11, 1981
Lewis A. Dunn, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Implications for US Policy of a Pakistani Nuclear Test'
Memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggests that the prospects for dissuading a Pakistani nuclear test were dimming and suggests possible U.S. responses should detonate a device.
August 20, 1981
Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation'
In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
November 21, 1981
Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or)
Secretary of State Haig writes to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) to explain possible U.S. courses of action with regards to military and economic aid should Pakistan test a nuclear weapon. A test, Haig said, would “in all probability” lead to an end of economic and military support.
June 17, 1982
Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products
A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
July 05, 1982
US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10239 to State Department, 'My First Meeting with President Zia'
A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”