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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from MichaƂowski (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)

    Cable from Jerzy Michalowski in Warsaw to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow, informing him of information from the DRV ambassador to Poland. The ambassador relayed that the VWP does not think that the situation in South Vietnam is not yet favorable, but that once it is they will seek a solution to hostilities at an international peace conference. They state that they will continue to ascertain the true intentions of the United States, particularly the provision for a ceasefire.

  • May 29, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7237]

    Cable from a Polish official in Saigan, Maneli, to Warsaw. detailing talks with Vietnamese officials and the Soviet ambassador. They discuss the investigations of the ICC, and the importance of probes into the Vietnamese situation. The Soviet ambassador notes that Soviet-Vietnamese relations have shifted.

  • May 31, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7353]

    Report from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, on his meeting with Pham Van Dong. Dong describes plans for South Vietnam's future government and neutrality, along with North Vietnam's compliance with the Geneva Accords. Reports that Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian was surprised at the high degree of Chinese participation in Vietnam.

  • September 02, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw)[Ciphergram No. 11289]

    Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, notifying Warsaw that the coup d'etat against Diem and installation of the American military junta is to be executed soon. Notes the inclinations of Diem and Nhu.

  • September 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 11464]

    Record of remarks by French ambassador Lalouette, sent by Polish official Maneli to Warsaw. In it, Lalouette notes that an overthrow of Diem and Phu would be bad for the possibility of peace in Vietnam. He states that leaving them in power, weakened, could lead to more useful negotiations.

  • September 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 11424]

    Summary of Commissioner Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu expresses a desire to establish a ceasefire, but notes his inability to make a concrete statement because of the United States. Maneli writes that Nhu's goal is an independent, neutral country, but that he is hindered by his tense, but still existent relations with the United States.

  • September 05, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 11462]

    Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, informing Warsaw of a meeting with Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu, which will also be attended by the Canadian and Indian ambassadors.

  • September 06, 1963

    Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency

    Report from the CIA station in Saigon on Ngo Dinh Nhu, stating that he is opposed to neutralism in South Vietnam. He also discusses the difficulties of negotiating or even communicating with Hanoi.

  • September 25, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12328]

    Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, reporting his meeting with a US official "Henry" (not Cabot Lodge), where they discuss Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Notes that it was an attempt to establish contact between US and Polish officials in Vietnam.

  • October 03, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12768]

    Report by Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, on his meeting with the North Vietnamese delegation. The North Vietnamese outline their stance toward South Vietnam and the United States, looking to exploit the tension between the latter and Ngo Dinh Diem and a refusal to cease fighting until the US allows for negotiations and the formation of government in South Vietnam. They also want to establish contact between the International Control Commission and the NLF.

  • October 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw)

    Telegram from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, explaining his frustrations in not being able to help the South Vietnamese situation, and defending his meeting with Nhu. Mentions the Buddhist crisis.

  • September 10, 1964

    Note on a Conversation by Tarka, Jurgas and Milc at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi [Excerpts]

    A conversation between three Polish delegates in Hanoi, where they discuss American activities in and attitudes toward Vietnam. They note that the Soviets are not as optimistic about the military situation in Southeast Asia as the Poles.

  • January 06, 1965

    Note No. 2/65 on Conversations with Comrade Shcherbakov about the Developmental Tendencies in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on 22 and 28 December 1964

    Conversation between the East German and Soviet ambassadors to Vietnam, on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Shcherbakov expresses his belief that China is increasingly using Vietnam as a pawn, and that, as a result, the Chinese are pushing the Vietnamese towards talks of negotiations with the United States.

  • August 20, 1965

    Record of Conversation between Premier Kim and the Chinese Friendship Delegation

    Kim Il Sung and the Chinese Friendship Delegation discuss agriculture issues in China and North Korea, the war in Vietnam, and confrontation with the United States.

  • July 06, 1967

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.247

    A Romanian assessment of North Korea's relations with Vietnam and involvement in the Vietnam War.

  • December 08, 1967

    Letter from Ambassador Brie of the GDR in the DPRK to Deputy MFA Hegen

    East German Ambassador to North Korea Horst Brie reports on the growing number of incidents at the Demilitarized Zone between North Korean forces and South Korean and U.S. forces. Brie offers his own analysis of the military situation in Korea while highlighting the different views of officials from Czechoslovakia and Poland.

  • February 19, 1968

    Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.047, Regular

    The Embassy of Romania in the DPRK conveys the views of Le Thet Hung following the seizure of the USS Pueblo.

  • January 02, 1969

    Letter, Korean Affairs Institute President Yongjeung Kim to UN Secretary-General U Thant, Concerning ROK's involvement in the Vietnam War

    Yongjeung Kim of the Korean Affairs Institute writes U Thant. Kim encloses his letter imploring Park Chung Hee to reconsider sending Korean soldiers to Vietnam and reliance on Washington's support for reunification and domestic affairs.

  • August 07, 1970

    Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

    ROK government consents to US troop withdrawals in exchange for a modernization program of ROK forces and a public statement from US about their continued support and protection of the ROK. Additionally, Park Chung Hee visits South Vietnam and confirms the presence of ROK troops until the end of the war.

  • December 31, 1970

    Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

    Kuzbari briefs Narasimhan on election and national security updates in South Korea, including the campaigns of Kim Dae Jung and Park Chung Hee; the debate over ROK forces in Vietnam; DPRK and ROK naval clashes over what DPRK speculates to be a spy boat but ROK states is a fishing boat; and discussion concerning the return of the North Korean pilot who crash landed in South Korea.