This report found “no hard evidence” that Iraq was intent on a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, considering the scope of Iraq’s “ambitious” nuclear program, intelligence analysts concluded that the Baath regime was covertly seeking a weapons capability to support its pursuit of regional hegemony and to match the perceived Israeli nuclear threat.

This issue of Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments includes a heavily excised article on Iraq, a piece on South Africa’s security prospects, and a apparently a third essay that has been wholly exempted. The essay on South Africa’s nuclear aims suggests that the arguments pro and con for a nuclear capability to deal with regional security threats are so powerful that “internal political and bureaucratic” consideration are probably more relevant for nuclear decisions.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."

This report by the Hungarian Embassy in Egypt describes the Egyptian government's surprise at the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear site in Iraq in 1981 and concludes that peace in the region must come through international cooperation and conferences.

Saddam Hussein discusses the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi reactor at Osirak, explaining why the attack was expected and his reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons development.

With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

Training manual for the Iraqi armed forces describes tactical uses of nuclear weapons during war. The foreword explains that "It is not unlikely that the Iraqi Army will participate in a future Arab-Israeli war, in which the enemy will resort to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

Iraq's WMD capacity as of October 1989 from Stasi Perspective

Pakistani scientist 'Abd-el-Qadeer Khan offers to help Iraq establish a project to enrich Uranium and manufacture a nuclear weapon.

Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN inspection committee on nuclear weapons, requested the United Statesprovide him with an aircraft so he could do an aerial survey of Iraqi lands.

These talking points, prepared by John T. Kriese who at the time was both chief of the Nuclear Energy Division at DIA and chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community, focused on the intelligence the US had available on the Iraqi nuclear program.

Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials discuss missile development and weapons programs in the wake of loses following the Persian Gulf War. They also discuss United Nations inspections which were currently ongoing.

Iraqi officials and United Nations inspectors discuss the history of Iraq's biological weapons development.

Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz reports on his visit to the United Nations and progress of UN inspections of Iraq's WMD projects.

Saddam and his ministers discuss the reorganization and rebuilding of the Iraqi nuclear program.

Saddam and political advisors discuss hostilities with Israel, Iraqi defense capabilities, and Iraqi-Syrian relations. American position as well as the position of many Arab nations are also discussed.

Saddam and his Security Council discuss Iraqi biological and nuclear weapons program. Focusing primarily on the biological file, they consider possible interpretations by Ekeus, director of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, as well as potential UN reactions.

Saddam, General Amir, and Party members speculate on various motivations behind a UN plan for monitoring the status of WMD's in Iraq. Saddam states that Iraq possesses no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, but he is informed that a "traitor" had falsely reported to the UN that Iraq was in the possession of a certain number of missiles. They discuss possible UN conclusions and assumptions regarding WMD's in Iraq.

Training, instructions, procedures, and precautionary measures against threats.